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Note from the editors
Claudia Padovani1 and Francesca Helm2
On October 3rd, 2016, the University of Padova hosted an international 
conference entitled ‘Rethinking the transition process in Syria: Constitution, 
participation, and gender equality’.
The event was the result of a joint collaboration between the Interdepartmental 
Center for Gender Studies (CIRSG) of the University of Padova and Euromed 
Feminist Initiative (IFE-EFI) in the context of a three year project called 
‘Supporting the transition towards democracy in Syria through preparing for 
an engendered constitution building process’. This was funded by the External 
Action Service of the European Commission and the Swedish government, and 
carried out by IFE-EFI. Support in the organization of the conference also came 
from the University of Padova’s research group, Next Generation Global Studies 
(NGGS).
The event featured some of the most relevant voices that have been struggling 
for peace and gender equality in the Syrian context over the past years, and the 
aim of the conference was to investigate the key role of women in the Syrian 
transitional process, in view of promoting gender justice and social change in the 
perspective of a solution to the conflict that has affected the country since 2011. 
Within this frame, the conference addressed questions such as: how should 
women’s demands and voices be placed at the forefront of the negotiating tables, 
in order to secure women’s fundamental rights and inclusive citizenship? How 
is it possible to envision drafting constitutional processes that acknowledge 
and include gender concerns? Under what conditions are such processes likely 
1. Interdepartmental Center for Gender Studies (CIRSG), University of Padova, Padova, Italy; claudia.padovani@unipd.it
2. Next Generation Global Studies (NGGS), University of Padova, Padova, Italy; francesca.helm@unipd.it
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to develop in Syria’s future, and what will women’s roles be in the political 
transition? 
Through a combination of academic reflection and advocacy expertise, historical 
and geo-political perspectives were presented, practical experiences from within 
the Syrian territory shared and discussed, and concrete proposals for gender 
aware transition processes to peace were introduced.
The conference was opened by the University of Padova Rector’s delegate for 
working and studying conditions, Renzo Guolo. Then introductory remarks, 
setting the tone for the discussion, were offered by the Director of the CIRSG, 
Claudia Padovani, and by the Project Coordinator of IFE-EFI, Francesca 
Rondina. Three thematic sessions followed, respectively chaired by Paolo 
de Stefani (Center for Human Rights, University of Padova), Annalisa Oboe 
(University of Padova Rector’s delegate for society, culture, and gender issues) 
and Francesca Rondina (IFE-EFI), with Alisa del Re (University of Padova) 
acting as discussant in the last session. 
1. About this volume
The present volume features most of the presentations made at the conference, 
in the diverse, direct, and lively styles – academic, advocacy, self-reflective 
– in which interventions were made. We edited all chapters so that this 
collection reflects the structure of the conference, as well as the productive 
collaboration between the University of Padova and IFE-EFI. Reflections and 
comments were made in 2016, over a year before this publication went to 
press, yet we feel the unprecedented character of this conversation – where 
the Syrian reality is critically investigated through women’s eyes – make it 
still highly valuable for all interested actors, particularly in view of future 
developments in the country and the whole region. Clearly, we make no claim 
of encompassing the diverse views of the many women’s realities and beliefs 
within the highly complex Syrian context, but only of those that have emerged 
within this important project. 
Claudia Padovani and Francesca Helm 
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The first part of the volume – entitled Transitional justice from a gender-sensitive 
perspective: CEDAW and UN Resolution 1325 – is devoted to a critical discussion 
of the relevance of the Security Council Resolution 1325 and provisions that 
followed, according to which women should be actively engaged as central 
actors and decision-makers in mediation and peace-making processes, and in 
post-conflict developments. In reality, during conflicts as well as in processes 
of transition to peace, women’s rights risk being bracketed; their concerns are 
not perceived as priority issues within scenarios of hardship, disorder, and 
widespread violence: a situation that ends up jeopardizing any effort in creating 
conditions for sustainable and lasting peace. 
Lilian Halls French highlights the role of international advocacy networks to 
promote women’s leading roles in peace processes, as IFE-EFI has done in Iraq, 
by supporting the adoption of a national action plan; an experience that may well 
inform future developments in Syria.
Lama Kannout, Coordinator of the Studies Committee of the Syrian Feminist 
Lobby (SFL), provides evidence from the ground, through the powerful voice 
of a Syrian woman who is directly involved in and affected by many of the 
processes described in this volume. Kannout gives examples of how the situation 
of many Syrian women is linked to the domestic laws, including the 2012 Syrian 
constitution, which discriminate against women, often through omissions (it 
contains no article prohibiting discrimination or violence against women) and 
the language used. Linking the local and international dimensions, Kannout 
also denounces the shortcomings in women’s participation in the official peace 
negotiations.
Two scholarly contributions follow, providing legal insights and critical 
accounts.
Paola Degani focuses on women’s experiences in humanitarian crises and 
on the actual impact of UN Security Council Resolutions, while stressing the 
importance of acknowledging the ordinary dimension of women’s discrimination 
and subordination in order to explain the intersection of women’s everyday life 
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and their increased vulnerability in conflict and emergencies, as well as the 
several links between violence and inequality. 
Sara Pennicino explores the relations between transitional justice and 
constitutionalism, paying particular attention to the issue of gender equality in 
constitution making. Examples from South Africa, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, 
Tunisia, and Kosovo, as well as Syria, make a number of issues emerge as 
problematic nodes, including accountability of state and non-state actors, the 
international dimension of transitional justice, and the role of NGOs, as well as 
the specificities of local contexts for the delivery of justice.
The second part focuses on The role of women in the Syrian uprising and in 
the political transitional process and helps to clarify how relevant women and 
women’s networks have been in the Syrian uprising from the very beginning; 
how crucial their role has been over the years to the survival of families and 
communities facing the conflict, inside and outside the country, and how 
fundamental it would be to properly acknowledge this role in current negotiations 
and forthcoming transition processes. 
Providing the context to the following testimonies, Massimiliano Trentin offers 
a general, detailed, overview of the Syrian conflict from a historical, political 
perspective. His contribution sheds light on the main events in the transformation 
of what was a political conflict in 2011 into a full-scale war until late 2016. He 
identifies the main features of the political regimes that developed alongside the 
conflict, starting with the government ‘regime’ in Damascus and the fragmented 
opposition consisting of groups with different sources of political legitimacy 
who shared only a common stance against the regime, the international alliances 
they made, and then the different sets of government that have developed during 
the war in various regions of Syria. 
Annalisa Oboe offers a vivid perspective of how women’s experiences are 
constrained between empowerment and disempowerment in uprisings and 
revolutions. Making reference to the historical moment of the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, she brings testimony of how women 
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may take up positions of responsibility and leadership in ‘exceptional times’. 
However, she also points out that this offers no guarantee that those roles will be 
acknowledged once the revolutionary moment has passed, and that normalization 
comes with ‘old style’ silencing and marginalization.
Joumana Seif and Mariam Jalabi, both members of the Syrian Women’s 
Network, a non-profit and independent network established in May 2013, speak 
from the standpoint of women in their engagement for social change and gender 
equality in Syria.
Joumana Seif opens her remarks asking if it is possible to obtain women’s and 
human rights under a dictatorial regime; a question that had been raised among 
activists, in private and confidential forums, many years before the outbreak of 
the Syrian revolution, in which Syrian women had the main role from the very 
beginning. Hers is a lively account of women’s initiatives since the revolution 
times, first within Syria and then – once the situation became too dangerous and 
many of them were forced to flee the country – by creating transnational networks 
of solidarity. It invites full appreciation of the many voices that have been, and 
still are, all too often marginalized, and yet keep trying to influence the official 
peace process at all levels. Seif concludes by listing a number of conditions – 
still relevant though the situation on the ground has changed profoundly over the 
past months – to be met in order to reach peace with justice.
Mariam Jalabi follows suit and stresses that to achieve gender equality in a 
future Syria, women would need to coordinate at every level of decision-making 
and contribute to establishing a constitution that institutionalizes a political 
space in which the equal rights and responsibilities of all Syrian men and women 
are protected and respected. The risk of women’s voices going unheard remains 
high, including in international negotiations where Syrian women are often 
expected to espouse apolitical positions in favor of peace, while their acting 
and being inherently political is denied; hence Jalabi’s call for strengthening 
women’s political participation – internationally and locally – and for enshrining 
gender parity in the foundation of any political solution to the conflict and 
throughout the process of rebuilding.
Note from the editors
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The third part of the volume, Launching the ABC for a gender sensitive 
constitution, introduces an inspiring and challenging tool: an ABC guide 
– promoted by IFE-EFI and written by Sylvia Suteu (University College of 
London) and Ibrahim Draji (University of Damascus) – that includes theoretical 
background, normative references, and concrete suggestions towards drafting 
gender sensitive constitutions. 
Co-author of the ABC guide Ibrahim Draji highlights states’ responsibilities and 
obligations to engender their constitutions on the basis of international instruments 
mandating gender equality and non-discrimination, which call on states to 
implement such treaties and incorporate them into their national legislation. 
Draji introduces the content of ‘democratic gender sensitive constitutions’ which, 
amongst other aspects, ensures substantive gender equality both in theory and 
practice, prohibits discrimination, and pays attention to how provisions of the 
constitution impact on gender. Providing several examples, he also discusses 
the basic principles that are of special importance for women’s rights, such as 
freedom, non-discrimination, separation of powers, and secularism.
Looking at the ‘implementation problem’, Francesco Biagi contributes a critical 
reflection on the potential for application of the gender equality principle in 
constitutional developments across the MENA region where, from Morocco to 
Egypt and Tunisia, constitutional reforms adopted following the Arab uprisings 
have significantly strengthened the provisions on women’s rights. His central 
concerns are the main factors that may support or constrain the crucial process of 
constitutional implementation: discussing the nature of the constitution, the role 
played by the constitutional courts, limitation clauses, international treaties and 
conventions on human rights, women’s representation in elected institutions, 
and the social, cultural, and religious context. Biagi calls our attention to how 
the implementation of ‘superior laws’ could concretely foster gender equality.
Finally, Maya Alrahabi, General Coordinator of the Coalition of Syrian Women 
for Democracy, recalls the realities of the Syrian conflict over the past years, 
and the suffering of women and feminist activists in that context: arrested 
and tortured, some of them killed. She denounces the international patriarchal 
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order that legalizes wars, and highlights the ways in which women advocates 
have attempted to foster conflict resolution, from the local and national, to the 
supranational level. Criticizing the tendency in the international community 
for the standardization of the role of women as victims of wars seeking peace, 
she argues for a sustainable just peace which will only be achieved by striking 
a balance between forgiveness and accountability, setting up institutional 
mechanisms, and realizing a specific set of principles to be enshrined in a 
gender-responsive constitution.
Together, these chapters make a strong argument in support of UN Resolution 
1325 and its follow ups: they call for explicit commitments from all parties 
to include women’s voices, knowledge, and determination in designing and 
building a future for Syria. At the same time, they illustrate the fact that solutions 
to the Syrian conflict, and to engendering the transition to peace, are neither 
simple nor one-track, as shown by a number of transversal concerns that run 
through the collection. These include: the contradiction between the central roles 
played by women at the outburst of the revolution and the gradual side-lining, 
whereby women found themselves within a war zone dominated by men, and 
yet struggling to continue their work and establishing safe spaces for women and 
children; there is the need for National Action Plans (NAPs), institutionalized 
mechanisms for political inclusion, and recognition of fundamental principles 
of gender equality at the highest level of the juridical system, but also the 
large and persistent gaps between the adoption of formal documents and the 
implementation of principles and programs. Also considered by the contributors 
are the multifaceted responsibilities of governments, on the one hand, who should 
be held accountable for policies and the implementation of legal provisions, and 
of the international community, on the other, that has yet to fully acknowledge 
the crucial contribution of women towards a lasting peace and to set up adequate 
mechanisms for a meaningful inclusion of women in the Syrian peace processes.
Speakers who contributed their knowledge and understanding came from both 
academia and civic organizations and networks, in the attempt to create a space 
for ‘action-focused intellectual exchange’: a space to share knowledges and 
learn from different perspectives and expertise.
Note from the editors
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In particular, facing the risk that in current and future peace negotiation and 
post-conflict developments women are once again side-lined, both by the 
international community and domestically, the accounts offered in this collection 
through Syrian women’s own voices should be highly valued. They reflect the 
spirit and respond to the goals of the UN Resolution 1325 (2000) that calls for 
women to be listened to, and included as actors in full right to all phases of peace 
negotiations and beyond.
The fourth part of the volume, Testimonies by civil society organizations 
and Syrian lawyers’ internships at the CIRSG and SPGI, also reports short 
interventions made on the occasion of a public session that was held in the 
evening of October 3rd, 2016, at Teatro Ruzante, with the participation of 
Massimiliano Fanni Canelles (President of the Auxilia foundation) and Giulia 
D’Odorico (Trama di Terre, Imola). Finally, two short pieces are included, by 
young lawyers Roula Baghdadi and Yousef Razouk, who were visiting scholars 
at the University of Padova in the first half of the same year.
We believe that listening to all those voices, and relating them to the insights 
coming from academia, is crucial for scholars and interested observers, as 
well as for the international community and decision-makers who have direct 
responsibility for putting an end to the gross violation of human rights in the 
region. We trust the inspiring conversation accounted for in this volume will 
constitute a meaningful contribution towards a much needed understanding 
of the crucial role women should play, as social and political actors, in peace-
building processes and in the long struggle for human and women’s rights in 
Syria and across the Middle East.
2. Synthetic timeline of the Syrian peace process
Several of the contributions to this collection mention specific moments of the 
Syrian peace process, a set of initiatives to resolve the Syrian Civil War which 
started in 2011. Here we provide a synthetic timeline of events related to this 
process.
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The Syrian peace process has been moderated by several institutions and forces: 
the United Nations (UN) and its Special Envoys on Syria, the Arab League, 
Russia, and Western Powers. The negotiating parties are typically representatives 
of the Syrian Ba’athist government and Syrian opposition forces, whose 
composition has changed over time according to the differentiated phases of the 
armed conflict. Notably, Kurdish forces have been precluded from most of the 
negotiation frameworks; whereas radical islamist forces, and the organization 
of the islamic state (ISIS/ISIL) have refused to engage in contacts on peaceful 
resolution to the conflict.
The attempts to find a solution to the Syrian conflict began in late 2011, when the 
Arab League launched two initiatives, without much success. Russia in January 
2012 and in November 2013 suggested talks in Moscow between the Syrian 
government and the opposition.
In March-June 2012, the UN  and the Arab League coordinated a new plan, led 
by Kofi Annan, Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations and the Arab League, 
called Geneva I.
In January and February 2014, the Geneva II Conference on Syria took place, 
organized by Lakhdar Brahimi, the new UN Special Envoy to Syria. In July 
2014, Staffan de Mistura was appointed Special Envoy for Syria.
On October 30th 2015, intergovernmental talks started in Vienna involving 
officials from the US, the EU, Russia, China, and various regional actors such 
as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and, for the first time, Iran. In December of the 
same year, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2254, indicating bases 
for the political transition in Syria. 
Attempts for a Geneva III were made by UN Envoy de Mistura in late January 
2016, but were suspended after a few days. 
In early February 2016, the UN Special Envoy for Syria announced the 
appointment of a Women’s Advisory Board (WAB). Composed of twelve women 
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from the different parties to the conflict, the WAB is politically unaffiliated. 
It does not participate in the negotiations, but advises the UN mediator on all 
proceedings. Criticism of the lack of transparency in member selection led to the 
Syrian Women’s Network to withdraw from the WAB.
The Geneva peace process continued between the Syrian government and the 
Syrian opposition under the auspices of the UN: Geneva IV in April 2016, 
Geneva V in February 2017, Geneva VI in May 2017, and Geneva VII in July 
2017.
Peace talks to stop the armed clashes between the Syrian government and 
opposition forces, now including armed rebel leaders too, were led by Russia in 
Astana, Kazakhstan, together with Turkey and Iran in the course of 2017.
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Opening speech expressed 
at the international conference
Claudia Padovani1
“Distinguished guests, Euromed Feminist Initiative (IFE-EFI) members, dear 
students, colleagues, I speak today as the Director of the Center for Gender 
Studies at the University of Padova that is co-hosting this event together with 
IFE-EFI.
I feel it is an extremely meaningful event that we are hosting today: in addressing 
the complex and tragic reality of the Syrian conflict, this conference aims at 
investigating one specific aspect which is all too often left aside in policy debates 
and remains invisible in media accounts of conflict areas and struggles for 
peace and democracy, that is: the key role of women in conflict and transitional 
processes – and in the Syrian context in particular – in order to promote gender 
justice and social change within and across communities in the Middle Eastern 
region. 
This occasion stems out of a recent collaboration our center had with IFE-
EFI. In the context of a project they are conducting with the support of the 
European Union in early 2016 for a period of five months, we hosted two young 
Syrian lawyers in Padova. They came to meet with us at the Center for Gender 
Studies and got involved in our activities at the Department of Law, Politics, 
and International Studies. They took courses and participated in our scientific 
initiatives and they met our students and engaged with local civic organizations. 
Roula Baghdadi and Yousef Razouk, through sharing their experiences and 
visions, certainly enriched our perspective on the complexities that characterize 
the Syrian context today, and the Middle East more generally.
1. Director, Interdepartmental Center for Gender Studies, University of Padova, Padova, Italy; claudia.padovani@unipd.it
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At some point, we felt it would have been crucial to create an opportunity to 
bring some of this understanding to a broader audience in the premises of a 
university that – as a place of knowledge production and sharing – has a 
mandate to promote a culture based on universal values of human rights, peace, 
environmental protection, and international solidarity. So we started, together 
with IFE-EFI, to plan for this international event. 
We decided the focus of the discussion would be on how to better understand 
the role and the contribution of women in peace processes, and what are the 
challenges they face in their efforts to promote and protect human and women’s 
rights in ongoing conflicts and in constitution building, as well as in transition 
and post-conflict situations.
Indeed, it is crucial to make clear that gender gaps – in both peace talks and 
transitional phases, as well as before and beyond emergency situations – are a 
persistent and universal challenge to national as well as international solidarity: 
as issues of gender exclusion, women’s marginalization, and stereotypes persist 
at all levels and across social and cultural backgrounds, feminist analyses can 
help understand the connection between daily experiences of gender-based 
discrimination and crisis situations, between ‘ordinary’ and ‘extra-ordinary’ 
forms of violence against women, such as those we have witnessed during the 
long years of the Syrian conflict.
By adopting this perspective, and looking at national conflicts and international 
developments through a gender lens, we also want to highlight the responsibility 
of the many actors and institutions that have a role to play when the challenges of 
gender equality and women’s empowerment are immense and when a politics of 
recognition and political will would be core to take the formal principles of respect, 
dignity, and equality for women and men that are enshrined in international standards 
and constitutional laws to the more concrete level of actual implementation.
Historical, juridical, and geo-political perspectives will be presented today, 
and practical experiences from within the Syrian territory will be shared 
and discussed. Indeed, we need these diverse perspectives and disciplinary 
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approaches to be brought to us so that we can all understand how norms evolve 
internationally, impact on national contexts, and learn from a dialog amongst 
different knowledges – those emerging from academia and those elaborated 
through political activities on the ground and transnationally – to try and make 
sense of the complexities of the current situation.
We have the privilege today of listening to some of the voices that have been 
struggling for gender equality and peace in the Syrian context over the past 
years: advocates and activists whom we normally do not hear about; actions and 
struggles that are seldom reported in the news, even when the news is about the 
violation of human and women’s rights.
We shall have three sessions in our conference: one devoted to a better 
understanding of international juridical standards as critical tools for moving the 
gender equality agenda forward, in conflict and post-conflict situations; a second 
one focusing on how women’s rights organizations in Syria support women’s 
claims to play a key role in the transition towards democracy and regime change; 
and a third session where an ABC for a Gender Sensitive Constitution, produced 
by IFE-EFI, will be introduced and commented upon.
There is also a ‘civil society dialog’ organized in the evening. That session 
gathers civil society organizations from Syria and Italy to address the Syrian 
conflict and its tragic consequences with a gender lens. The aim is to discuss the 
impact of the conflict on women, girls, and children; as well as to address the 
implications on the refugee issues that are at the core of Italian and European 
democratic crises nowadays. 
As I said, we have worked in close collaboration with IFE-EFI to make this 
happen, and this has been a pleasure. But I would also like to thank all those 
who have contributed in different ways: our Syrian speakers, who have come a 
long way to tell their stories and expectations; our Italian colleagues, who have 
agreed to share their expertise; members of the Center for Gender Studies and 
staff at our Department, for continued organizational support; our hosts in this 
amazing space; our video-makers; and our translators.
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Finally, I would like to take the opportunity to remind everyone that the Center 
for Gender Studies is part of an evolving network of similar centers across Italy, 
and is strengthening its connections with European and International realities 
engaged with the promotion of a culture of gender equality, from the local to the 
global level, within and beyond academia.
This broad network – as well as an internationally interested audience – will 
have access to the content of our conference thanks to a video recording that 
will be made available on our respective websites. The presentations will also be 
collected in a publication. In this manner, we aim to give continuity to the effort 
that is initiated today. 
As we are daily confronted with the tragedy of conflicts and human and women’s 
rights violations, we are also faced with the questions: how can we contribute 
to making women’s struggles for peace known? How can their voices enter 
our communication channels, our research communities, and our educational 
activities? 
We, at the Center for Gender Studies, wish today’s event will contribute to 
making these spaces for dialog – and the collaborations through which they are 
made possible – part of our ongoing academic commitment and practice. 
I wish you all a fruitful conference”.
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Opening remarks on the publication
Francesca Rondina1
This publication is the result of a fruitful cultural cooperation and shared vision 
on the Syrian human crisis between Euromed Feminist Initiative (IFE-EFI) and 
the University of Padova.
I would first like to thank Claudia Padovani from the Interdepartmental Center 
for Gender Studies of Padova University; Francesca Helm from the Next 
Generation Global Studies Group; the Department of Political Science, Law, 
and International Relations; the international service Servizio Accoglienza 
Ospiti Stranieri (SAOS); the university accommodation service (SASSA); 
Lucille Delbecchi; Tania Toffanin; Barbara Gollin; and all the people who 
were committed and dedicated to the organization of the internships and of this 
conference.
I was deeply honoured to be present at the Museum of the History of Medicine 
representing IFE-EFI. Founded in 2003, IFE-EFI is a network of women’s rights 
organizations from the two shores of the Mediterranean and from Caucasus. It 
advocates for gender equality and women’s universal human rights as inseparable 
from democracy building and citizenship, for political solutions to all conflicts, 
and for the people’s right to self-determination. IFE-EFI headquarters are in 
Paris and our regional office is in Amman. 
The conference aimed at sharing insights and facilitating discussions among 
academics, Syrian women’s rights activists, students, and citizens on issues of 
deep importance that are at the core of IFE-EFI’s projects in the Middle East and 
North African region, and of those of us working for women’s empowerment 
and rights. 
1. IFE-EFI Project Coordinator, Paris, France; rondinafrancesca@gmail.com
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If some of you are still wondering why this gendered lens was adopted for the 
International Conference, there are three main reasons that reflect the topics of 
the sessions.
First, the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and path-breaking United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security. These legal 
tools must be used together to broaden, strengthen, and operationalize gender 
equality in conflict, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction stressing 
the pivotal role women should play in all these phases. However, in order to 
transform the verb ‘should play’ into ‘do play’, a lot of work needs to be done. 
Only with women’s full participation and representation in the political sphere 
at international, national, and local levels will women’s human rights be secured, 
gender-based violence be tackled, and an inclusive democracy prospected.
Second, the exclusion of women from decision making processes. Although 
Syrian women have been at the forefront of the Syrian uprising from the 
beginning and have been playing crucial roles throughout its phases, roles 
that have shifted over time in response to the militarization and violence on 
the ground, they are systematically side-lined from political decision-making 
regarding the future of their country. 
Third, the gender-sensitive constitution process: within the framework of a 
program co-funded by the European Union and the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency, IFE-EFI and Syrian partners worked together 
towards a gender-sensitive constitution that combines the establishment of the 
rule of law, equality between women and men, and respect for human rights 
and dignity of both women and men alike. This work led to the publication of a 
handbook, ABC for a Gender-Sensitive Constitution2.
So now is precisely the time for the challenge of the Syrian transition to be 
raised and dealt with through a gendered approach. I would therefore like to 
2. Suteu, S., & Draji, I. (2015). ABC for a Gender Sensitive Constitution. Euromed Feminist Initiative IFE-EFI. https://
www.efi-ife.org/sites/default/files/ABC%20for%20a%20Gender%20Sensitive%20Constitution.pdf
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thank our Syrian contributors: Maya Alrhabi, Executive Director of Women’s 
Studies Center and General Coordinator of the Coalition of Syrian Women for 
Democracy; Lama Kannout, Coordinator of the Studies Committee at the Syrian 
Feminist Lobby; and Joumana Seif, Head of the Legal Committee of the Syrian 
Women Network.
Thanks to all of you for participating in the Padova Conference and for your drive 
and involvement for Syrian women’s rights both at grassroot and international 
levels. 
Furthermore, Mariam Jalabi, member of the Syrian Women Network and Syrian 
Feminist Lobby based in New York, joined the Conference through Skype; and 
Ibrahim Draji, Professor in International Law at the University of Damascus, 
also participated remotely during the session on the ABC for a Gender Sensitive 
Constitution, which he co-authored with Dr Silvia Suteu, from the University 
College in London. 
Through Syrian lawyers’ first-hand experiences and angles, we brought into 
light the resilience and resourcefulness of women who are usually depicted only 
as ‘vulnerable women in need of protection’ by dominant patriarchal discourses 
in the mainstream coverage of the Syrian conflict. If Europe desires a political 
solution for Syria, a country that is approaching its seventh year of war, national 
unity, inclusive democracy, human rights, and lasting peace, then women’s 
voices need to be heard, too. 
Finally, this conference contributed to engendering a multi-faceted view of the 
current Syrian context and its dramatic consequences and will hopefully have an 
impact on attitudes towards refugees based on human dignity, human security, 
protection of asylum seekers, and solidarity. I strongly believe that this initiative 
can pave the way for further academic, social, and cultural cooperation between 
Syria and Italy.
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Section 1.
Transitional justice from 
a gender‑sensitive perspective: 
CEDAW and UN Resolution 1325
This session investigates the protection of women during armed conflict and 
their participation in peace and security decision-making. Two sets of standards 
– UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security (UNSCR 
1325), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) – are critical tools for moving the gender equality 
agenda forward in conflict and post-conflicts contexts; but it is also crucial to 
understand the limits and challenges to their implementation and the follow 
up provisions and mechanisms that have been elaborated in relation to specific 
situations in recent years.
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1Peace and security for whom?
Lilian Halls French1
The Euromed Feminist Initiative (IFE-EFI)2 is a network that brings together 
women’s rights organisations from Europe, Maghreb, and Middle East. 
All of them have the same belief that feminism is a driving force behind the 
transformations that our societies urgently need, all over the world. I would like 
to highlight here some of IFE-EFI’s analyses on peace and security. Let me first 
remind everyone that one of the objectives of this conference is to continue 
supporting the advocacy work of the Syrian women’s rights activists and to 
provide them expanded space to discuss and advocate for their demands. IFE-
EFI has been working with them for several years, contributing to the efforts 
of preparing a democratic future for Syria inclusive of women’s rights and 
gender equality. The University of Padova has been associated to this work by 
welcoming two young lawyers for a five-month internship and for both sides, 
this experience was a very fruitful one! 
Peace and security are among the major issues that frame the action of our 
network, and United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 13253 is one 
of the major tools we use to preserve women’s rights rights and security, together 
with other international and regional statements and resolutions, above all the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW). The gender gap in both peace and transitional phases is a persistent 
and universal challenge. Thus, women’s struggle for political and social change 
needs strong international solidarity to expose both the prevalence of militaristic 
1. Co-president, Euromed Feminist Initiative, Paris, France; lilian.hallsfrench@efi-ife.org
2. http://www.efi-ife.org/
3. https://goo.gl/5S9IUn
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values, and male-dominated cultures and norms that lead to limited space and 
access for women’s political and social role and influence. 
Today, we are globally confronted with an unprecedented wave of reactionary 
political movements and religious fundamentalisms that threaten people’s lives 
and deny their rights to freedom, social justice, and peace. We are facing the rise 
of bloody conflicts, the pursuit of repressive regimes, and occupying forces that 
kill and imprison people to stifle all voices defending human rights. Women’s 
rights, as universal human rights, are particularly targeted. That’s why there are 
urgent steps to lay the foundation for political solutions to the conflicts in which 
women play an equal and significant leading role.
As feminists, we are pacifists and used to questioning the traditional approach of 
peace and security, and we strive to uncover the emptiness of dominant discourses 
based on domination, control over the other, military action, and destruction. We 
strive to unveil the continuum of violence against women during peace and war 
and to get from the States the integration of this structural violence as part of 
their security policies. We stress that human security truly merits its name only 
if it includes the two components of Humanity. In times of crises and conflicts, 
the issue of gender equality is more than ever pushed at the background of the 
public debate, while it should be the opposite. 
Why is there such a persistent gender gap in the planning of both peace and 
transitional processes that take societies out of conflicts and dictatorships in spite 
of the role played by women? Peace processes are built upon a combination of 
different factors. 
The first obstacle is related to the specific patriarchal legacy of societies and 
universal traditional patriarchal values. This combination results in different 
forms of discrimination against women after conflicts are over and during 
the political transitions that follow. Therefore, women’s active participation 
for social change and for keeping the community going during violent 
conflicts does not translate into their proportional participation in formal 
peace processes and decision making under the following transitional period. 
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The debate on women’s participation in decision-making processes often 
leads to the same questions about ‘the difference that women would make’. 
For us, this participation is not a matter of ‘plus’ or efficiency, on which 
difference women would make, but a basic matter of social justice. In other 
words, the presence of women is not measurable in terms of impact, but it is a 
measure of democracy. This means that all decision-making processes, peace 
processes among them, should include equal representation and participation 
of women. 
The second is related to the power structures that maintain women in a 
subordinated position all over the world. As we know, one of their bases is 
militarism that sustains and strengthens the supremacy of military values 
on culture, identity, and norms of society on public institutions and policies. 
Militarist culture is a major barrier to the presence of women in decision making 
in the field of security.
The third is the strength of stereotypes about the myth of a feminine identity 
characterized by a so-called women’s lack of taste and incapacity to deal with 
power or to manage difficult negotiations. This ‘femininity’ has always been 
used to exclude women from history. Our network, IFE-EFI, acts with all the 
components of the democratic movement for the development, in the whole 
Euromed region, of political tools to eradicate these stereotypes – as early as 
at school – and to denounce the increasing intrusion of religions in the public 
sphere that contribute to consolidating them.
The last obstacle is linked to the nature of peace negotiations: as political 
processes, they are male-shaped in their composition, functioning, language, and 
history. Women are welcomed to intervene on ‘women’s issues’, supposed to be 
‘their’ specific issues, and not issues related to half of humanity.
How to face all these obstacles? The first necessity is the implementation by 
the States of actions counteracting dominant discourses on militarism that 
penalize fundamental women’s rights in the name of national security. Besides, 
together with all components of the feminist movement, we have to convince 
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the democratic political and associative movement of the urgency to take into 
account feminist analyses as it is the only way to build a democratic world.
Last and not least, it is crucial to promote the UNSC Resolution 1325 and work 
for its implementation. This resolution, adopted in 2000, reaffirms the important 
role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, 
peace building, peace keeping, and in post-conflict reconstruction. It stresses 
the importance of equal participation and full involvement of women in the 
maintenance and promotion of peace and security. It urges all actors to increase 
this participation and incorporates gender perspectives in all United Nations 
(UN) peace and security strategies. It also calls on all parties of the conflicts to 
take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, 
particularly rape and sexual abuse in situations of armed conflict. This resolution 
provides a number of important operational mandates, with implications for 
Member States and entities of the UN system.
For the first time, women are not only approached as ‘victims’ or as a ‘vulnerable 
group’ by the UN Security Council. Resolution 1325 focuses on women as 
agents in their own right in situations of conflict and post-conflict. It recognizes 
the unbalanced and gender-specific impact of conflicts on women, but also 
highlights the very limited role of women in the prevention and resolution 
of conflicts and in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. In Article 
1, it calls for the “increased representation of women at all decision-making 
levels in […] prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts”. In Article 
8, it requires all participants to the negotiation and implementation of peace 
agreements to “adopt a gender perspective”.
Even if three other Resolutions have also been adopted after 1325 to preserve 
women’s rights in conflict situations – UNSCR 1820, 1888 and 1890 – UNSCR 
1325 is important because it is mandatory for all member states. As such, it is 
a precious tool in the hands of civil society to make governments accountable.
In this year of the 16th anniversary of the Resolution, what has been achieved? 
The reports about sexual violence in conflict zones and the persistent under-
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representation of women in peace negotiations and post-conflict governance 
highlight the huge gap between the adoption of the resolution and its 
implementation. As early as 2004, the UN called on Member States to develop 
National Action Plans as the most effective way to fill this gap. As the Resolution 
was written in general terms concerning women’s needs in all conflict and 
post-conflict areas, its implementation needs national plans with specific, 
measurable, and time-limited objectives. Furthermore, the change of women’s 
situation “requires specific actions and policies, accountability mechanisms for 
the different ministries and respective authorities, a concrete allocated budget, 
transparency, and [therefore] evaluation and monitoring reporting mechanisms”4.
With the support of the Norwegian Embassy, IFE-EFI initiated, supported, 
and facilitated the development of the National Action Plan (NAP) for the 
implementation of the UNSCR 1325 in Iraq 2012-2014. The plan was adopted 
in 2014. 
The main objectives5 of this project were through the plan to: 
• increase the effective and proportional participation of women 
in decision-making positions on local and national levels in all 
reconciliation committees and peace-building negotiations;
• increase quotas as an affirmative action on all levels: executive, 
legislative, and judiciary and in the local communities to allow women 
to play their role in decision making;
• harmonize national legislation with international standards and 
mechanisms for women’s human rights, including UNSCR 1325, annul 
laws which violate women rights, and promulgate/enact legislations 
that protect and promote them;
4. http://www.equalpowerlastingpeace.org/tag/national-action-plan/
5. http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/image/iraq_nap.pdf?
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• strengthen women’s agency through right-based approaches; 
• integrate and mainstream gender in in all policies and processes related 
to conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peace-building in Iraq.
Via this project, Iraq has become the first country in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region to have such a plan. It was adopted in 2014. Its 
development was carried out by a Cross Sector Task Force (CSTF) composed 
of State actors, representatives from relevant ministries, members of parliament, 
judiciary courts, and the ‘INAP 1325 Initiative’ – an informal network of women’s 
rights organizations and networks in the civil society – from Iraq and Kurdistan.
IFE-EFI is now supporting the phase of implementation that can also have an 
impact on regional peace and stability. Exchanges have already taken place with 
Syrian activists on the Iraqi experience and the lessons learned from this process. 
The last report provides an overview of the collective and individual efforts 
of Iraqi ministries, security institutions, and civil society in implementing the 
plan in a very challenging context. Analysing the achievements, as well as the 
challenges and the gaps in the implementation will help the CSTF in addressing 
them during the development of the second national plan.
The key provisions of the resolution, captured by three P’s (protection of human 
rights of women and girls during times of conflict, prevention of sexual and 
gender-based violence, and equal participation of women in peace building and 
reconstruction), are addressed by the Iraqi National Action Plan. A fourth pillar 
related to economic empowerment was also integrated, responding to the actual 
needs of women. Legal actions have also been elaborated in order to enable the 
implementation of the resolution. Approaching these issues in a comprehensive 
manner, the national plan has thus become an important tool to enhance the 
implementation of measures guaranteeing an increased level of security and 
participation of women in rebuilding society. 
The added value of this national plan is its collaborative and consultative 
process which ensured broad ownership. Furthermore, the common work on its 
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development and implementation provided space for all involved to responsibly 
enhance skills and increase capacities in the field of women’s rights as well as for 
understanding the interconnected nature of women’s meaningful participation in 
decision making and building peace and security. 
Most of all, we hope that this work has contributed to an improved situation for 
women on the ground, who are the real actors for change. 
As stated above, to face the immensity of the present challenges, feminist 
perspectives must be shared and adopted by the democratic movement. In 
parallel, immediate steps must be taken by all States to stop the bloodshed, 
to act for global demilitarization, and the end of occupation. Without this, no 
advancement of any rights can be achieved, as militarism and sacrifice of rights, 
in particular women’s rights, in the name of national security, will prevail. It is 
our common responsibility, researchers and women’s rights activists together, to 
intensify our efforts in order to reach our common goal: a peaceful and secure 
world, where security will equally benefit women and men and not only half of 
humanity.
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2Resolution 1325: advantages and disadvantages1
Lama Kannout2
When they launched their revolution in 2011 to ask for freedom, the Syrian men 
and women knew that the regime would treat them with utmost violence, as 
history is full of horror stories from the eighties in Hama. However, the violence 
would not have reached this level of savagery in the face of the communities 
that rebelled peacefully had it not been for the fact that the regime was reassured 
that it would be safe from accountability and safe from sanctions. The Security 
Council was divided and remained incapable of referring the Syrian file to the 
International Criminal Court due to a double veto from Russia and China. The 
Russian-American deal (resolution 2118 dated September 27th, 2013) that 
stated that the regime was to submit its chemical weapons system, after it had 
perpetrated the chemical massacre of Eastern Gota in the Damascus countryside, 
was a signal to allow it to kill the Syrians using any other weapons, including 
exploding barrels, napalm, and prohibited weapons. 
The regime skilfully implemented its logo ‘Assad or we burn the country’ or 
‘Assad forever’, and it brought in fanatic invaders (Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians, and 
Lebanese) that stood on the hills of the cities whose besieged populations were 
coerced to leave, and it handed over the sovereignty of the country to whomever 
would ensure the perennity of its rule. In return, the enemies of freedom and 
democracy – supported by countries from the region with the force of weapons 
and fatwas – pursued the plan of oppression and destruction as Syria turned into 
an offering on the altar of freedom, eaten up by the game of interests and nations. 
1. These arguments were further discussed in the author’s book (Kannout, 2017).
2. Syrian Feminist Lobby, Coordinator of the Studies Committee, Beirut, Lebanon; lamakannout@gmail.com
How to cite this chapter: Kannout, L. (2018). Resolution 1325: advantages and disadvantages. In C. Padovani & F. Helm 
(Eds), Rethinking the transition process in Syria: constitution, participation and gender equality (pp. 29-38). Research-
publishing.net. https://doi.org/10.14705/rpnet.2018.21.756
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As regards the general situation and the specific situation of Syrian women, 
at the time of writing, the number of registered Syrian refugees exceeded 
4.8 million, and 7.6 million are displaced in Syria – United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2016) –, 45% of inhabitants had to 
leave their residences and some have had to do so more than once. “More 
than 145,000 Syrian refugee families in Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan 
– [one family out of four] – are headed by women struggling on their own 
to survive” (UNHCR, 2014); they also suffer from poverty, lack of aid, and 
difficulty in obtaining documentation. They have no skills for work, and if 
they do they face exploitation, sexual harassment, sexual attacks, or forced 
marriage. Furthermore, according to the discriminatory laws that are in place, 
they cannot circulate with their children, nor can they give them nationality 
or have custody of them. The number of school dropouts due to the conflict 
(UNICEF report 2015)3 is 2.6 million Syrian boys and girls. Over 20% of 
Syrian schools have been destroyed and 20% of male and female teachers lost, 
and the general poverty level was estimated at 85.2% in 2015, the percentage 
of which living in extreme poverty reaching 69.3% (UNHCR, 2016). These 
people are incapable of ensuring their basic needs, be they nutritional or other. 
1. Constitutional discrimination
Syrian women have crumbled under legalized violence and discrimination 
for decades, both in the private and public spheres. There are many coercive 
laws against women – personal status laws, penal codes, nationality laws, and 
reservations on the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW). Article 3 of the 2012 constitution4, in paragraphs 1, 
2 and 4, states the following: 
• Paragraph 1: “The religion of the President of the Republic is Islam”. 
This paragraph is in line with paragraph four of article 84 that sets 
3. www.unicef.org/about/annualreport/files/Syria_Arab_Republic_2015_COAR.pdf
4. http://ncro.sy/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/2012.pdf
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conditions for the candidate to the presidency: “he is not to be married 
to a non Syrian woman”, which means that women are deprived from 
their right of being in the position of President of the Republic. 
• Paragraph 2: “Islamic jurisprudence shall be a major source of 
legislation”. This means the enforcement of the most discriminatory 
and strict stipulations on women in the personal status laws, the penal 
code, nationality laws, labour laws, and the social insurance law, since 
this male dominated doctrine is based on the principles of guardianship 
and wardship, which go against the charter of human rights for women 
and men and international treaties. 
• Paragraph 4: “The personal status of religious confessions shall be 
protected and respected”. This is a consecration of sectarianism in 
society as it becomes part of the constitution, given that there are eight 
personal status laws5 that consecrate discrimination against women 
and deprive them of their civil rights, giving control of their lives to 
religious instances. 
The constitution does not include a definition of discrimination against women 
as stipulated by CEDAW, or an article that prohibits discrimination and violence 
against them, which has increased the harm done against women. Nor does it 
include a clear article that establishes the importance of international agreements 
in relation to national laws, which deprive women of legal opportunities to 
amend discriminatory laws based on the stipulations of these agreements. For 
instance, the personal status laws consecrate discrimination and violence against 
women through their content, language, and practice regarding issues related 
to marriage, divorce, custody, wardship, guardianship, movement, inheritance, 
and certification, along with the absence of equality between males and females 
5. Comparative study: “Discrimination in the Personal Status Laws in Syria” authored by a group of female researchers, 
Edition Atar 2014. Personal status laws, general personal status law for Muslims, for Christian Orthodox, Armenian 
Orthodox, Catholics, Confessional Evangelical courts in Syria and Lebanon, and the book of legal rulings for personal 
status for the Jews, the special stipulations of the Druze confession included in article (307) of the general personal status 
law. The code of religious sects: issued by the French High Commissioner Lamartine according to the decision 60 LR of 
1936 that established the sects that are recognized in Syria and that each have the right to adopt their own personal status 
laws.
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regarding the minimum age for marriage, etc. Article 305 of the law stipulates 
that for all matters not mentioned in this law, the judge goes back to the most 
agreed upon text in the Hanafi School in the Kadri Pasha Law, meaning 
subjecting women to rules that are almost one hundred years old: “anything 
that is not mentioned in the text of this law is resolved as per the most widely 
recognized in the Hanafi School”. 
2. The political participation of women 
in the official negotiations
In Geneva 2, on January 22nd, 2014, two out of 15 members of the opposition 
delegation were women, along with two women in the regime’s delegation. On 
December 9th, 2015, out of the 115 members of the opposition conference that 
was held in Riyadh, only ten were women. The conference led to the creation 
of a ‘Supreme Commission for Negotiations’ that included 32 persons including 
two women only. This body formed the negotiating delegation to Geneva III. 
It included three women out of 15 members. As for the regime’s delegation, 
it included the participation of four women out of 15 members. It cannot be 
considered that the ratio of women in the regime’s delegation is an indicator of 
democracy, as they do not express anything but the official discourse and they 
do not dare criticize the authorities; they are fierce in defending decisions that 
violate their rights. Their nomination was based on their allegiance to a regime 
of despotism and corruption. 
On the level of the local councils6 in the areas outside of the authority of the 
regime, women are almost absent and work in very hard conditions as they are 
systematically targeted with all the means of killing and starvation along with 
explosive barrel attacks and the use of prohibited weapons. On the other hand, they 
face the tyranny of Salafi armed groups, as for the areas of control of the regime 
their ratio is 3% (in the tenth electoral cycle, 2011) (Al Chaher, 2015). The Syrian 
6. Definition of local councils and their goals can be found at http://www.etilaf.org.
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Feminist Lobby7 is concerned with the political participation of women and their 
right to the same level of access to decision making positions as men and the right 
to build their country, establish policies, and free it from tyranny in all its forms. It 
is fully aware of the importance of Resolution 1325. Thus, we have started – with 
the support of Euromed Feminist Initiative (IFE-EFI) – working on publishing an 
informational guide on how to draft a national plan for the resolution to achieve 
its objective. The guide includes recommendations such as:
• Providing knowledge to male and female Syrian decision makers, 
and to the office of the United Nations (UN) envoy to Syria and the 
influential countries in the Syrian file explaining the importance of 
having a national plan for Resolution 1325 and the priorities of women 
in three phases: the current/conflict phase, the transitional phase, and 
the phase of building the state.
• Providing advocacy material to the human rights defenders for men and 
women, and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).
• Informing the countries of the region about the importance of Resolution 
1325 and drafting national plans to implement it, as the countries hosting 
female Syrian refugees and the local organizations whether national, 
regional, or international that took part in the Syrian file did not include 
the concept and implementation of Resolution 1325 in their programs. 
The regime in Syria has not set contingency programs for the protection 
of women despite the horrendous conditions they live in. According 
to the speech delivered by Assad8 in presence of a number of Sheikhs 
and Islam advocates in Damascus on April 23rd, 2014 where he called 
millions of Syrians ‘terrorists’, he meant the popular incubator of cities 
7. The Syrian Feminist Lobby, an independent political lobby not affiliated to a party committed to equal participation of 
men and women in all political decision making processes in Syria and in all fields, the members of this lobby are convinced 
that democracy cannot be built without respect and full implementation of women’s rights as part of the international 
human rights and the principles of full equality between men and women both in the private and public life. See: http://
syrianfeministlobby.com/aside-post/
8. Assad in an encounter with the Oulemas (Islamic advocates and religious instances) where he describes hundreds of 
thousands of Syrians (with a social support, there is a relative, a neighbour or a friend) as terrorists. See: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=_l0zcjPQv8Y
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and villages that rebelled against him. Also, in one of his speeches on 
June 3rd, 20129, he said: “and I say to be accurate that the President 
is for all those who are under the umbrella of the state, constitution, 
and law or else I would be putting on the same level the traitor and the 
patriot, and the victim and the torturer, and the corrupt and the honest, 
and the destructor and the constructor”, meaning that he is a president 
for his supporters and allegiants only. As for those who rebelled against 
him like the male or female activists and the defenders of human rights, 
they have been uprooted, detained, or forced into exile as they were 
called traitors, terrorists, and destructors. 
• Informing the upcoming transitional ruling body according to Resolution 
2254, Geneva I, about the importance of drafting a national plan for the 
resolution. 
Our vision in writing the guide is based on the importance of the political 
participation of women as an essential and crucial entry point into all the levels 
of authority that will promote protection and safeguard women. We aim at 
matching and implementing CEDAW 1979 and the Declaration of Beijing of the 
year 1995 and the methodology stemming from it with Resolution 1325 and all 
other relevant resolutions.
3. The importance of Resolution 1325
• The resolution considers that guaranteeing the participation of women 
in the peace process on all decision making levels and the protection of 
women is one of the matters most relevant to world peace and security.
• It lays the foundation for the promotion of the equality between men 
and women in participation and monitoring to draft the constitution, 
laws, and legislations along with the electoral system, the parties’ law, 
9. Speech by Bashar al Assad at the parliament on June 3rd, 2012. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WGQczIqsJ3c
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and building the police and judiciary sector and all the state institutions 
and all their levels. 
• Resolution 1325 is the first of its kind in that it stipulates the participation 
of women in the bodies and positions of decision making of a military 
or security nature. This will lead to a new quality increase in the nature 
of the role of women and their participation on new unconventional 
political levels. 
• The resolution emphasized that gender based violence, particularly rape 
and other forms of sexual harm, is a war crime that does not abate with 
time, and is not included in amnesty laws and relevant legislations; the 
resolution called for the protection of women in armed conflicts from 
this type of crime. 
• The resolution provided the countries with training materials 
regarding the protection of women and their rights and private needs; 
it also encouraged the countries to increase the financial donations to 
specialized funds and programs.
• Resolution 1325 was enforced as the Security Council adopted four 
other resolutions, including three that consider sexual violence as a 
war crime: 1820 year 2008, 1888 year 2009 which was followed by 
the creation of an office for the personal representative of the General 
Secretary of the UN for the affairs of sexual violence in conflicts, and as 
for resolution 1960 of the year 2010, it called for systemic arrangements 
for monitoring and reporting that enhance the efficiency of tracking the 
range and severity of these war crimes. The three resolutions (1820, 
1888, and 1960) have called for increased efforts by the states that are 
member of the UN in order to prevent the occurrence of systemic sexual 
violence, or on a broader scale, during conflicts. Resolution 1889 of 
the year 2009 is relevant to gender equality and the empowerment of 
women after the end of conflict in the long term, along with setting 
indicators to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1325.
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4. Challenges and shortcomings
4.1. Internationally
• Resolution 1325, similar to many resolutions and agreements of the 
UN, is not mandatory for member states. 
• The politicization of justice and human rights for men and women 
and the support provided to totalitarian regimes like the Syrian model 
that committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. Despite all 
the international and local legal reports that mention those crimes, UN 
resolutions are drafted with a language that attempts to please all the 
international players (Resolution 2254) except Syrian men and women. 
They also omit the fate of the dictator and his aides, nor is there any 
mention of the transitional justice that cannot be skipped if we are to 
build a fair and sustainable peace in Syria. 
• Resolution 1325 deals with ongoing wars and conflicts as if they were 
a fatality or a natural disaster we cannot do anything about, even as the 
UN, despite many warnings that conflicts are often inevitable in many 
countries of the world that are ruled by totalitarian security regimes 
like the Syrian model. The crimes and violations have reached alarming 
levels since the conflict started and have had a great impact on all the 
countries of the region, including the European Union, as shown by 
the unprecedented waves of refugees. We cannot stop that wave except 
via a political solution that puts an end to the tyranny and builds a just, 
sustainable peace based on holding the war criminals accountable as a 
starting point to building a democratic state committed to the charter of 
human rights for men and women. In the Syrian context, we see various 
attempts to stereotype the role of feminists/women as, on the one side, 
victims, and on the other they are required to push the males to the 
negotiations table for a reconciliation of some sort that they call ‘peace’, 
in a cloning of the role of women whose country has been through an 
armed conflict between two teams that want to seize the power and 
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resources: good women that want peace are facing mean men starting 
wars. This view includes discrimination against men and oversimplifies 
the role of women as free politicians and rebels that took part in the 
revolution and face tyranny and the distortion of the required democratic 
alternative in future Syria. It also understates the major sacrifices that 
the Syrian people have presented.
4.2. Locally
• The limited awareness of decision makers amongst the Syrian men and 
women regarding the resolution, even on a leadership level, and the 
absence of a political will to set women’s causes as a priority.
• The absence of trust on the side of the oppressed Syrian men and 
women in international bodies as they have been let down and are 
not being given support as refugees, forced emigrants, who were 
besieged, detained, or forcibly disappeared. Our requests to separate 
the humanitarian file from the political one are still unheard. The cause 
of the men and women detained in the detention centers of the regime 
is our bleeding wound. The exploding barrels are still there along with 
the prohibited weapons targeting civilians. The regime still practices 
starving and besieging and forced displacement as a weapon of war. 
The more the international community talks about a political solution, 
the more the battles, air raids, bombing of innocents continues, and the 
more the military bases of the countries involved in the conflict (i.e. 
Russia, the US, and recently the Turkish army) join. The more they 
talk in international resolutions about a political solution produced 
and owned by the Syrians – men and women –, the more they draft 
resolutions without the participation of Syrian men and women and the 
more Syrian bloodshed is undermined. 
• Religion has always been used to oppress ideas and for political gain, 
‘cultural specificity’ is a term that was always used to oppress half of the 
society, subdue it, abuse it, and terrorize it. In Syria, the two tyrannies 
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– political and religious – join forces, mutually support one another, and 
dominate the public and private sphere. This has lead to the trampling 
of human rights for men and women, and emptied the society from the 
politics that was regained by the oppressed revolution that is not being 
allowed to prevail. All opposition and human rights groups have been 
banned and chased. All attempts to create a democratic change were 
aborted and feminist associations were deprived of the possibility to 
have legal authorizations and from making a noticeable change in the 
coercive rights ruling their lives. The regime allowed and facilitated the 
spread and expansion of a religious current that calls for the subjection 
to rulers and custodians. To understand the Syrian situation, it is enough 
to review how the constitution was amended in the year 2000 after the 
death of Hafez al Assad within minutes to fit the age of the heir. On 
the other hand, a simple change to the personal status laws regarding 
increasing the age of custody took decades.
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3Women’s human rights when experiencing humanitarian crises and conflicts: the 
impact of United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions on women, peace, security, and 
the CEDAW General Recommendation no. 30
Paola Degani1
Violence and insecurity are strictly linked to unequal political, social, and 
economic power. However, the continuity of violence is obscured by masculinist 
and patriarchal rules of security within gendered structures, especially inside the 
division of public/private dimensions and spaces, of production-reproduction 
activities, and of conflicts of war/peace. 
Nowadays, there is a general perception of the gendered dimensions of 
humanitarian emergencies in public policy outcomes and more in general 
in institutional contexts where the central role of women in security and 
maintaining peace, at all levels of decision making, both prior to, during, and 
after the conflict stage, hostilities, and peace-keeping and peace-building stages, 
as well as in trying to pursue a condition of reconciliation and reconstruction, 
has been formally recognized at international level.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to focus on some problems related to the 
conceptualization of and legal provision for ‘gender based security’ and its 
subsequent effects upon accountability, with particular reference to transitional 
justice and post-conflict societies. It is important to assess a range of contemporary 
issues implicated for women and security, such as violence and other forms of 
harassment in times of post-conflict.
1. University of Padova, Padova, Italy; paola.degani@unipd.it
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1. On the concept of women’s 
security: introductory notes
For quite a long time now, the scientific literature has addressed the security 
paradigm(s) and issues without paying adequate attention to the ways in which 
specific kinds of threats or vulnerabilities may affect certain individuals.
Themes touching on women’s insecurity have appeared in institutional and 
political agendas only in recent years, making visible how the lack of integration 
of political-military security from socio-economic perspectives determines 
important consequences for women’s rights. Issues classified today under the 
heading ‘gender (women) security’ in the political debate at international level 
have crucial political relevance for the development of public policies aimed at 
the recognition, respect and effectiveness of human rights in terms of promotion 
and protection. In this debate, ‘security’ or ‘security sectors’ as analytical 
categories – or political perspectives – are often used as holistic concepts, 
encompassing both the notion of physical security for women in transitional 
societies, and a broader notion of human security, based on a relationship 
between material security, legal security, and political capacity. Indeed, these 
categories substantially improve and innovate the decision-making and law 
making processes in the area of security. 
The very concept of human security was advanced by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) in 1994 in the fifth Human Development 
Report (UNDP, 1994), which included a systematic discussion on security. 
In that report, the UNPD did not dedicate any specific attention to women, 
but defined a series of security areas that allow reference to be made to this 
holistic perspective in order to emphasize and frame an inclusive idea of 
gender security. 
The concept of human security is deliberately protective and proactive. This 
orientation follows the pathway traced by the United Nations Charter, and by 
the development of the human rights law at the international level. It does this 
through a machinery provided for monitoring the effectiveness and the level of 
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implementation, within each single state, of many treaties and other instruments 
devoted to improving different aspects of human dignity and well-being 
(Newman & Richmond, 2002). 
As mentioned in Degani (2013, p. 5) and in Pividori and Degani (2018), initially, 
‘human security’ presented four main features: the universality of threats, both in 
type and territorial extension (unemployment, poverty, drugs, crime, terrorism, 
environmental pollution, human rights violations); an interdependence of its 
different elements; prevention as a crucial tool in achieving the goals; and 
centrality of the individual and social groups in satisfying the fundamental needs/
rights. In other words, if the human security framework or approach is based first 
of all on protecting people and communities, in terms of both freedom from fear 
and freedom from want, this should mean safety from chronic or sudden threats, 
including sexual violence, hunger, human rights abuses, disease, and repression.
Security, based on a concrete active citizenship, also represents a concrete 
basis for building a sustainable, peaceful scenario. Following the reasoning put 
forward by Martha Nussbaum (1997), it is a duty to take a look at the different 
capabilities of which people are deprived, such as being able to live a long life in 
good and positive conditions and environments; to engage in all forms of social 
interaction; to participate, disapprove of, and influence decisions; and to live 
acquiring a decent standard of living, defined by level of individual security as 
something holistic and essential for living in dignity.
The complexity of a gender/women perspective in policy areas involving 
the concept of human security stems from the specific nature of certain risks 
affecting specifically the woman’s condition. The traditional model of security, 
still understood under the prism of political realism and, its most relevant 
modification, neorealism, completely neglect women’s needs. 
So while the primary purpose of addressing gender security remains redressing 
the imbalance and distortion produced by dominant security discourses and 
the policies that accompany them, its broader effects may transform the post-
conflict environment in unexpected ways. Taking into consideration the pre-
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existing conditions for women, that is women’s ordinary experiences in their 
daily lives, is fundamental when dealing with women’s potential vulnerability 
and specificities in situations of crisis or humanitarian emergencies. Only 
by acknowledging the ordinary dimension of women’s discrimination 
and subordination is it possible to explain the intersection of women’s life 
experiences and the humanitarian emergencies normally characterized 
by physical displacement, physical injury requiring medical intervention, 
inadequate access to food and water, severe psychosocial Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms, and increased evidence of post-event 
violence directed at vulnerable individuals. Women face particular social and 
economic problems in conflicts and emergencies that can cause or increase 
their vulnerability. For many, the relationship between the abusive and violent 
practice and situations experienced during conflict and the security of the post-
conflict environment are not discontinuous realities, but rather part of a single 
experience defined by discrimination and abuse rooted in the cultural and 
social context of many of the countries involved in situations of emergencies 
and transition.
Gender dichotomy (the division and the difference between male and female 
in terms of social roles and attitudes) is first of all characterized by hierarchies 
that are rooted, to various degrees, in the various social and cultural contexts. 
This phenomenon implicates important repercussions increasing inequality and 
polarization, and deepening the hierarchies that have historically characterized 
the sexual and international division of labor. The issue of women’s equality 
reflects this complexity, since the discriminations and some widespread and very 
common forms of violations of human rights still affecting women make them 
more vulnerable to individual and social conditions that are incompatible with 
an holistic, authentic, and coherent perspective of ‘human security’ (Degani, 
2013; Pividori & Degani, 2018). 
The 1990’s represents a very important historical moment both in the process 
of multiplication and progressive elaboration of rights, and in promoting and 
protecting human rights, particularly women’s rights. But in parallel there have 
been drastic changes in the social and economic status of women generating 
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enormous discrepancies based on gender. Different kind of emergencies, 
however, have recently created the conditions for developing greater awareness 
concerning the insecurity of women. Such crises also include the recent and 
ongoing economic and financial recession, even in European countries, where 
the migration processes today increase the contradictions that many states face 
in this political moment: changes involving labor relations; female migration 
with new patterns and trends, in its different expressions; the trafficking of 
young women for forced prostitution and the proliferation of sex businesses 
on an industrial scale; the extent of conflicts based on ethnic discriminations; 
ideological and religious fundamentalisms and intolerance; and the diffusion 
of violence as a social reality transversally added to all the other peculiarities 
that might characterize women. Such situations of crisis over the last 20 years 
have brought about a radical change in how women’s security is framed and 
evaluated. The need to prohibit and punish a series of conducts, now recognized 
by international criminal law as crimes against humanity or war crimes (and/
or genocide) in times of war, has been formally acknowledged. The feminist 
concept of violence as well as its causes, in times of peace, have been re-framed 
as problems where the public and the private dimensions intermesh and influence 
one another, both on the level of values and on a material level, also involving 
the Due Diligence standard (Pividori & Degani, 2018).
2. Gender security issues 
within the human security paradigm
On a strictly politico-institutional level, it is possible to define distinct stages 
in the evolving notion of human security and the progressive affirmation of a 
paradigm authentically different from the traditional realist view. This phase 
coincided with the Agenda for Peace presented in 1992 by the Secretary 
General of the United Nations (UN), Boutros Boutros-Ghali, followed in 1995 
by the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace that re-proposed the goals already 
mentioned in 1992. During those same years, while the search for new political 
instruments for peace and international security continued, new interest in other 
dimensions of human insecurity that gave evidence to women’s realities grew. 
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Women have responsibilities related to human care in most societies and 
also disproportionately bear familial and communal care responsibilities 
in communities affected by disaster, war, and humanitarian and natural 
emergencies. Among the different states and across jurisdictions, women possess 
different levels of legal capacity to engage in legal contracts, face systematic 
discrimination in their access to employment, receive differential payment once 
employed, and meet obstructions as regards their own or transferral of property.
These different, multiple, interlocking and intersectional discriminations, and 
the need to combat them, are recognized in the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) through 
the observations and jurisprudence produced by the committee foreseen by the 
convention to monitor its implementation among state parties.
Beyond a doubt, the international political arena’s activities in promoting the 
status of women proceed in a globalized context marked by the advancement 
of neo-liberal policies, which seem to aggravate gender inequalities rather than 
favor an improvement in women’s standards of living. 
In particular, the reproduction of human beings, which is the foundation of every 
economic and political system, and the enormous amount of paid and unpaid 
domestic work done daily by women in the home (and in the informal economy), 
is what permits the world to evolve and to perform and respond to different 
challenges. From a feminist perspective, this issue postpones and calls for the 
transformation of our everyday life and the creation of new forms of solidarity 
(Dalla Costa, 1973; Federici, 2012).
Numerous opinions today denounce an overall worsening of the woman’s 
condition due to policies of deregulation and privatization and the direct effects 
and the mechanisms they have triggered, dismantling social welfare structures 
and reducing the quality level of social reproduction and incomes.
With regard to gender security, an increasing political awareness of male 
violence against women sheds light on the urgent need to intervene at various 
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levels. Degani (2013) further states that “[w]ith reference to the conflicts of 
the 1990’s, to traditional practices affecting women and to the consequences 
of poverty, unemployment and precarious living conditions, the need to 
discuss the issue of violence against women in terms of security crisis appears 
evident” (p. 10). Male violence against women is a universal problem, despite 
the peculiarities marking the various geographic and social contexts as a 
consequence of gender inequalities.
Violence against women can be viewed as a turning point between male and 
female insecurity that allowed us to seize one of the main critical issues for 
human rights today. 
The linkage between patriarchal structures and culture with violence is much 
more complex than would appear at first sight due to the fact that violence 
takes shape within a continuum of power that sometimes makes it difficult 
to distinguish among different forms, fluctuations, and phases. “Inequality 
is tied to violence with a double cord. First of all, inequality breeds and 
favors violence, which is an expression or effect of inequality itself. Second, 
inequality is fuelled and fostered by violence” (Degani, 2013, p. 12). Violence 
also represents the real gap between a ‘male’ and ‘female’ concept of human 
security, and is the most significant manifestation of systemic conditions of 
discrimination.
In humanitarian crises, the widespread risk of violence against women can be 
framed from a perspective of unequal gender relationships in both the family and 
society. There can be an escalation of specific forms of violence against women 
in societies experiencing armed conflict (Fisher, 2010). 
Violence against women can be observed as a means of warfare in such contexts, 
precisely intended to target the civilian community. In humanitarian emergencies, 
since the early stage, women become even more vulnerable to violence as a 
result of fraying social structures and the collapse of political and legal systems, 
but more specifically because they normally lack protective instruments and 
social structure (Ní Aoláin, 2009, 2011). 
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The international community’s efforts to contrast male violence against women 
based on gender, formally announced during the World Human Rights Conference 
in Vienna in 1993, are summarized in the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence against Women, adopted by the General Assembly in the same year and 
in the appointment by the former United Nations Human Rights Commission 
(UNHRC) of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women. The work 
of this last mechanism was remarkable during the 1990’s and in the following 
years, and today represents a very important input in updating political agendas 
on this matter (Charlesworth, 1990; Degani, 2000; Sullivan, 1994).
The relevance attributed to the issue of violence against women and more in 
general towards populations struck by humanitarian emergencies is partly 
linked to the strong media impact of a number of emergencies during the 1990’s 
(Pickup, Williams, & Sweetman, 2001). Reference here is made in particular to 
ethnic conflicts where sexual violence was used as an instrument of war. 
In this historical phase, the conflict in Syria, and the resulting refugee crisis in 
the Middle East, has placed many girls and women at risk of different forms of 
violence, exploitation, and insecurity. More than 75% of the Syrian refugees who 
have fled to neighboring countries are women and children (UNHCR, 2016b). 
According to the UN, Gender-Based Violence (GBV), including child marriage, 
is the main issue currently experienced by girls and women in Syria and hosting 
countries, and trafficking linked to smuggling of migrants in the context of 
mixed migrations is on the increase. Without a doubt, the dimension assumed 
today by this phenomenon indicates the absolute necessity of reinforcing 
international instruments devoted to the protection of women’s rights in order 
to avoid conflict related to situations that affect women who have been forcibly 
displaced, especially those on the move to seek asylum. This implies framing 
better the acts committed against women and girls as part of genocidal violence, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
From a historical point of view, the condition of women in armed conflicts has 
not been the object of specific attention under international law. Sexual violence 
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in armed conflict is, of course, forbidden and sanctioned under international 
humanitarian law but the efficacy of these provisions in preventing and 
identifying accountability for these crimes remains unconvincing, although the 
new great attention towards victims of severe crimes in international human 
rights and in the criminal law drawn up by the European Union and the Council 
of Europe is promising.
3. Women, peace, and security: 
beyond the symbolic dimension 
From the very start, United Nations activities for the promotion of the status of 
women and the protection of women’s rights have been characterized by the link 
between peace, development, and equality. Reconsideration of three fundamental 
policy elements in a holistic manner was needed starting from the First World 
Conference on the International Women’s Year held in Mexico City in 1975, even 
though a more elaborated conceptualization of the issue at the policy level was 
only developed in the framework of the Third World Conference on Women in 
Nairobi in 1985. As stated in Degani (2013), in subsequent years, “the elaboration 
of the linkages between these three objectives (peace, development, equality) 
formed the basis for the political discussion and activity not only of the women’s 
movement but also of international institutions devoted to the protection of human 
rights” (p. 19) and more specifically those which was/is related to the promotion 
of women, such as the UN Commission on the Status of Women.
Institutional feminists, in particular advocacy activities for peace, have called 
for the equal participation of women and men in decision making associated 
with conflict resolution and peacemaking, underlining the importance of gender 
equality as a value in itself and in opposition to the lack of physical security 
and the persistence of discriminatory social norms that reproduce and legitimate 
violence against women both in private and public dimensions.
In practical terms, the prevalence of violence that women in transitional societies 
experience, both in the public and private spheres, can be contrasted not only by 
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placing barriers to state or public violence directed against them. There is, rather, 
a fundamental need to promote transformative actions against violence and its 
underlying causes in the private sphere, as part of a more holistic transformative 
and inclusive project. This situation needs to change, not only because it is 
a source of major global injustice in the world, but also because poverty is 
sexist, and poverty (of resources and rights) is the primary cause of women’s 
vulnerability in emergencies. Poverty and gender inequality are on the same line.
“Of fundamental importance is the recognition of the role of women in 
situations of crisis and of their struggle to contribute to the well-being 
of their communities. […] An equitable gender representation in peace 
negotiations should ensure the social legitimization of such decision-
making processes and […] provide for more acceptable solutions to 
those members of society bearing the highest costs of war, [thus offering 
women a chance for advancement in numerous areas related to their 
rights]” (Degani, 2013, p. 20).
4. Women’s security in the framework 
of UN Security Council resolutions 
Through the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR)1325 and the subsequent UNSCRs, the Women, Peace, and Security 
(WPS) agenda identifies three priority issues: the representation of women at all 
levels of peace and security governance; the significant participation of women 
in peace and security governance; and the protection of women’s rights and 
bodies in conflict and post-conflict situations (Shepherd, 2014).
In relation to these issues, the UNSCR 1325 on Women and Peace and Security, 
adopted in 2000, signs an important stage towards the recognition of the 
supporting role and capacity of women in the prevention and resolution of 
conflicts and in encouraging the expansion of their contribution to international 
policing missions. The resolution thus recognizes women’s conceivable 
contribution to peace, in conflict resolution and, more generally, in assisting 
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post-war reconstruction efforts and the rehabilitation of victims. UNSCR 1325 
recognizes that men and women experience security differently and that to build 
sustainable peace, women need to be fully involved.
In its 18 paragraphs, the resolution expresses the commitment of the most 
important body responsible for the maintenance of peace and security in the 
international community to enhance the involvement and full participation of 
women in all efforts towards peace and security. 
In this important document, which recognizes the different experiences of 
women and men with regard to security and peace, the Security Council 
prompts the States to focus more on gender-sensitive issues when training the 
peacekeeping personnel, and urges all parties to armed conflict to fully respect 
international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls. 
Clearly this implies that there be a Security Sector Reform (SSR) that meets the 
different security needs recognizing different gender attitudes in terms of men, 
women, boys, girls, and others too. 
“Resolution 1325, given its wide-ranging goals and unanimous 
approval, is considered a milestone in that it inaugurated a new kind 
of commitment which from 2000 has led to the adoption of other 
important resolutions in the area. […] It is thus evident that the growing 
attention towards populations struck by humanitarian emergencies must 
adequately address the gender dimension in peace negotiations if such 
interventions are to be effective” (Degani, 2013, p. 22).
Over the last two decades, the UNSC has adopted other resolutions that highlight 
some of the particular consequences of armed conflict afflicting women and 
girls, and which emphasize the idea of an active role in transition processes, in 
disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and, more in general, in reforming 
the security sector. In real terms, these documents do not challenge effectively the 
‘patriarchy’ and masculine culture structures of the transitional justice reforms/
processes, nor do they pay sufficient attention to the link between ordinary and 
extra-ordinary violence against women. First of all, according to Puechguirbal 
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(2010), the re-proposition of stereotyping language in these texts sometimes 
risks removing women’s agency keeping them in the subordinated position of 
victims. As a result, women are not seen as actors within their own community 
and agents of change in post-conflict environments. As discussed in Martín de la 
Rosa and Domínguez Romero (2014), 
“[t]he representation of women in these resolutions plays down female 
agency, articulating a feminine subject that in times of conflict is the 
target of sexual violence, [and other severe forms of sexual abuses in 
particular in the context of forced prostitution and human trafficking.] 
In times of peace they just reproduce the roles assigned to them in the 
power hierarchy, where they are subordinated and dependent [on a male 
(with different status)]. In other words, as stated by Shepherd (2011), it 
can be said that the discursive representation of gender assumed in these 
documents reproduces roles where women [appear] fragile, passive, and 
in need of protection, and men as [breadwinners who have always had 
the decision-making power and the responsibility of providing] needed 
protection to women, [as foreseen by the social, cultural rules and in 
some situations by law systems too]” (p. 59).
This situation contributes to a complete lack of awareness about the real 
nature of the ordinary private violence experienced by women and arising 
from usual dimensions of subordination and discrimination, which is totally 
dissociated from the wider issues of control being exercised in society. 
Differently, focusing upon women’s potential to fill active roles in the political 
transformation, women’s participation should be vital both in contributing 
to solve the crisis and in making sure that women’s interests and needs are 
addressed in every agreement and political choice moving forward. In many 
places around the world as commonly recognized, war can be a turning point 
for female empowerment. As men are absent, fighting or killed, women move 
out of their traditional roles.
In November 2011, a UNFPA report found that one in three women in Syria 
experienced domestic violence and several Syrian laws clearly disadvantage 
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women; the penalty for ‘honor’ killing is softer than for other murders, 
and there is no legislation that specifically prohibits gender discrimination 
(UNFPA, 2011). The Syrian family code limits women’s financial rights within 
marriage if they work outside the home without their husbands’ consent. In 
other words, Syrian women have to fight against patriarchy, dictatorship, and 
also religious extremism. In these circumstances, it is explicit that women’s 
participation could also be needed to improve reporting on gender-specific 
impacts of violence to struggle against the reproduction of the structural 
dimensions and causes that continue to improve severe forms of women’s 
human rights violations.
All the acts provide guidance for states, regional organizations, the UN system 
and other stakeholders in addressing the needs of women and girls during 
and after armed conflict, and in promoting their empowerment, stressing the 
importance of protecting women by preventing conflict-related sexual violence 
and other abuses.
The UNSC resolutions adopted after Resolution 1325 in general are focused 
on the peculiar negative effects of armed conflict on women, the potential of 
women’s contribution to peace, security, and reconciliation, and the need to 
combat male violence against women declining these specific aspects with more 
or less importance and deepened differently.
A few days after the adoption of UNSCR 1325, in adopting another resolution, 
Resolution 1327 (2000), the UNSC re-emphasized the importance of the 
Secretary-General in conflict prevention and reaffirmed the role of women in 
conflict prevention, resolution, and peace-building.
The adoption of this act was followed by others, first UNSCR 1820, adopted in 
June 2008, which underlines the need for special measures to protect women 
and girls from sexual violence in armed conflict, and to ensure access to justice 
and assistance for victims while also emphasizing the role of peacekeepers 
in protecting civilians and advocating an increase in the number of female 
peacekeepers. 
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UNSCR 1888, adopted in September 2009, focuses on the inclusion of sexual 
violence issues in peace processes, and on addressing impunity in order to ensure 
access to justice for survivors. It also defines new mechanisms within the UN 
to intensify the struggle against war-related sexual violence, and foresees the 
establishment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue. 
After this document, UNSCR 1889, adopted in October 2009, widens the 
Council’s focus on and commitment to women’s participation in peace-building, 
emphasizing the role of women in political and economic decision-making. 
Differently, Resolution 1960, adopted in 2010, establishes a monitoring, 
analysis, and reporting mechanism on conflict-related sexual violence, and calls 
upon parties to armed conflict to make specific, time-bound commitments to 
prohibit and punish this crime, also asking the Secretary-General to monitor 
those commitments. Meanwhile, UNSCR 2106, adopted in 2013, reiterates its 
demand for the complete suspension, with immediate effect by all parties to 
armed conflict, of all acts of sexual violence and it calls for these parties to 
make and implement specific due date commitments to combat sexual violence 
focusing on accountability for perpetrators (Pividori & Degani, 2018).
In the same year, UNSCR 2122 aims at strengthening women’s role in all stages 
of conflict prevention and resolution and in addressing the persistent gaps in the 
implementation of WPS agendas, expresses the will to increase the attention, 
making reference in particular to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, to 
post-conflict peace-building, to strengthening the promotion of the rule of law, 
and to the threats caused by terrorist acts.
In the last years, the UNSC has adopted two other resolutions on this topic: in 
October 2015, UNSCR 2242, on women’s roles in countering violent extremism 
and terrorism, and in March 2016, UNSCR 2272, on sexual exploitation and 
abuse in peace operations. 
Recently, the position expressed by the CEDAW Committee on the 18th of 
October 2013 with the General Recommendation (GR) no. 30 on women in 
conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations, reaffirms the link between 
Paola Degani 
53
the principle of non-discrimination and the urgent need to recognize the specificity 
of women’s condition in the situation of humanitarian crises and conflicts. 
5. Recent developments: on the CEDAW 
Committee General Recommendation no. 30 
As is known, CEDAW has used this form of soft law to support a correct and 
coherent interpretation within the human rights perspective of the contents of 
the convention by the member states (Kois, 1999). CEDAW GRs in recent years 
in particular have made a progressive adaptation of the text of the convention 
possible with the evolution of the principle of gender/sex-based discrimination. 
This has been done through a progressive integration of a relevant number of 
issues and by updating the interpretations with regard to many topics from the 
entry into force of the convention and with it the CEDAW committee. 
This GR improves synergies between WPS and broader human rights duties. 
With this act, the committee called on CEDAW state parties to guarantee that 
implementation of their WPS efforts will consider within the broader equality 
and women’s rights obligations of CEDAW. Further, state parties are called to 
report on implementation of their WPS commitments in their periodic reports to 
CEDAW. GR no. 30 specifies that
“the general recommendation covers the application of the Convention 
to conflict prevention, international and non-international armed 
conflicts, situations of foreign occupation, as well as other forms of 
occupation and the post-conflict phase. In addition, the Recommendation 
covers other situations of concern, such as internal disturbances, protracted 
and low intensity civil strife, political strife, ethnic and communal 
violence, states of emergency and suppression of mass uprisings, war 
against terrorism and organized crime, that may not necessarily be 
classified as armed conflict under international humanitarian law and 
which result in serious violations of women’s rights and are of particular 
concern to the Committee” (CEDAW, 2013, p. 2).
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The structure of this document is highly technical. It offers an extensive 
interpretation of the convention’s content and develops a coherent approach that 
confirms the continuum of work carried out by the committee in recent years 
directed towards the structuring of increasing affirmation of the due diligence 
standard. The specificity of this document is with no doubt represented by the 
political need and opportunity of the CEDAW committee to identify the impact 
of the convention declining more deeply in terms of “women’s human rights”, a 
list of issues normally and implicitly included within WPS agendas today. With 
the aim of polishing every ambiguity about these matters, the committee offers 
a holistic perspective and a genuine interpretation to states operating on these 
situations and contexts.
Particularly, the general standard of the due diligence and the perspective 
of a duty to protect women based on this political framework should help 
intergovernmental organizations reinforce the commitment towards more 
concrete efforts in protecting women and supporting their fundamental capacities.
GR no. 30 is a document that definitely frames issues related to the status of 
women in different humanitarian emergency situations in a more complex 
manner compared with the different acts adopted by the UNSC. Through a 
progressive integration of a number of acts and situations within the concept 
of discrimination, and with the consequential duties under the convention, 
the committee progressively increases the political relevance and the holistic 
character of the convention content offering women a more adequate protection 
of their rights. And there is no doubt of the very high symbolic dimensions in 
these documents of CEDAW’s commitment in this phase, but it is absolutely 
undeniable that this treaty body has in recent years acquired a much stronger 
legitimacy than in the past.
To sum up, the GR considers the possibility offered by the convention in conflict 
prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations, the application to state and non-
state actors, the complementarity with the international humanitarian, refugee 
and criminal laws, and with the UNSC agenda on women, peace, and security, 
and the monitoring and reporting system in relation to the treaty ratification. 
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Many issues are taken into consideration in the text: conflict prevention, 
male violence, human-trafficking, participatory attitudes, level of education, 
employment opportunities, and health services. For rural women too: 
displacement, refugees and asylum-seekers, security sector reforms, disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration, constitutional and electoral reform, access to 
justice, nationality and statelessness, and marriage and family relations.
6. To conclude: on the state of the art
The approach proposed by the international community on the issue of human 
security and the status of women, categorically overcomes the traditional 
perspective of the relationship between the gender issues and armed conflicts, 
emphasizing, on the other hand, the impact of armed conflicts on the civil 
population and in particular on women and girls with a particular emphasis on 
the role of sexual violence. Contrary to the view that wars and humanitarian 
emergencies are distinguished phenomena that do not interfere with women’s 
lives and the human reproductive dimension, it is acknowledged that they deeply 
impact the female population. 
Considering that women have a greater risk of dying and being injured than 
fighters seems to point to the significant way in which armed conflicts have 
changed over time.
Disarmament, demobilization, and social reintegration during the transition 
phase are today included in the political agenda of the international 
community, as is the problem of forced displacement. This is underscored by 
the High Commissioner for Refugees data (UNHCR, 2016a) that illustrates 
the fact that women and girls are among those seeking in great proportion 
humanitarian protection. This also implies that trafficking in human beings, 
due to the features of the migration processes today, finds a favorable 
ground in situations of conflicts. On their journeys, the migrants who flee 
from their country of origin towards European nations using the Balkan 
route, especially in countries like Greece and former Yugoslav Republic of 
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Macedonia, have a high probability of encountering situations of violence, 
extortion, and exploitation, including rape, transactional sex, and human 
and organ trafficking. Women and girls, especially those travelling alone, 
face particularly high risks of certain forms of violence, including sexual 
violence by smugglers, criminal groups, and individuals in countries along 
the route. As of November 2015, per government figures, 950,469 refugees 
and migrants had arrived in Europe through the Mediterranean, with the vast 
majority of these arriving to Greece (797,372). According with UNHCR 
(2016a) statistical data, approximately, 24 percent are children and 16 percent 
are women, while 3,605 have either lost their lives or are missing. Although 
the existing research and progress made in the work against sexual gender 
based violence, there is still a perception among many humanitarian actors 
that these facts are not a feature of this crisis due to a lack of data on its 
incidents and due to the tentative of the victims to avoid disclosing this 
experience and seeking assistance unless there is a severe and visible health 
implication. As described in the report produced by the Special Rapporteur 
of the Human Rights Council on trafficking in persons (UNHRC, 2016, p. 8), 
since 2011, an increased number of Syrian refugees have been trafficked for 
purposes of labor exploitation in the agricultural, industry, manufacturing, 
catering, and informal sectors in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Women and 
girls seeking to survive in conflict zones are often compelled to exchange 
sexual services and even to “marry” for food, shelter, protection, or safe 
passage. UNHCR (2016a, p. 11) has recognized and denounced that women 
in conflict situations are vulnerable to a range of discriminatory practices that 
increase their dependence (for example, receiving smaller food rations or not 
having ration cards or other identity documents in their own name) and are 
disproportionately exposed to sexual violence. The trafficking of women and 
girls for sexual exploitation, which frequently implies such acts as sexual 
slavery, forced marriage, forced prostitution, and forced pregnancy, features 
within the broader scenario of sexual violence perpetrated against the civilian 
population during and in the wake of conflicts. Perhaps the link between 
trafficking in women and girls and sexual violence is clearly recognized 
today at institutional levels and in many international instruments. As the 
same Special Rapporteur has underlined presenting her report during the 
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General Assembly 71st session (UNHRC, 2016, p.12), although some form of 
abduction has been a feature of armed conflicts in the past, recently there has 
been an extreme arrangement of abducting women and girls from their homes 
or schools in conflict-affected contexts and areas. These women and girls may 
subsequently be forced to marry and/or work as sex slaves. Such exploitation, 
in some cases, also involves trafficking for forced and recently for shamed 
marriage and sexual enslavement by religious and political extremist groups. 
In order to prevent such kidnappings, families are reported to be confining 
women and girls and removing girls from school. Trafficking for the purpose 
of forced prostitution does not represent an act perpetrated only by organized 
criminal groups. For instance, the Special Rapporteur’s (UNHRC, 2016, p. 12) 
report underlines that Syrian refugee women and girls may be trafficked for 
sexual exploitation through the practice of “temporary” or child and/or forced 
marriages. They may be obliged by their parents to marry and these arrangements 
are a way of securing their daughters’ safety and safeguarding the family’s 
maintenance through the bride price. Once married, such wives are likely to 
end up in a situation of sexual and domestic exploitation. Trafficking for forced 
prostitution through marriages with foreign men who then force their “brides” 
into prostitution in another country is common.
Sexual violence contributes to exacerbate the difficulties of the families to adapt 
their life during armed conflicts. It should be considered that:
“one of the consequences of humanitarian emergencies and current 
migration flows is the phenomenon of family disintegration. In this 
context, a large number of family households, often including elderly 
or persons with disabilities, are headed by and thus totally dependent 
[on a woman]. Once again, then, strengthening [women’s] economic 
security status [and personal capacity], thus promoting their economic, 
social, and cultural rights, is of fundamental importance. It would not 
only enable women to fully participate in decision-making processes, 
whether in times of emergency or transition, but it also confers full 
citizenship upon them” (Degani, 2013, p. 25).
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Instead of advancing a paradigm of security centered on military control, security 
should be framed as a part of the wider move towards global governance, 
becoming an all-encompassing condition in which individuals live in safety and 
in dignity. 
What is certain is that the number of relevant situations on the humanitarian level 
in the world, the spread of conflicts and complex emergency crises suggest that 
giving effect to the content of these acts seems difficult. It is necessary to build 
an idea of real sustainability of international political processes that focuses 
on the person; one which re-proposes a new social welfare policy through the 
research of a new world order project, capable of solving the humanitarian crises 
that we are living today, and it is necessary to consider that gendered inequalities 
and discriminations between men and women should be part of the same global 
frameworks for bringing about lasting peace and a real people-centered approach 
towards security.
For women, safety requires a comprehensive reflection on the system of 
inequalities and a general political effort towards more equitable societies in 
terms of human rights and access to resources.
Regarding the main causes of male violence, they involve redefining the 
social structures and community systems. Moreover, women’s autonomy, their 
decision-making skills, and their empowerment also need to be reinforced. 
A proper understanding of violence against women within the patriarchal 
structures of society allows for a politicization of issues related to violence, 
and for a concrete elimination of the obstacles that do not permit women to 
live in dignity.
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4Transitional justice, constitution making, and gender equality in a post conflict Syria
Sara Pennicino1
We are all well aware of the fact that the war in Syria is still far from an end and 
therefore one might think that addressing the issue of post conflict transitional 
justice with specific reference to gender equality might appear very abstract and 
disconnected from reality. This criticism is certainly not unfounded, however, 
it cannot be ignored that one of the recommendations of the Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, established on 
the 22nd of August 2011 by the Human Rights Council2, is to “[t]ake appropriate 
action by referring the situation to justice, possibly to the International Criminal 
Court or an ad hoc tribunal” (emphasis added, UNHRC, 2017, para. 147).
As a constitutional lawyer, I would therefore like to contribute to the debate herein 
by framing the mutual influence of transitional justice and constitutionalism, 
understood as the set of fundamental, constitutive legal standards and practices, 
with specific attention to the enhancement of gender equality in constitution 
making. Bridging political transitions and constitution drafting is one of the keys 
to unleashing long term effects of inclusive and transformative peace-building, 
with regard to systemic gender inequality. Accordingly, I will first address the 
concept of transitional justice and its developments and then move to analyze its 
relationship with constitutionalism. 
Finally, although I will not specifically focus on the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR 1325) or the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) as tools for moving 
1. University of Padova, Padova, Italy; sara.pennicino@unipd.it
2. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic was established on the 22nd of 
August 2011 by the Human Rights Council through resolution S-17/1 adopted at its 17th special session with a mandate to 
investigate all alleged violations of international human rights laws since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic.
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the gender equality agenda forward in conflict and post-conflict contexts, 
it is important to note that both documents identify constitution-making as a 
necessary step in improving the status of women and girls in these scenarios; 
CEDAW (1979) Article 2 calls upon states to “embody the principle of the 
equality of men and women in their national constitutions”, while UNSCR 1325 
paragraph 8.c urges “the protection of and respect for human rights of women 
and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution”3. I will make my final 
remarks on why and how this relationship is relevant for the inclusion of gender 
equality in constitution making. 
1. Transitional justice
In her groundbreaking work, Ruti Teitel (2003) explains transitional justice as 
“the view of justice associated with periods of political change, as reflected in 
the phenomenology of primarily legal responses that deal with the wrongdoing 
of repressive regimes” (p. 893). With antecedents in the post-Second World War 
trials at Nuremberg and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
transitional justice has developed over the 20th century, showing the urgency for 
a more comprehensive approach aimed at guaranteeing accountability beyond 
the State. In other words, “transitional justice is [today] an encompassing term 
that refers to the normative, legal, and political concerns around how post-
authoritarian and post-conflict societies provide accountability for the human 
rights violations of the past, while also consolidating a transition away from 
political violence” (O’Rourke, 2013, p. 17).
Developments in transitional justice have also played, and will continue to 
play, a role in changing the content of constitutionalism. Indeed, 20th century 
constitutionalism was shaped around a demand for limited government and its 
essential task was that of defining the ambit of applicability of constitutional 
norms according to the principle of separation of powers and judicial review. 
Liberal constitutionalism was modelled on a “pre-commitment and constraint on 
3. S.C.Res.1325, paragraph 8, U.N.Doc.S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
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governmental and state action, usually in the name of individual rights” (Teitel, 
2014, p. 57), while, on the contrary, contemporary constitutionalism shows a 
growing concern with accountability for action (and inaction) of the state and 
also of non-state actors. In fact, “accountability appears not to be exhausted or 
fulfilled either by rights against the state or by democratic self-determination” 
(Teitel, 2014, p. 58), as is evident from core approaches to normative and judicial 
protection of rights in 21st century constitutional systems. A great contribution to 
this change can be ascribed to the evolution of the concept of state responsibility 
in international law; indeed, the latter has progressively expanded the meaning 
of state action as a primal concern of constitutional law. 
For well-known historical reasons, 20th century constitutionalism had its focus 
on abusive conduct of the state, while more recent trends show evidence of 
a demand for further understanding of responsibility beyond the state. This 
evolving conception has also been informed by contemporary developments 
in transitional justice, especially with regard to overlapping areas between 
international law and international humanitarian law. As an example, one may 
think of CEDAW, which reaches out well beyond state action into the private 
sphere, i.e. where discrimination is at stake, and how this international convention 
expanded individual responsibility. As a result, constitutional obligations are 
impacted in terms of the “evolution of substantive norms of accountability in the 
changing parameters surrounding the protection of non-state actors in interstate 
affairs” (Teitel, 2014, p. 59).
It should be noted that “the momentum of this reciprocal influence, which 
ultimately makes a mark at [the] constitutional level, is also the result of the 
increasingly prominent dimension of the combined internationalization and 
judicialization of transitional justice” (Teitel, 2014, p. 59). In fact, when politics 
cannot work out a solution in a post-conflict context, victims’ groups and other 
civil society organizations refer to transnational institutions in order to seek 
reparation. On the contrary, in the past, these situations, as difficult as they 
might have been, were resolved largely in domestic fora. For example, “both 
South Africa and Argentina’s transitional justice arrangements were the product 
of multiple stages of political bargaining and, particularly in South Africa, 
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processes of constitution making, including processes of democratic ratification, 
and consensus over commitments concerning what values should guide the 
transition”4. 
Having said this, the internationalization of transitional justice is not limited to 
the role of adjudicatory bodies, but it involves international organizations and 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) at a transnational level who interact 
with local NGOs and other organized groups, especially victims’ groups. This 
combination of levels calls for specific attention to the context in order to deliver 
true justice, i.e. justice as understood in that specific context. One possible 
approach is that of Rwanda, with the combined prosecutions by the International 
ad hoc tribunal and the Gacaca Court system – justice in the grass – at a local 
level.
2. Transitional justice and constitution making
The mainly backward looking aims of transitional justice and the forward looking 
ones of constitution making are linked. However, depending on what approach 
is adopted towards transitional justice, the constitutional outcome may differ. 
For example, a strictly restorative approach to transitions has the objective of 
restoring the status quo ante and will therefore orient the type of constituent 
process in both procedural (who is involved, is it shared with the polity, etc.) and 
substantive (content wise) terms. On the contrary, there should be a transitional 
commitment to transformation in order for the constitutional change to represent 
the legal response to the past regime on the road to liberalization. 
But what is the link between this commitment and constitutional change? “A 
transitional context itself lends the constitutional project an implicit teleology” 
(Teitel, 2014, p. 61), meaning that the way transitional justice is handled and 
delivered shapes the constitutional self. South Africa is again the best example, 
4. See Azanian Peoples Org. and Others v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC) and Azanian 
Peoples Org. and Others v. Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1996 (4) SA 562 (CC) (upholding amnesty agreement 
against victim’s challenge).
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with its case of ubuntu – the art of humanity –; the inclusion of social rights in 
the Constitution, and the recognition of cultural and linguistic rights in both 
individualistic and communal terms. In countries that did not follow the path 
of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) or other forms of transition 
justice, history tells us that many years after the end of the transition, questions 
about victims and perpetrators of past-regimes’ abuses are still in the spotlight 
of attention5. However, a best practice approach based on the idea that a TRC 
model should be universally applicable to grant a successful transition is 
evidently inadequate; rather, the focus should be on transformation reconciled 
with existing institutions and the contextual meaning of justice. 
3. Constitution making and gender equality
With specific regard to the gender equality agenda in transitional justice and 
constitution making, contemporary scholarship started paying attention to 
demands for a feminist perspective only as a consequence of widespread sexual 
violence against female civilian populations in the Balkans conflict (see for 
example Allen, 1996; Askin, 1997; Copelon, 1995; Meznaric, 1994). Currently, 
feminist priorities in transitional justice scholarship are “(1) the recognition of 
gender-specific harms against women in transitional justice mechanisms and 
processes; (2) the amelioration of structural gender inequalities that make women 
particularly vulnerable to certain harms; and (3) the participation of women in 
the processes and institutions of transitional justice” (O’Rourke, 2015, p. 118).
Generally speaking, nationalism and war usually facilitate a cultural patriarchal 
backlash with regard to the role of women in society, while it is also true 
that women, during wartime, experience new identities and responsibilities. 
Moreover, “the supposed reconciliation, and oppositions to reconciliation, which 
must take place at the wars’ end, aims to create a coherent memory and identity 
from a context, which is much more fragile and unstable” (Luci, 2005, p. 146).
5. See Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. v. State of Peru (The Barrios Altos Case) 14 May 2001, Series C No. 75 (Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights).
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This process is relevant to the definition of what has been identified above as 
the constitutional self; in fact, the restoration of the status quo ante combined 
with the necessity to build a ‘people’ based on the identification of who ‘we’ 
is as opposed to ‘the other’, may cause a conundrum for gender equality in 
nation building, as this operation has historically excluded women (Ivekovic, 
1999, p. 17)6. On the basis of past experience, for example in former Yugoslavia 
where “from a specific feminist activity, groups moved on to becoming more 
anti-nationalist and pacifist” (Ivekovic, 1999, p. 98), it appears to be crucial, 
for both international and local actors, to keep the focus on women as inspirers, 
recipients, and deliverers of (transitional) justice. This will ensure that women 
are a constituent subject and not the object of a gender-blind constituent process. 
4. Transitional justice, constitution making, 
and gender equality: why is a human rights 
centered approach the best option available?
Adopting a taken-out-of-context toolkit/best practice approach to the inclusion 
of gender equality in constitution making, particularly if the latter follows a 
transitional justice process, is not advisable for a number of reasons. First of all, 
a toolkit approach could backfire on women in post-conflict societies. Second, 
especially for international and transnational organizations, it is advisable to 
move beyond advocacy of interest-based representation (e.g. reserved quotas) 
and take advantage of the jurisdictional and human rights-centered form 
of transitional justice, which positively focuses on context by working on 
individual cases. Accordingly, their action should be led by the principle of 
complementarity, i.e. complementing the transformative national project during 
the transitional justice phase. An example may clarify this final point. The 
deadline for victims to file cases of human rights abuses committed between July 
1955 and December 2013 in front of the Tunisian Truth and Dignity Commission 
expired on June 15 2016. Some 46,500 cases were filed, of which 8,800 by 
6. “Come le altre «minoranze», per esempio gli albanesi jugoslavi agli occhi dei nazionalisti serbi, o i serbi agli occhi 
dei nazionalisti croati, la donna avrebbe diritto alla democrazia (e, nel migliore dei casi, vi sarebbe rappresentata) solo 
se potesse provare la sua appartenenza alla specie umana secondo il modello maschile (o serbo, o...). Ma ciò è sempre 
impossibile da provare per chi, in quello stesso contesto, è ammesso solo in quanto è assente: in quel contesto che esclude”.
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women, i.e. nearly 21% of the total complaints. This percentage was only 5% at 
the beginning of the campaign and has risen significantly in the last few months 
thanks to the efforts of the Association Tounissiet (Tunisian women) and the 
International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). The first went from door 
to door to find victims and persuade them to take part in the transitional justice 
process by filing their stories; the second trained eleven women’s associations in 
reaching out to female victims and informing them about the urgency of filing 
their cases (Belhassine, 2016), thus positively impacting the transitional justice 
system through cooperative actions aimed at supporting and complementing the 
constitutionally vested body. 
Moreover, it should be underlined that international transitional justice 
mechanisms that end up being unable to deliver justice and truth to victims 
may turn out to be counterproductive. For example, the “top-down agenda for 
transitional justice in Kosovo, focused mainly on the institutional level, has 
ignored truth-seeking, victim support, apologies, reparation, and community 
reconciliation” and has instead “resulted in unplanned outcomes fuelling ethno-
nationalist discourses and increasing popular legitimacy of former combatants 
and their political power” (Visoka, 2016, p. 7). By side-lining civilian and 
minority victims of the conflict, it goes without saying that, in such a context, 
women who experienced and survived sexual violence were overshadowed and 
forgotten on one hand, and socially and politically stigmatized on the other. In 
order “to overcome these challenges, civil society organizations have played 
a vital role in recognizing the victims of conflict in Kosovo as well as filling 
the vacuum created by the lack of a formal truth-seeking mechanism” (Visoka, 
2016, p. 71) (e.g. Kosovo Memory Book, a project of the Humanitarian Law 
Center). 
5. Transitional justice, gender equality, 
and the future of Syrian women 
Turning back to the conflict in Syria, when the time comes to address the 
genocide of the Yazidis, lessons based on the experience of the last 25 years 
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should be taken into account. In the report entitled “They came to destroy”: 
ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis, released on the 16th of June 2016 (UNHRC, 
2016), the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic found that many of the women and girls “were sold as chattel and 
sexually enslaved by [ISIS] fighters. […] ISIS committed the crime of genocide 
by seeking to destroy the Yazidis through killings, sexual slavery, enslavement, 
torture, forcible displacement, the transfer of children, and measures intended to 
prohibit the birth of Yazidi children” (OHCHR, n.d., para 3). A robust, human 
rights-centered form of transitional justice in Syria will help form a constitutional 
system that provides accountability for crimes committed by state and non-state 
actors. Such a system must eschew gender-blindness and seek to include women 
in all stages of peace promotion. Again, women were and still are the ones paying 
the highest price in terms of suffering and human rights violations; therefore, 
in my opinion, when international organizations finally start prosecuting these 
heinous crimes, they should engage with civil society at a local level so as to 
really make women important stakeholders in the constitution making process. 
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Section 2.
The role of women in the Syrian 
uprising and in the political 
transitional process
Despite women’s participation and visibility in uprisings, the greatest risk in 
transitional processes lies in truncated or aborted transitions where women’s 
rights are given up as an item of populist compromise. This session explores how 
women’s rights organisations in Syria articulated and supported women’s claims 
for new representation and for a key role in bodies negotiating the transition 
towards democracy and regime change.
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5Lineages and trajectories of change and conflict in Syria
Massimiliano Trentin1
This chapter tries to view the current conflict in Syria from a historical and 
political perspective. With all the analytical limits of summaries, it highlights 
the main lineages of social and political conflict in the country: from the major 
changes that occurred in the 2000’s, to the transformation of the political conflict 
in 2011 into a full-scale war until late 2016. It also takes a look at the main 
features of the political regimes that developed alongside the conflict, with a 
final remark on a possible post-war Syria.
1. Lineages of development and conflict
In the well-known interview released in late January 2011 for The Wall Street 
Journal, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad stated that the on-going uprisings in 
Arab countries (namely Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen) would not affect 
Syria thanks to the government and state’s close relations to their people (WSJ, 
2011). According to him, the primary factor cementing the alliance between the 
ruling elite and the Syrian population was the posture that Damascus had adopted 
in Arab, Middle Eastern and international affairs, namely, the ‘resistance’ to 
foreign intervention (like the West-led ‘regime-change’ in Iraq in 2003), diktats 
(like the European Union requests for the disarmament of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) vs. the granting of the Association Agreement in 2009), and 
Israeli expansionism (occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights, the summer 2006 
war against Lebanon). Second, the path of economic reforms adopted since his 
access to power in 2000 secured the country from major social discontent: he 
conceded that much was still to be done, but the country was on the ‘right’ path 
1. University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy; massimiliano.trentin@unibo.it
How to cite this chapter: Trentin, M. (2018). Lineages and trajectories of change and conflict in Syria. In C. Padovani 
& F. Helm (Eds), Rethinking the transition process in Syria: constitution, participation and gender equality (pp. 73-88). 
Research-publishing.net. https://doi.org/10.14705/rpnet.2018.21.759
Chapter 5 
74
of change. However, he proved wrong because despite all its peculiarities, Syria 
was no exception to the processes of uneven development that has characterized 
the Arab world in recent decades and led to popular mobilization, both civic (the 
‘uprisings’ in 2010-2012) and violent (the ‘wars’ in 2012-2016) (Aita, 2014, 
p. 21; Declich, 2017, p. 47; Van Dam, 2017, p. 64).
A few months later, in March 2011, the country spiralled into a full-scale crisis, 
where popular demonstrations for civic and political reforms were met by the 
‘regime’ (al-nizam) with a mix of coercion, implemented through the large array 
of security services (al-mukhabarat) and elite units of the Syrian armed forces 
(Republican Guard), and a set of political reforms meant to appease dissent 
without endangering the primacy of the existing ruling elite (April, 2012). 
However, the ‘traditional’ strategy did not work in front of quite ‘new’ actors 
on the ground. Both the massive display of violence against mostly non-violent 
activists and the gathering of international support for the opposition soon turned 
the confrontation into open, armed conflict, where all parties believed they were 
fighting an ‘existential’ threat and thus behaved along the ‘winner-takes-all’ 
strategy. From early 2012, Syria was engulfed in a conflict that was at once civil, 
regional, and international, with multiple actors moving into the battlefield in 
order to grasp the economic and political assets enshrined in the lands and the 
people of modern Syria. 
Most of the literature on the conflict has highlighted its changing nature. First, 
it was a confrontation between a broad set of social groups that were largely 
marginalized by the ruling elites, particularly during the 2000’s, and a ‘regime’ 
which struggled to maintain its monopoly over the state and politics while 
disbanding those institutions and policies that so far had guaranteed its social 
constituencies. The geography of early demonstrations largely coincided with 
those urban centers in rural provinces (Deraa, Homs, Hama, Idlib, Deir al-Zor) 
that had been excluded from development policies or the inflow of private wealth 
that swept across Syria along the decade prior to the war (Al Laithy & Abu-Islamil, 
2005, pp. 27, 35; Sayigh, 2016; SCPR, 2013, p. 21). With the notable exception 
of the Mediterranean coast, these provinces were the bulwark of the Baathist 
social constituencies: the latter’s leadership being largely of rural, provincial 
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origin, ascended to power through the development of state institutions (armed 
forces, security services, education, health, and agricultural cooperatives) and 
mass organizations (Ba’th Party and Labour Unions) (Balanche, 2006; Batatu, 
1999). The fiscal crisis of the state and the ‘austerity’ measures of the 1980’s, the 
limited liberalizations of the 1990’s, and the major push towards private sector- 
and market-based reforms shifted the regime’s privileged constituencies from 
the rural, popular ones, to the urban, wealthy ones (Haddad, 2012). 
The delicate balance between those institutions that represented the different 
social and political constituencies under the long, embattled presidency of Hafez 
al-Assad was put under heavy strain by the reforms enforced by his son Bashar 
from the mid-2000’s. Once appointed to the presidency in 2000, he raised hopes 
for a relaxation of the Ba’thist monopoly on politics, but the repression of the 
civic, urban movement of the ‘Damascus Spring’ in 2001 signalled the limits on 
the scope of any reform process (Wieland, 2012, pp. 46-48): this latter might 
concern first and foremost economics, and met the approval of the elite in order 
to consolidate rather than endanger the current pillars of the state, namely the 
presidency and the security forces. The external threat of the US-led ‘regime-
change’ in Iraq in 2003, and rising pressure from European states against 
Damascus to relinquish its political control over neighboring Lebanon in 2005, 
contributed to distancing the ‘regime’ from the West and aligning it to more 
secure and traditional allies, like Iran, Russia, and China, which did not question 
the connections between domestic politics, development, and international 
relations (Zorob, 2007). While engineering new waves of political co-optation 
for private entrepreneurs and religious leaders, major space was accorded to 
wealthy businessmen in order to mobilize private capital in those sectors that 
were deemed more rewarding in terms of profits. During the 2000’s, the economic 
sectors that mostly contributed to the growth of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) were energy, trade, transport, information-technologies, finance, tourism, 
and real estate. Instead, agriculture, industry, and manufacturing, long being 
the backbone of the Ba’thist-led agro-industrial development, suffered from de 
facto de-investment in infrastructure, like irrigation systems (Mohtadi, 2012). 
The public (state and cooperatives) abstained for fiscal reasons, and the private 
focused on short-term production for export, thanks to the differentials between 
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the subsidized costs of production (originally meant for domestic consumption) 
and the neighboring countries’ market prices. 
With all due peculiarities in time and space, Syria embarked on a process of 
development which coupled the basics of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, 
which featured other cases in neoliberal globalization, with the so called ‘Dubai 
Consensus’, which translated the supply-based, market-oriented ‘Washington 
Consensus’ of the 1990’s into the Arab world of the 2000’s (Hanieh, 2011; 
Harvey, 2003, p. 137). 
Income, as well as the polarization of living conditions, increased sharply between 
provinces, to the detriment of waged-labor, peasant and urban, small merchants. 
The Regional Congress of the Ba’th Party in 2005 adopted the ‘Social-Market 
Economy’ model in the Tenth Five-Year Plan, which officially recognized the 
private sector as the main engine for growth and employment, whereas the public 
would guarantee social cohesion by providing basic services to those left out by 
market competition (SAR, 2016). However, there was no major fund left for the 
‘social’ (Abboud, 2015) once the Plan was implemented, and private actors, both 
domestic and foreign, mostly preferred to invest in economic activities which 
guaranteed short-term profits but did not provide major employment at a critical 
conjuncture, namely when Syria was experiencing the massive entry of the 
‘baby-boomers’ of the 1980’s and 1990’s into the labor-market (Aita, 2011). In 
their twenties and thirties, quite well-educated and highly connected to the rest of 
the world by the widespread and skilful use of information technologies, the new 
generations were unable to find any employment suited to their competences and 
life-expectations, if any at all, and were largely prevented from expressing their 
opinions in public, least of all organizing and engaging in politics, apart from in 
the regime’s institutions. 
Discontent and dissent found space on the internet, while resilience, ‘quiet 
encroachment’, and sporadic riots were devied as a major strategy for living as 
in other Arab states (Bayat, 2010, p. 43; Chalcraft, 2016, p. 22). Moreover, the 
dismantling of infrastructure and services in rural areas accelerated the peasants’ 
exodus towards urban centers. While Damascus and Aleppo, the main ‘global 
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cities’ of Syria, still managed the process, this was not the case for provincial 
centers excluded from the new patterns of development and the related new 
geography of wealth and power: in particular, this was the case of the rural, 
impoverished North-east (Ababsa, 2015). Religious groups and institutions 
like mosques, churches, and charitable associations were granted more space 
as service suppliers in order to counterbalance the retreat of state institutions 
in the peripheral areas (Aita, 2013; De Elvira & Zintl, 2012). In this case, the 
Presidency and security services cultivated close relations with specific religious 
forces as long as they promoted regime policies and prevented the emergence of 
any organized dissent: like co-opting conservatives, leading ‘ulama in Damascus 
or Aleppo, and flirting with radical, Salafi ones against US forces in Iraq (Lister, 
2015, p. 31; Mubayed, 2015, p. 42; Pierret, 2011; Weiss & Hassan, 2015, p. 99). 
However, once the regime faced crisis, these forces proved their autonomy and 
popular support. 
In all cases, the presidency, the security forces, and small groups of wealthy 
businessmen became the backbone of the ‘authoritarian upgrading’ of the Syrian 
regime, whereas mass organizations, like the Ba’th Party, the Unions, and the 
state, were downgraded to a secondary role (Hinnebusch, 2012; Trombetta, 
2014). Given this trend, the security services, and their practices of coercion 
and corruption, became the main interface of the regime for people living in the 
restive, subaltern suburbs of Damascus and Aleppo, as well as in rural provinces 
(Glasman, 2013). 
Social polarization, discontent, and early signs of tensions led the Presidency to 
a partial reassessment of the economic policies in 2010: the next XI Five-Year 
Plan was to focus back on agriculture and manufacturing, as well as on state 
intervention in the economy and the provision of social services (Amonajed, 
2012; Syria Today, 2010). And yet, while liberalization was still deemed 
necessary to trigger domestic growth, there were few signs for tackling the so-
called ‘institutional bottlenecks’ that prevented the development of any ‘liberal’ 
context in Syria. This was coupled with the engagement of former leading 
figures of the Ba’thist leadership who had been side-lined previously and were 
known both for their links to provincial Syria and security-oriented approach 
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to dissent (Abbas, 2011). The move was significant insofar as it meant that the 
Syrian leadership was preparing for major challenges ahead, given the growing 
instability in other Arab countries.
2. From political to armed conflict
The chronicles of the early protests accounted for their ‘civic’ features: namely, 
ultimate opposition to the police and security forces’ arbitrariness in enforcing 
law, their brutality in repressing dissent, and eventually their unaccountability 
to ordinary citizens. The regime resorted to the traditional strategy of hitting 
the frontline of dissent hard with violent coercion while co-opting the latter’s 
constituencies with limited rewards. Though that had worked on previous 
occasions, this time protesters engaged in sustained struggle, banking on the 
mobilization of Arab and foreign support to put pressure on Damascus, as they 
thought had occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, and later on Libya. The increasing, 
massive use of military violence by the elite units of the Syrian armed forces 
against protesters and the latter’s resort first to non-violence and later to 
armed force led to an escalation of the crisis, whose main trajectories might be 
summarized as follows, with all due limits2. 
Between early 2011 and early 2012, the confrontation was primarily between 
Syrian actors (Declich, 2017, p. 89; Phillips, 2016, p. 40; Van Dam, 2017, p. 96). 
On the opposition side, forces developed along the axis of ‘moderate-to-radical’ 
reform of the ‘regime’. However, the escalation of violence led to an outright 
rejection of the ‘regime’ as a whole, though without elaborating precisely whether 
the latter meant the whole ‘state’ or just the removal of the ruling elite. On the 
government side, after a referendum on February 2012, a new Constitution was 
adopted whose reforms were nevertheless deemed ‘too little, too late’. Activists 
scattered around the country organized into the Local Coordination Committees, 
while defectors from the Syrian Army formed the ‘Free Syrian Army’ (FSA), 
and increasingly relied on foreign powers for political and logistical support, 
2. For a timeline of the crisis in Syria, see the British guardian.co.uk for an accurate interactive map, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/interactive/2012/feb/15/syria-timeline-how-conflict-escalated-interactive.
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especially Turkey, the Gulf states, and NATO countries (later to be named ‘The 
Friends of Syria’). The Arab Gulf monarchies planned to get rid of al Assad and 
the Ba’thists namely, difficult partners and long-standing allies of their Iranian 
rival. In parallel, the presidency in Damascus was confident of its major allies’ 
support (Iran and Russia) and continued with the ‘hard-stick’ and ‘small-carrot’ 
strategy. The United Nations (UN) tried to mediate by sponsoring talks and 
meetings between parties (Geneva I, June 2012). 
From mid-2012 to summer 2013, with strong foreign backing from NATO 
countries as well, the opposition conquered and managed territories in 
provincial Syria, and moved military confrontation into the main urban centers. 
Radical, jihadist movements entered the conflict and proved skilful in waging 
war, enforcing discipline on armed units, channelling funds from abroad, and 
providing services to the areas under their control. Kurdish forces in the north 
began to act in their native territories against the FSA, jihadis (battles of Ras 
al-‘Ayn, 2012-2013), and occasionally against the Syrian armed forces, whereas 
the latter grew over-stretched in personnel and retreated to defend ‘core’ areas 
from Damascus to the Mediterranean coast.
The refusal by the US and UK to take military action against al Assad in the 
event of the chemical attacks in Damascus in August 2013 pushed the Lebanese 
militia of Hezbollah and Iran to engage officially, and help the Syrian armed 
forces to reconquer strategic areas in the center-west of the country throughout 
2014. In the opposition camp, space was open for radical, jihadi forces with 
sectarian discourse and agendas to take the lead in the armed struggle against 
the regime and the establishment of emirates or radical, Salafi systems of 
governance: especially in the Idlib province around Damascus and in eastern 
Syria along the Euphrates river. However, they split into different factions as 
soon as the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (‘Islamic State’ (IS), 
by June 2014) moved from neighboring Iraq to assert its primacy over Syrian 
rebels. Kurdish forces in the north resisted against the IS and, after the battle 
of Kobane/‘Ayn al ‘Arab (2014), consolidated their project for an autonomous 
municipal confederation (‘Rojava’). UN-backed talks (Geneva II, January-
February 2014) stalled as all parties tried to set ‘facts on the ground’ to their 
Chapter 5 
80
favor3. Supported by Turkey and the Gulf monarchies, rebels gathered forces 
around Islamist groups and fought back against the government in the north and 
south from early 2015 in a last bid for regime-reversal. Damascus was under 
heavy strain for lack of combat personnel and lack of discipline among pro-
regime militias – National Defence Forces (NDF) – and Iranian-trained forces. 
Russia intervened directly in September 2015 with a heavy air campaign, 
officially against the ‘terrorist’ forces of the IS, but substantially against al-
Qaeda in Syria (Jabhat al-Nusra) and all other rebel forces (FSA) which posed 
a major threat to the strategic ‘core’ of the regime. By reversing the military 
balance on the ground, Moscow planned to force rebels and their foreign backers 
to a ‘political solution’ based upon the primacy of existing state institutions, 
especially the regular Syrian armed forces. Meanwhile, Western countries 
(especially, the US, France, and the UK) began reassessing their involvement in 
Syria (logistics, training, funds) after the ‘nuclear deal’ with Iran in July 2015, 
which paved the way to a major appeasement in mutual relationships, and a de 
facto concerted campaign against the IS in Iraq. 
During 2016, previous processes were consolidated. Thanks to renewed military 
and organizational support from Russia, Damascus slowly took back control 
of more territory, both through military conquests and ‘siege’ strategies, until 
the major battle for Aleppo in late 2016. The rebels staged repeated counter-
offensives in the north and Aleppo, which proved effective but short-lived 
because of diminished foreign support. Meanwhile, with US support and 
Russian acquiescence, Kurdish-led forces – the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 
– expanded their reach against the IS in the north, liberating the city of Manbij, 
on the west bank of the Euphrates river, and laying siege to Raqqa, the de facto 
capital of the IS in Syria; in turn, this prompted Turkey’s military intervention 
beyond its border with Syria in October 2016. The end of the fifth year of war and 
2017 accounted for the total conquest of Aleppo city by the Syrian Army and its 
allies and the ejection of the rebels from most of the western parts of Syria under 
the UN-backed and Russian-led ‘de-escalation zones’; the rebel containment in 
3. For a timeline of UN-based diplomatic activities in Syria, see the website of Security Council Report, http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/syria.php.
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the Idlib province, where jihadis made their bid for leadership; the retreat of the 
IS down to the Euphrates river in the east and out of all major urban centers, 
from Raqqa to Deir er Zur and Albu Kamal; the consolidation of Kurdish-led 
‘Rojava’; and last but not least, the contest for leadership in the southern and 
eastern provinces between Western, Gulf-backed rebels and government forces.
3. Back to the future: 
from war to political, civic conflict?
The dynamics of the conflict in Syria have proven that, on their own, neither 
the Syrian government nor the opposition had the decisive capacity to strike a 
fatal blow against the other and win the conflict by military means. A strategic 
stalemate soon translated into a war of attrition. The so-called ‘regime’ proved 
more cohesive than expected, it had long experience in political survival and 
diplomacy, it could count on the asset of the remaining state institutions, and held 
major firepower but lacked sufficient human resources for waging a long war 
(Holliday, 2013; Kozak, 2015). The opposition enjoyed significant popular and 
international support and was rich and creative in establishing alternative patterns 
of governance and development (from the Local Coordination Committees to 
the Kurdish-led Rojava), even in war-contexts. However it suffered from scarce 
resources and deep fragmentation: besides sharing a common stance against the 
government in Damascus, they differed in the sources of political legitimacy 
(religion, sectarianism, nationalism, communitarianism) and related discourse, 
as well as in the negotiating strategies, which undermined their efficacy in 
crucial moments, and even led to armed clashes (Caffarella & Casagrande, 2015; 
Hassan, 2012; Holliday, 2012; Sayigh, 2013). 
Both camps had to rely increasingly on foreign support for diplomacy, finance, 
logistics, and armament supply. Despite frictions on military strategies, namely 
the role of militias, Iran and Russia proved more cohesive and coherent in 
their support to the Syrian regime, which eventually proved decisive to tilt the 
strategic balance of forces in their favor in late 2013 and 2015. On the contrary, 
NATO and Gulf monarchies’ support proved limited, hesitant, and contradictory, 
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providing aid to competing, rival groups with divergent projects for political and 
social development (Caffarella & Casagrande, 2016; Phillips, 2016, pp. 59, 147, 
168; Van Dam, 2017, p. 119). Last but not least, though very much dependent, 
the Syrian government still enjoyed quite a leverage vis-à-vis Moscow and 
Tehran in order to set its own priorities; on the contrary, the opposition had quite 
a limited influence over its foreign backers, and followed rather than conditioned 
their priorities. 
Despite the strategic stalemate, until late 2016 both the regime and the opposition 
framed their priorities and discourses along the patterns of a zero-sum game: 
accordingly, the ‘other’ represented not just a political rival but an existential, 
physical threat, with whom no legitimate compromise might be struck except 
for surrender and total, unconditional defeat. The Syrian government labelled 
all rebel factions as ‘terrorists’ and ‘foreigners’ whereas the latter denigrated 
Damascus as the ‘regime’, ‘killers’, ‘unbelievers’ (targeting the ‘Alawite or 
Shia’ members), or simply in the hands of the ‘Persians’ (meaning, Iran). Given 
the social fabrics of Syria, such uncompromising positions easily translated 
into the ideological categories and discourse of sectarianism, which flattens the 
complexity of affiliations and ‘multiple identities’ into just one binary category, 
as promoted by radical forces inside both camps (Hinnebusch, 2016). 
The widespread, direct experience of mass violence, death, and destruction 
pushed individuals and groups ‘to close ranks’ to the community they thought 
would guarantee their physical safety and material survival which, in the Syrian 
context, might coincide with ethnic and sectarian groups. Evidence from the 
ground shows the shifting nature of divisions: first, the divide between pro/
against the regime cut cross Syrian society; then, as the political conflict turned 
into an armed one, it located to specific territories (provinces, municipalities, 
districts) (Pierret, 2012; Rey, 2013, p. 89) whose social composition grew 
more homogeneous due to migrations and forced displacements; from then on, 
sectarianism was able to develop as a framework for defensive and offensive 
action, with substantial support from foreign countries as well (The Day 
After, 2016; Wherey, 2013). This process undermined any unitary projects or 
institutions. 
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A major consequence of such uncompromising postures concerned the central 
state institutions: since the ‘regime’ in Damascus kept control over most of them, 
their legitimacy as pillars of common affiliation and citizenship has been further 
discredited in the eyes of the opposition and their popular constituencies. All 
this, despite the fact that at the beginning most of the claims concerned not the 
value of the ‘state’ per se, but its reform and relinquishing from the control of the 
ruling elite (Aita, 2013, pp. 92-95). 
As the armed conflict was prolonged, different sets of government developed in 
the war-torn Syria: a military-led, political regime under the capital Damascus 
where the state decentralized most services to local levels but prevented popular 
participation in the decision-making process (SCPR, 2016a; Yazighi, 2014); 
radical Islamist-led regimes, under the IS or other jihadi forces, where minimal 
government institutions were built or run along supposedly Islamist criteria and 
popular participation was either prevented or limited to the norms set by the 
central leadership (Rey, 2017, p. 33); the Kurdish-led Rojava as well as other 
experiments in opposition-held territories saw citizens step in to run basic, 
public services according to their professional competence, and participated in 
the political decision-making process (Federici, 2015, pp. 81-90); here, a major 
difference concerned the capacity to provide physical security by centralizing or 
coordinating armed groups. 
Along the ups and downs of the conflict, several actors elaborated and submitted 
different political solutions to the crisis: from the regime to the opposition 
groups, from foreign powers to the UN, there was considerable consensus on the 
fact that a political solution would prevent further destruction and civil suffering. 
However, all efforts at negotiations, like the UN-sponsored ‘Geneva talks’, 
stalled on the issue of the role of President Bashar al-Assad and his loyal majors 
in any ‘political transition’. Both Damascus and jihadi-led rebels entrenched 
uncompromising stances, banking on their respective ‘long-term’ resistance 
capacity: as a consequence, time has never been ‘ripe’ for real negotiations 
and conflict resolution (Van Dam, 2017, p. 138; Zartmann, 2008). Then, since 
2015, Russian proposals were limited to ‘enlarging’ the current regime to some 
opposition groups, thus reflecting the new military balance on the ground. 
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From 2016 Damascus banked on military success to enforce only ‘local’ deals 
where rebels surrender, give up weapons, and migrate to other opposition-held 
territories. 
By December 2016, the death toll was estimated to be 500,000 people. Over 
4.8 million have fled the country, mostly to neighboring Turkey, Lebanon, and 
Jordan, and 6.3 million are internally displaced. Thirteen and a half million 
need humanitarian assistance, and less than a half is actually met by domestic 
and foreign assistance4. The agricultural, industrial, and infrastructural capacity 
of Syria has been cut to one-third, downgrading the country to a “shattered, 
fragmented” war economy, “mainly dominated by subjugating powers” and 
“dependent on external support” (SCPR, 2016a, pp. 23-26; SCPR, 2016b, pp. 
12-38; UN ESCWA, 2016a, pp. 83-87). Millions of children have lost years of 
school learning, and illiteracy has come back to Syria as a mass phenomenon. 
Research institutions and UN agencies have estimated that Syria would need at 
least twenty-five years to recover from the war. However, only a “new social 
contract” and new development paradigms might grant Syrian citizens the 
chance for effective participation in the reconstruction process, as well as for 
sustainable development (UN ESCWA, 2016a, pp. 8, 43). 
Within such a disastrous context, projects for the reconstruction of Syria have 
begun to move since 2015. The country has experienced years of de facto 
partition, with different political and economic regimes at work. Nevertheless, 
connections throughout territories have held for basic items like energy, currency, 
salaries for public employees and, albeit sketchy, transport as well. The process 
of reconstruction might be an opportunity to rebuild the country’s social and 
political community, which would have to be different from the past because of 
the radical experience people have lived through. As other cases have shown, 
‘institutions’ might play a decisive role in the process, and the state in particular. 
Despite the latter’s disruption, all major forces in Syria still defend the territorial 
and political unity of the country, countering all projects for partition into 
small, ethno-sectarian statelets (like, IS caliphates, jihadi ‘emirates’, or foreign 
4. See statistics from UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, www.unocha.org/syria.
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protectorates). Indeed, the struggle still concerns the kind of political regime and 
state institutions to develop in Syria. With all limits due to warfare and scarcity, 
there have been plenty of experiences of self-government by local communities: 
here, people learned to master common goods by enhancing their capabilities 
and competences.
Given the massive scale of destruction and fiscal distress of the Syrian central 
state, it is hardly possible that the latter, in its current shape, could work as 
the main driver for reconstruction and development as has occurred in previous 
crises. For all these contingent and structural reasons, the decentralization of 
state institutions, both political and administrative, based on the specifics of 
territories and reconstruction needs, might provide a useful framework to match 
the unity of the country with the enhancement of people’s competences at 
different levels: municipal, provincial, and national (Harb & Atallah, 2015). At 
all levels and for most actors involved, the participation of women has been so far 
of primary importance: not only as for care-work but as primary, frontline agents 
of political mobilization and construction of different patterns of government, 
both conservative and progressive ones. Such an experience will not be easily 
marginalized in any credible, post-war reconstruction effort. However, such 
potential cannot be detached from the adoption of new paradigms of economic 
development that equally enhance popular participation in the decision-making 
process, which is far from obvious given the previous record of international 
agencies and foreign advice (Abu Mosleh, 2014; SCPR, 2016b, pp. 81-88; UN 
ESCWA, 2016b). Far from giving a chance to secession and sectarianism in 
Syria, this framework might couple the resilience of citizens’ participation in 
development with the endurance of state institutions.
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6Women in uprising and transitional processes: an introductory note
Annalisa Oboe1
During uprisings, revolutions and times of conflict, women always walk a very 
thin tightrope between empowerment and disempowerment; they are forced 
into positions of responsibility that only the day before were unthinkable and 
they take up leading roles to guarantee social survival and the future, but this 
does not guarantee that once the ‘revolution’ is over, their new power will be 
acknowledged. 
Times of upheaval can be times of hope, but also of death, destruction, and 
mourning, in which rights are suspended and old rules are broken. These times 
are in all senses ‘exceptional’ times. When they eventually come to an end and 
some sort of new ‘order’ is established, women’s participation in bringing about 
that newness tends to be overlooked, to be seen as ‘exceptional’ as the times that 
produced it, as extra-ordinary, anomalous. From there, the step to the restoration 
of old roles for women and to disempowerment is very short, and so women 
need to start re-negotiating again, to denounce the complicity between the post-
conflict present and the status quo and re-organize a vindication of rights and 
status.
I want to focus briefly on the meaning of this tightrope, this crucial empowerment/
disempowerment dialectics in historical moments of political transition for 
women, during and after uprisings and wars, by referring to one historical 
experience that I have followed closely, and that has come back to me in the 
1. University of Padova, Padova, Italy; annalisa.oboe@unipd.it
How to cite this chapter: Oboe, A. (2018). Women in uprising and transitional processes: an introductory note. In C. 
Padovani & F. Helm (Eds), Rethinking the transition process in Syria: constitution, participation and gender equality 
(pp. 89-94). Research-publishing.net. https://doi.org/10.14705/rpnet.2018.21.760
Chapter 6 
90
form of questions for today’s work. The great event is the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of the late 1990s2.
Years ago I worked on the testimonies of the South African women who stood 
before the Human Rights Violation Committee during the TRC’s special hearings 
that were held in Johannesburg on the 28th and 29th of July 19973. Hundreds of 
victims testified, above all women, and what was striking about these women’s 
testimonials was that they were able to disclose what had happened to family 
or community members but were reluctant to talk about what had happened 
to them. Special hearings were thus organized to encourage women to discuss 
their life experiences as women under apartheid. They were called upon “to 
speak as actors, as active participants and direct survivors of the violation of 
human rights […] as themselves, those that directly suffered” (Mtintso, 1997). 
A representative of the Federation of Transvaal Women highlighted how women 
in South Africa “deserve to be counted among those who have played a role. 
Not as wives, not as mothers, but as women, but as citizens of this country 
and as leaders” (Makoyane, 1997). The emphasis was clearly on recovering 
the women’s perspectives and their roles, not only as victims but also as social 
actors. The hearings allowed for the various degrees to which women’s identity 
was cancelled to come to light: from intimidation and forms of psychological 
pressure to annihilation through violence and torture. 
Sheila Masote, daughter of the late Zeph Mothopeng, President of the Pan African 
Congress from 1986 to 1990, strayed from the expectations of the Committee, 
which had been appointed to hear about ‘gross’ violations of human rights, when 
she took the stage and vindicated her own negated self:
2. As explained in Oboe (2007), “[t]he South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was called into existence in 
July 1995, after intensive negotiations between the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP). The 
mandate of the TRC was enormous: it was required to establish as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature 
and extent of the gross violations of human rights which were committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to 10 
May 1994; it was asked to suggest ways of repairing past wrongs and, under certain conditions, it was allowed to grant 
amnesty to apartheid perpetrators. In order to achieve these ambitious tasks, three committees were put into place: the 
Committee on Human Rights Violations (HRVC), which held public hearings where people could testify about past abuses; 
the Amnesty Committee, which considered applications for amnesty; and the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation, 
which recommended policies to the government regarding reparations for the victims of apartheid” (p. 72).
3. TRC Women’s Hearings: http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/special/#wh
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“On the programme it says I’m here to speak about – on behalf of the 
family. No, that is not what I am here about. [… Y]es, I’m part of the 
family, but I refuse to be family and have no identity as Sheila. The 
problem that I have always suffered and I have always said to myself 
is that I don’t seem to be having an identity like belonging to me. I’m 
always either Zef’s daughter, Mathopeng’s daughter or Mike Masote’s 
wife. Or no, Masote’s mother and Zef Masote’s mother. But no, I feel 
I am me. And this is why I am here” (Masote, 1997).
We gather from her stand that the TRC, alongside post-apartheid South Africa, 
was hardly able to offer women a proper forum, and that what it expected of them 
did not really coincide with what women wished or needed – new identities, new 
roles, new rights, which not even one of the most enlightened constitutions in the 
world could guarantee, unless culture changed. As stated in Oboe (2007),
“[d]espite the framing of equality and sympathy, which was at the core 
of the TRC, forms of social, cultural and gender inequality did get into 
the proceedings, which were uneasily located between past horrors and 
present dreams of reconciliation and justice. The women’s voices came 
out as quite ex-centric in relation to both” (p. 63).
The questions that this reference to the TRC women’s hearings triggers for me 
are the following: is it possible to spell out the ways in which a gendered culture 
may be formed, or has formed in Syria? 
What is the process that will lead the majority of Syrian women to be ‘themselves’ 
rather than someone’s daughter/wife/mother? I am asking this because taking 
away women’s rights, identities, and presences is still a widespread occurrence 
in our unbalanced word, and we need to be watchful.
A relevant example is the predicament of women candidates during the Palestinian 
municipal elections of 2016, announced on the 23rd of June 2016, and repeatedly 
suspended (Ma’an News Agency, 2016). These were to be the first elections 
in all of the Palestinian territories since Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip in 
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2007. In the fraught process leading up to the vote, the exclusion of female 
candidates’ names from campaign materials ahead of municipal elections in the 
West Bank and Gaza sparked a new focus on women’s civil rights in Palestinian 
society. In some areas, women could only register and appear as candidates in 
the election lists as the sister/wife/daughter of some brother/husband/father, and 
their face could not be shown, no picture exhibited. However, the fact did not 
go unnoticed. News that election materials from villages near Hebron and Jenin 
excluded women’s names (MEMO, 2016) caused an outcry on social media, 
birthing the Arabic hashtag “Our names should not be covered”4. Women took to 
Twitter and Facebook using the hashtag to say they were proud to put their names 
to their achievements, as well as those of their mothers, sisters, and daughters 
(McKernan, 2016). Apparently, many men did the same. The incident resonated 
with Palestinians, and the Central Election Commission said that the papers in 
question were illegal, since women are entitled to full political participation 
under Palestinian law. 
I do not wish to conflate Syria and Palestine, but stress that patriarchy takes 
many forms, some more vicious than others – it may take away the subaltern 
woman’s name and the subaltern woman’s face exactly when some speaking 
position is apparently achieved or allowed. 
One last reflection: thinking about the role of women in the Syrian uprising has 
made me go back to the meanings and the shapes of women’s culture in relation 
to religion and nation.
Do you remember the scene in The Battle of Algiers (DZ/I 1966, dir. Gillo 
Pontecorvo) which is taken up as an echo in Frantz Fanon: Black Skin, White 
Mask (UK 1996, dir. Isaac Julien)? A veiled woman in Algiers, during the 
late ’50s, in the years that saw the confrontation between Algerians and the 
occupying French colonial power, smuggles a gun through a French checkpoint, 
and she then hands it over to a member of the French Front de Libération 
Nationale (FLN) who kills a colonial official at a coffee table in the centre 
4. https://goo.gl/JQ4y3B
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of town. The Battle of Algiers reflects Fanon’s arguments about the veil and 
violence as a justified means of anti-colonial struggle in quite a complementary 
way, while Julien’s film takes a more critical stance towards both issues. 
In the case of the veil, Pontecorvo is following Fanon’s example, stressing 
its significance related to cultural independence from the French occupier. 
Accordingly, in another scene of the film, while the female FLN members 
prepare for the guerilla bomb attack they will carry out in the French quarter, 
they look uncomfortable taking off their veil and transforming their appearance 
into a Western one. It does not seem to be a pleasant or emancipatory act for 
them, as the French/Western discourse would argue. Maintaining their cultural 
heritage is represented as a virtue, and the veil as not oppressive, because they 
are shown as equal to and respected by the male FLN members.
In the film Frantz Fanon: Black Skin, White Mask the appropriation of the veil 
as a tool to hide and transport weapons and explosives is shown by means of a 
quotation from The Battle of Algiers. In both films, thereby, a critique against 
the Eurocentric perspective on the Muslim woman as obedient and passive is 
deconstructed. To Stuart Hall, who serves as a commentator in Julien’s film, the 
women serving the FLN ‘could turn the veil against its meaning’. Still, Julien 
uses the mentioned scene of transformation from veiled to unveiled from The 
Battle of Algiers in order to criticize Fanon’s and the film’s concept of the veil.
So my third and last question would be: What is the role of religion (and the veil) 
in this process of emergence of women out of patriarchal control and towards 
gender equality?
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7Women’s role in the Syrian Revolution… Still hope!
Joumana Seif1
Is it possible to separate women’s rights from human rights in general and is it 
possible to obtain these rights under a dictatorship regime? 
These questions had been raised among activists many years before the outbreak 
of the Syrian revolution due to the increasing calls to amend the personal status 
law. They were raised during private and confidential forums. Those who raised 
them did not have a voice: they were deprived from accessing any platform 
in light of the prevailing political muteness and emergency law that had been 
applicable for more than four decades in Syria, and confiscated of all rights and 
freedom. 
Most of the Syrian women activists and political opponents did not get involved 
in this battle at that time due to their belief that women’s rights cannot be 
separated or disentangled, and due to their belief that it would be meaningless 
to have delusive gains under a rule that violates all the rights and does not 
acknowledge citizenship. 
When the Syrian revolution began in 2011, Syrian women realized that it was 
the right moment to demand all rights: freedom, justice and full equality under 
a civic and democratic state; a state of citizenship and a state that is ruled by the 
law. 
I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that Syrian women had the main role 
in the outbreak of the revolution, particularly in Damascus. While waiting 
for the verdict hearing of the activist Ali Al-Abdallah, more than 50 male and 
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female activists, lawyers, and politicians gathered in the hall of the military 
court. Al-Abdallah had been arrested for writing an article criticizing the politics 
of Iran and he was sentenced to one year in prison. While waiting, there had 
been arrangements for a sit-in in front of the ministry of the interior to protest 
against the conditions of the political prisoners, who announced an open-ended 
hunger strike inside Adra prison. While male politicians suggested that the sit-in 
should be restricted to only prisoners’ families and wanted to submit a petition 
including their demands to the minister of the interior; the women insisted on 
mobilizing and expanding the participation and insisted on raising the ceiling of 
the demands. The women’s views won in the end; there was a mobilization, most 
of the sitters-in were women, many of them were arrested on that day, and some 
of them were not released until after a long hunger strike. 
These Syrian women leaders, including Razan Zaitouna, believed in democracy 
and human values and challenged the Syrian regime for many years, as well as 
the Islamists that kidnapped Zaitouna to silence her voice and the values she 
believed in. 
A few months after the revolution and with the excessive violence of the regime, 
women felt the danger of approaching violence. They also realized that this 
would limit women’s participation disproportionately given the magnitude 
of women’s presence and their active role. They launched initiatives through 
which they proved their political stance, which was to support the revolution and 
peaceful protest and to refuse all forms of violence against protesters, including 
killing, arresting, and torturing. They also demanded that the revolution be kept 
peaceful, for this was seen as the unwavering way to bring about the change they 
aspired to and wanted about the dangerous ramifications of armed actions.
During that time, women worked very hard to mobilize and organize themselves 
in groups with clear objectives, and they started to further expand their activities 
and networks in order to include women from other regions, particularly in 
conservative communities. With the intensification of the regime’s repression, 
women began to work in relief and to provide medications and medical supplies. 
With the intensification of violence and the arming of the revolution, women 
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were excluded from the fieldwork and many female activists had to flee Syria 
since they were directly and regularly targeted. 
Syrian women did not abandon their responsibilities and their active role even 
after they left Syria. They started to establish women’s organizations, feminist 
networks, and lobbies to mobilize their efforts and to work on women’s issues, 
needs, and empowerment in all fields and to have their voice heard to obtain 
decision-making positions and activate their role in the political transition 
process and envision the future of a democratic Syria. 
Syrian Women’s Network (SWN) is a non-profit and independent network that 
was established in May 2013 by a number of organizations and independent 
individuals. SWN works on active women’s participation and civic, political, 
cultural, and economic empowerment. It also works on raising community 
awareness to give voice and presence to Syrian women in all international 
forums. SWN is one of several bodies that have been established. Another 
example is the Syrian Feminist Lobby that was established in July 2014 to press 
for an active role and equal participation of women throughout political decision-
making processes inside the opposition spectrums that believe in democracy. 
Additionally, groups of specialized organizations have been established in all 
fields such as law, constitution, and its engendering. 
Since those organizations and networks believed in the peace process and 
building a new Syria, the Syrian Women’s Initiative for Peace and Democracy 
(SWIPD) was established under the auspices of United Nations (UN) Women. 
SWIPD distinguishes itself by its inclusiveness for diverse women who have 
different ideological and political views, yet who could come to a consensus 
on a group of common principles that bring them together and regulate their 
work and activities. The Initiative had a lobbying campaign that targeted the 
UN special envoy to Syria and Ambassadors of pertinent countries to include 
representatives from the Syrian feminist movement during the negotiations 
process. SWIPD also participated in the round of negotiations that was held 
by the Special Envoy (May 2015) during the preparations for launching 
Geneva III.
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Syrian feminist movements, in general, have so far achieved the following:
• the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board that works directly with the 
Special Envoy, Mr De Mistura (despite the many observations on his 
performance);
• a women’s Consultative Group of the High Negotiations Committee;
• three women out of fifteen members in the High Negotiations Committee 
(the Opposition); 
• 30% representation of women in the deliberations of the Civil Society 
Support Room in the negotiations in Geneva;
• a large number of Syrian women who are politically empowered and 
prepared to be in decision-making positions. 
On a personal note:
I am not satisfied with what we have reached so far and believe that some 
uncalculated moves have had negative impacts on long years of feminist struggle.
Today, the situation on the ground is appalling, the Russian military intervention 
and the targeting of schools, hospitals, and civilians in general undermine the 
efforts for peace, the negotiation process, and political transition. However, we 
are condemned to hope, we have to continue our efforts to achieve just peace and 
return to building a new Syria, and I believe that Syrian women have learned a 
lot from the hard conditions we have experienced and this suffering will impose 
a new reality on Syrian women, and new relations if we take what it has to offer. 
On the civil society level: 
In my opinion, if certain conditions are met, the role of women will be totally 
different after the war and reality will impose the emergence of new women 
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leaders and new relations in a society that is more open and balanced. Women will 
not accept exclusion or discrimination, especially since the main responsibility 
for reconstruction will be theirs due to a lack of men, like what happened in 
Germany after the Second World War. But as I mentioned this cannot be achieved 
without providing certain conditions.
A fair political solution is needed, based on the Geneva I communiqué, and that 
would lead to a democratic state and end all forms of tyranny; accompanied by a 
dignified return of refugees, who should not be forced to return. The transitional 
justice process should be initiated, because there is no peace without justice. 
Also, real support should be provided by the West and the friends of Syria, with 
a comprehensive plan like the Marshall plan, which observes the following:
• reconstruction of the economy to provide job opportunities in all areas 
of Syria to encourage those involved in fighting to leave their weapons 
and join the process of rebuilding;
• constructing a new educational system that includes human rights 
values and a culture of peace;
• strengthening the role of civil society;
• and providing projects aimed at women’s economic empowerment.
And the most important and urgent condition for now is that the violence should 
be stopped and humanitarian aid must be completely separated from the trading 
of political negotiations and allowed to reach those in need. Water, food, and 
medicine should not be weapons of war. The siege should be broken. That can 
help a lot in reducing the suffering and emigration.
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8Rethinking transition in Syria, gender equality, and constitution
Mariam Jalabi1
There would be no Syrian revolution without the brave and defiant Syrian 
women who founded it. Women activists, women human rights leaders, women 
lawyers, mothers, daughters, sisters; Syrian women have been at the forefront 
of the Syrian revolution since day one, and they have continued to lead their 
communities throughout the ensuing bloodshed.
Gender equality remains at the heart of the Syrian revolution as it approaches 
its sixth year. Without it, the revolution will not achieve its ultimate goals of 
freedom, dignity, justice, and democracy for Syria’s future. However, to achieve 
gender equality in a future Syria, we must coordinate at every level of decision-
making and establish a constitution that institutionalizes a political space in 
which the equal rights and responsibilities of all Syrian men and women are 
protected and respected. 
Until there is a legal space created to protect women’s rights, Syrian women’s 
voices will not be accounted for. The voices of Syrian women who work 
tirelessly, having maintained an essential role in the revolution since before it 
began, will go unheard. Women’s ability to influence political decisions will be 
minimal – if not non-existent. 
Over the past several years and months, we have seen the international 
community renew its focus on involving Syrian women in the political process. 
Too often, our role has been reduced to tokens espousing apolitical positions in 
favor of peace, but devoid of any stake in this conflict. The reality is that Syrian 
1. Syrian Women’s Network, Cairo, Egypt; mariam.jalabi@gmail.com
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women are inherently political. We were at the forefront of the revolution and 
our goals remain those of the revolution: we want a free, democratic Syria, free 
of Assad’s tyranny and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) terror. And we 
will not rest until this is the Syria we have achieved. 
While various diplomatic bodies debate Syrian policy, it is vital that the debate 
provides a clear space for women in Syria’s future, including the brave Syrian 
women who have played a vital role in the Syrian opposition from day one. 
These women should not be muted. Our political aspirations should not be 
reduced to sound bites that deny our opposition to a dictator that has killed half a 
million of our people, gassed our children, and besieged our cities. 
Equal inclusion of women in the future of Syria’s constitution is critical 
to achieving a true democratic, pluralistic, and civic state. In a future Syria, 
equality can only be achieved by institutionalizing a political space for women, 
enshrining gender parity in the foundation of any political solution to the 
conflict, and throughout the process of rebuilding. With a gendered constitution 
in place, Syrian women will have a concrete mechanism they can use to protect 
their rights.
From the beginning of the revolution, women actively participated in peaceful 
protests and civil organizing. Subject to less surveillance and scrutiny, women 
were able to subversively circulate flyers and information. Once the revolution 
became complicated by the regime’s brutal indiscriminate violence against 
civilians, the revolution was co-opted by men and effectively became a man’s 
domain. Somewhere along the way, women lost the role they had during peaceful 
uprising, which put them side by side with the men. Despite this, women found 
ways to continue their work and find their space within a war zone dominated 
by men. Syrian women are often successful within the realm of negotiations 
within Syria, having successfully brokered ceasefires, organized deliveries 
of supplies, and established safe spaces for women and children. Women are 
often at the forefront of efforts to continue children’s education, particularly 
when they cannot attend school. They are crucial to organizing nonviolent 
protests, documenting human rights violations, and are often the foundation of 
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civil society. At every level of the Syrian conflict, women play a distinct and 
constructive role. 
Despite this, women are blocked from positions of power in decision-making 
processes within the Syrian opposition, which remains dominated by men. 
Although progress has been made to raise awareness and to advocate for greater 
female participation, without an institutionalized mechanism for political 
inclusion, we have seen little progress. Women are active in all aspects of the 
revolution and in fact, broader Syrian society as a whole, yet they are still far 
from enjoying equal representation and participation in politics, both internally 
and within the Syrian opposition. Women constitute five percent or less in all 
recognized Syrian opposition groups, regardless of papers produced stating 
otherwise. When attempts are made to remedy the lack of women, they are often 
flawed and do not lead to actual results. Syrian women deserve a say in crafting 
the decisions that affect them. 
On the other hand, the internationally sponsored Syrian political peace processes 
lack meaningful inclusion of women. The United Nations Special Envoy 
established a ‘Women’s Advisory Board’ which seems to be its solution for not 
including women at a decision making level. This does not help women get to a 
decision making position. On the contrary, it camouflages the issue by suggesting 
women’s presence when in fact they do not have a meaningful seat at the table. 
The Syrian opposition has responded by creating the ‘Women’s Consultative 
Committee’. In both instances the meaningful participation of women in the 
negotiations will not take place unless women are sitting at the table with men 
making decisions for the future of the country together. Women’s presence at the 
margins only perpetuates their marginalized status. 
Without their inclusion and the guarantee for women’s rights, which are human 
rights, the revolution cannot achieve its goals. There are a number of ways to 
do so. Creative campaigns to amplify the voices of women who work tirelessly 
to raise awareness are vital to ensuring that the message is delivered. Syrian 
women’s organizations have organized themselves to lobby political efforts, 
including a push for a quota and enforcing existing quotas for women’s political 
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participation in the Syrian opposition political bodies. However, more must 
change in order for this shift to fully take place.
One way to achieve this shift is by demonstrating the value of women’s political 
participation. One of the many values in increasing the presence of women is 
that it diversifies the dialog around a political solution, providing an influx of 
nuanced outlooks and skills. Women are a huge, relatively untapped resource for 
information from on the ground in Syria, which would enrich any decision-making 
or policy. Women are able to effectively connect with others across ethnic and 
religious lines, enhancing their ability to provide a variety of outlooks on issues. 
This ongoing movement for greater political participation espouses equal 
opportunities for men and women in employment, education, and decision-
making. It also advocates for equality in gender roles and personal statuses in 
the eyes of the state. The goal is to enhance the national unity of Syria and to 
undertake concrete efforts to ensure legal, constitutional, and social equality for 
all Syrians, regardless of gender. Enhancing the role of women ensures equality 
and protects the national unity, which is essential for Syria’s future.
This must be approached at three levels: internationally, locally, and socially. 
At the international level, women must be made responsible for proposing 
and implementing political solutions. This includes an increase of women’s 
membership in negotiating bodies, political committees, and civil society 
leadership positions. At a local level, it is essential to work with all elements 
within Syria to conceptualize and implement action plans for ending the 
violence. Women must continue to be integrated in local councils, ceasefires, 
and civil society groups. Lastly, at a social level, the idea of women as leaders 
must be normalized across spectrums, both on the ground in Syria and in the 
negotiating rooms of Geneva. To normalize the position of women as leaders is 
to increase their physical presence in politics and have the agency for their own 
fate, which is a vital aspect of achieving gender parity in the future. 
Finally, I cannot stress enough how difficult it is to make my fellow Syrians 
prioritize issues like a constitution and gender equality, while our people are 
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being decimated with total impunity. Across Syria, women and men are being 
starved, tortured, and bombed to death at record rates while the world watches 
and people like myself discuss the virtues of ending a patriarchal system. Syrian 
women are being annihilated – tens of thousands have been killed. It is difficult 
for Syrian women to comprehend that we here in the West can talk seriously about 
their rights, when we won’t take basic steps to protect their lives. Syrian women 
want and need civilian protection. They are dying without it, and everyday that 
the world fails to take the action needed to protect Syrian women and men, 
extremists grow stronger – which as we all know, will hurt Syrian women in 
the long run. If the world truly wants a free Syria, in which women’s rights are 
protected, then it must stand prepared to protect Syrian civilians by taking the 
steps to stop the number one killer in Syria: indiscriminate aerial bombardment.
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Section 3.
Launching the ABC 
for a gender sensitive constitution
This section hosts reflections stemming from a challenging document: the 
ABC Gender Sensitive Constitution, a handbook for engendering constitution 
making, that has been promoted by IFE-EFI and written by Silvia Suteu 
(University College of London) and Ibrahim Draji (University of Damascus)1. 
The rationale for elaborating such an ‘ABC guide’, the challenges in adopting 
a gender perspective in constitution building, and the wager of moving from 
normative aspirations to implementation and actual respect of fundamental 
rights are elaborated upon from academic, advocacy, and political perspectives.
1. http://www.efi-ife.org/sites/default/files/ABC%20for%20a%20Gender%20Sensitive%20Constitution.pdf
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9The necessity of engendering the constitution and its content1
Ibrahim Draji2
“Women are born free, and they enjoy the rights of equality with men in all aspects”.
This is Article 1 of the Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Citizenship, 
which was written by the French women’s rights activist Olympe de Gouges 
in 1791, and was one of the reasons for driving her to the guillotine, where she 
was killed. The struggle for gender equality had started long before Olympe de 
Gouges’s Declaration, and continued after it. It knew milestones and witnessed 
many successes and achievements, as well as many failures and frustrations until 
women attained what they have obtained so far.
During this conference, I presented a guide to a gender sensitive constitution. 
Gender (Suteu & Draji, 2015) is a very important subject that needs to be tackled 
through formulating constitutions compatible with a gender perspective, and the 
existence of a legal obligation to formulate these types of constitutions first. 
Second, by checking the content of these constitutions and what they should 
incorporate.
1. First, why are states legally obliged 
to engender their constitutions?
Today, many people, women and men, support gender equality from different 
viewpoints: some believe in and adopt gender equality as a human right of 
1. This presentation has been made via Skype and part of the present article has already been published by the author in 
Suteu and Draji (2015), reproduced with kind permissions from the copyright holder Euromed Feminist Initiative IFE-EFI.
2. University of Damascus, Damascus, Syria; daraji@unhcr.org
How to cite this chapter: Draji, I. (2018). The necessity of engendering the constitution and its content. In C. Padovani 
& F. Helm (Eds), Rethinking the transition process in Syria: constitution, participation and gender equality (pp. 109-141). 
Research-publishing.net. https://doi.org/10.14705/rpnet.2018.21.763
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all genders, others for ethical and religious reasons, others for ideological 
and political reasons, or for intellectual and philosophical reasons. Some see 
gender equality as a manifestation of the advancement of civilization. However, 
regardless of these different starting points, it is necessary to also investigate the 
legal obligation incumbent upon states to engender their constitutions. To what 
extent are states legally obliged to respect the principles of equality and non-
discrimination between women and men? And what are the major international 
and regional conventions that deal with engendering the constitution? How 
important are these treaties in the legal systems of states?
1.1. International instruments3 mandating gender equality, 
non-discrimination and engendering the constitution
International law enshrines gender equality as a right and a principle of human 
rights. The many international documents relevant to gender equality and non-
discrimination reflect the attention paid to this issue, on the one hand, and the 
extent to which this right is violated, on the other.
I outline here, in brief, the major international and regional instruments 
(conventions, declarations, and resolutions) which address the issues of gender 
equality, non-discrimination on the basis of gender, and engendering the 
constitution.
1.1.1. United Nations Charter (1945)4
Although the Charter was primarily concerned with the legalization of the 
international order and the creation of a new international organization to lead 
the world towards peace after World War II, it did not neglect gender equality 
3. Some constitutions emphasized that texts relating to rights and freedoms must be interpreted in accordance with 
international human rights conventions. For example, the Spanish Constitution Article 10, Paragraph 2: “The laws relating 
to fundamental rights and freedoms recognized by the Constitution shall be interpreted in accordance with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties and conventions ratified by Spain in this regard”. As well as the 
Constitution of Portugal, Article 16, Paragraph 2: “The provisions of this Constitution and the laws relating to fundamental 
rights shall be interpreted in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. Such provisions reinforce the 
ability of judges to interpret the constitution in accordance with international standards and rely on them in their judgments.
4. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf
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and women’s equal enjoyment of all rights, without discrimination. These 
rights have been tackled in three different places of the Charter. Firstly, in the 
Preamble, which states: “We, the peoples of the United Nations […] reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, 
in the equal rights of men and women”; secondly, in Chapter I on the Purposes 
and Principles of the United Nations, where Article 1(3) states: “promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to […] sex”; thirdly, in Chapter IX on International 
Economic and Social Cooperation, where Article 55(c) reaffirms that the United 
Nations works towards “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to […] sex”.
1.1.2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)5
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights reaffirms the right to equality for ‘all 
human beings’. Article 1 states that: “All human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should 
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”6. It also clearly emphasizes 
the commitment to prohibiting discrimination in Article 2, which states that: 
“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as […] sex […] or other status”.
1.1.3. International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (1966)7
The Covenant reaffirms the right to equality between women and men. Article 3 
states that: “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the 
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social, and cultural 
rights set forth in the present Covenant”. As for non-discrimination, Article 2(2) 
of the Covenant states that: “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake 
5. http://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf
6. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers to ‘brotherhood’ which is a reflection of the period in which the 
document was drafted, and of the lack of awareness of its framers of the contents of this term.
7. http://www.pwescr.org/PWESCR_Handbook_on_ESCR.pdf
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to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised 
without discrimination of any kind as to […] sex […] or other status”.
In Article 2(1), the Covenant refers to the obligation to engender both the 
constitution and national legislation. This article obliges states to adopt the 
necessary ‘legislative measures’ to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights 
enunciated in the Covenant. It states: “Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and 
cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures”. It is noticeable here that 
the Covenant, after talking about the obligation of states to take ‘all means’ to 
realize these rights, focuses particularly on ‘legislative measures’. This reflects 
the priority given to these measures in implementing the rights and principles of 
the Covenant. Legislation, in its general understanding, here includes any law 
enacted and issued by the State, including the constitution as the state’s supreme 
law.
1.1.4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)8
The Covenant states the right to equality in Article 3 and reaffirms non-
discrimination by virtue of Article 2(1). The covenant emphasizes the need to 
adopt the necessary legislation in order to guarantee that everyone enjoys the 
rights stipulated, which is stated in Article 2(2).
1.1.5. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) (1979)9
This Convention is deemed an international bill of women’s rights; it defines 
decisively the actions considered as discriminatory against women and the 
8. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf
9. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cedaw.pdf
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measures to be taken to eliminate that discrimination. CEDAW reaffirms the 
principle of equality between women and men throughout its provisions. For 
example, Article 3 states, as does Article 15(1), that: “States Parties shall take in 
all fields […] all appropriate measures […] to ensure the full development and 
advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality 
with men”.
As for non-discrimination, CEDAW has not only used the general language on 
‘non-discrimination’ included in all other conventions. It instead went further 
and defined the concept of prohibited discrimination and set forth positive 
steps, such as temporary measures to remove previous discrimination, which 
has become entrenched through decades of discriminatory practices. CEDAW 
prohibits discrimination by virtue of Article 2, which states that: “States Parties 
condemn discrimination against women in all its forms”.
CEDAW imposes many obligations on states to incorporate women’s rights, 
gender equality, and the prohibition of discrimination between women and men in 
their national constitutions and legislation. It also imposes an obligation for states 
to amend their national legislation and penal provisions that contradict these rights 
and principles. This is clearly stated in Article 2(a), (b), (c), (f), (j), and (g).
It is noticeable that the Convention, in Article 5(a), asks states to take all 
appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of 
women and men, with a view of achieving the elimination of prejudices and 
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority 
or the superiority of either of the sexes.
1.1.6. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)10
The CEDAW Committee has mentioned that “women often take on leadership 
roles during conflict as heads of households, peacemakers, political leaders, and 
10. On women and peace and security: http://www.un-documents.net/sr1325.htm
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combatants” (CEDAW, 2013, para 6); the Committee has repeatedly expressed 
concern that their voices are silenced and marginalized in post-conflict and 
transition periods and recovery processes.
In order to overcome this reality, in 2000, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1325. It reaffirmed the important role of women in the prevention 
and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, as well as the need for their 
equal participation and more prominent role in decision making with regard to 
conflict prevention and resolution. Moreover, the Security Council has adopted 
several follow-up resolutions – 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 
(2010), 2106 (2013), and 2122 (2013) – recognizing further aspects of the link 
between women and peace and security: the use of sexual violence as a tactic of 
war; its status as a war crime; the obligation of parties to armed conflict to take 
measures to prevent it; the duty of peacekeeping missions to protect women and 
children from sexual violence during armed conflict; and setting up a roadmap 
for the implementation of member states’ commitments in this area.
The importance of this resolution lies in the fact that it promotes equality of 
opportunity for women and men in a field that has never been addressed before 
by any international or regional convention: conflict resolution and peace 
processes; women’s presence as special representatives and envoys to pursue 
good offices, incorporating a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, 
and the involvement of women in the making and implementation mechanisms 
of the peace agreements. While novel, there is also synergy between Resolution 
1325 and CEDAW, and the United Nations has explained the complementarity 
between the goals they pursue and the standards they set for the states. Both 
documents have a gender equality agenda and demand women’s full participation 
at all levels of decision making, both call for legal equality between women and 
men, and both seek to ensure that women’s experiences, needs, and perspectives 
are incorporated into political, legal, and social decisions.
Resolution 1325 explicitly mentions states’ obligations to engender their 
constitutions. This is stated in Clause 8(c), which reaffirms the state parties’ 
commitment to take “measures that ensure the protection of and respect for 
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human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, 
the electoral system, the police, and the judiciary”.
1.2. Regional instruments that mandate gender equality, 
non-discrimination, and engendering the constitution
There are also regional instruments which set forth obligations for states to 
recognize the principle of gender equality, prohibit discrimination, and require 
the engendering of national constitutions.
1.2.1. European instruments
The European human rights system is one of the most developed regional 
systems mainly due to the active role of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR)11 in sanctioning violations by member states.
The ECHR reaffirms the equality of individuals in the enjoyment of all rights 
implied in the phrase ‘everyone’ in its Article 1, which states that: “The High 
Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights 
and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention”.
Also, the ECHR prohibits discrimination by virtue of Article 14, which states 
that: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention 
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex […] or other 
status”. The jurisdictional reach of the ECHR is not limited to the people enjoying 
the nationality of one of the state parties. Rather, it covers everyone falling 
under the legal jurisdiction of any of the state parties, such as their residents. 
Thus, anyone who is under the jurisdiction of a state party enjoys the protection 
of the convention. This enforcement is the task of the ECHR, which receives 
complaints from individuals, groups of individuals, and state parties. The court 
has developed a rich jurisprudence on gender equality and non-discrimination 
(see Radacic, 2008).
11. https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680063765
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In order to ensure more protection and equality and to adopt a general principle 
prohibiting discrimination in the exercise of all rights included in the law, 
without specifying one right and neglecting another, Protocol No. 12 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
was concluded. It was introduced for signing on the 11th of April 2000, and 
entered into effect in 2005. The Protocol contains a general prohibition of 
discrimination in Article 1.
The importance of this protocol lies in the fact that it enhances the protection 
against discrimination afforded by the ECHR and reflects advancements in 
international legal protection against discrimination. Article 14 of the ECHR, 
contrary to other international conventions, does not include a separate 
prohibition of discrimination. Thus, discrimination is prohibited only 
with regards to “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms” set forth in the 
Convention in Article 14. However, when the Protocol came into effect, the 
prohibition of discrimination acquired ‘independent life’, separate from other 
provisions of the ECHR12.
Gender equality is a fundamental principle of the European Union and is listed, 
for example, in Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), which states that: “In all its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate 
inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women” (see European 
Commission, 2011). 
The right to equality is referred to in two places of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union13. The first is in Article 20, which mentions 
equality before the law in a brief and general way: “Everyone is equal before the 
law”. The second is in Article 23, which explicitly enunciates gender equality, as 
well as the possibility of adopting affirmative action measures14.
12. For more details on this protocol, see the Council of Europe website: http://www.coe.int/ar_JO/web/compass/legal-
protection-of-human-rights
13. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf
14. See further Handbook on European non-discrimination law March. (2011). http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2011/
handbook-european-non-discrimination-law
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1.2.2. African instruments 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights15 has been the starting 
point for a new era in the area of human rights in Africa. It reaffirms the right 
to absolute equality in Article 3. As for the principle of non-discrimination, it 
is reaffirmed in Article 2 of the Charter, which states that: “Every individual 
shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and 
guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as […] 
sex […] or any other status”.
The Protocol on Women’s Rights16 in Africa reaffirms the principle of legal 
equality between women and men. Article 8 of the Protocol states that: “Women 
and men are equal before the law and shall have the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law”. As for the principle of non-discrimination, Article 2(1) of 
the Protocol states that: “State Parties shall combat all forms of discrimination 
against women”.
This obligation is reaffirmed in the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa. 
It states explicitly the obligation of states to include the principles of non-
discrimination and gender equality in their constitutions and legislation. It also 
allows for affirmative action measures to redress continuing discrimination 
against women.
1.2.3. American instruments 
We refer here to the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
(1948) that affirms equality and non-discrimination in its Article 2. The 
American Convention on Human Rights (1969)17 declares the duty of state 
parties as protecting the rights of all persons under their jurisdiction, without 
15. http://www.humanrights.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/African-Charter-on-Human-and-Peoples-Rights.pdf
16. http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/women-protocol/achpr_instr_proto_women_eng.pdf
17. http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.pdf
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discrimination on the basis of, among other grounds, ‘sex’18, and the right to 
equal protection of the laws for all, “without discrimination” (Article 24).
In a separate article on the rights of the family, the convention affirms the 
principle of non-discrimination with regard to marriage (Article 17(2)) and also 
calls upon states to “take appropriate steps to ensure the equality of rights and 
the adequate balancing of responsibilities of the spouses as to marriage, during 
marriage, and in the event of its dissolution” (Article 17(4)). The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights adjudicates on disputes involving state parties accused 
of having violated their obligations under the convention and has developed a 
rich jurisprudence on gender equality and non-discrimination (Palacios Zuolaga, 
2008). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has also collated 
the legal standards applicable to gender equality in the InterAmerican system 
emerging from the court’s jurisprudence and state practice (IACHR, 2015).
1.2.4. Arab instruments 
States of the Arab region suffer from lack of regional sources concerning human 
rights in general and women’s rights in particular. This is in spite of the pressing 
need for such instruments, owing to the restrictions imposed on Arab women 
in many countries, either because of harsh discriminative constitutional and 
legislative provisions, or because of religious concepts and social customs. The 
main regional instrument is the Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004)19 which 
was adopted by the 16th Arab Summit hosted by Tunisia on the 23rd of May 
2004.
The Charter reaffirms the principle of equality in more than one clause and in 
more than one form. Article 3(2) suggests undertaking “necessary measures 
to guarantee effective equality in the enjoyment of all rights and [freedoms] 
established in the present Charter, so as to protect against all forms of 
18. This article and the previous one refer to ‘sex’ rather than ‘gender’. This should be read in the light of the date of these 
instruments, in 1948 and 1968, respectively, early in the history of international attention to issues of gender equality and 
non-discrimination.
19. http://www.eods.eu/library/LAS_Arab%20Charter%20on%20Human%20Rights_2004_EN.pdf
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discrimination”. Article 11 states that: “All persons are equal before the law and 
have the right to enjoy its protection without discrimination”. Article 12 also 
reaffirms that: “All persons are equal before the courts and tribunals”20.
The Charter also refers to non-discrimination and affirmative action in two 
separate paragraphs of Article 3. Article 3(1) declares “the right to enjoy all 
the rights and freedoms recognized herein, without any distinction on grounds 
of […] sex”, and Article 3(3) states: “Men and women are equal in respect of 
human dignity, in rights and in duties within the framework of the positive 
discrimination established in favor of women by Islamic Shari’a and other 
divine laws, legislation and international instruments”.
However, by conditioning gender equality and women’s rights to the religious 
framework, the Charter appears to allow for discrimination against women. This 
is manifested in the fact that ‘positive discrimination’ is attributed to religious 
laws, and then to the applicable legislation and instruments, which leaves open the 
possibility to deny women some of their rights. Therefore, the use of affirmative 
action in this context – linking it to divine laws – would have the same results 
as reservations raised with regard to international human rights conventions: 
both undermine women’s rights and justify discrimination against them. This 
“positive discrimination established in favor of women by […] divine laws”, 
in Article 3(3), differs radically from the original meaning of affirmative action 
and the purposes for which it has been developed. Eventually, it can be said 
that, among all international and regional charters and conventions, the Arab 
Charter provides the least protection of women’s rights and gender equality as 
per international law standards.
This issue is addressed in Article 44 of the charter, which states that: “The States 
Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes 
and with the provisions of the present Charter, [whatever legislative or non-
legislative] measures in order to give effect on the rights recognized by the 
present Charter”.
20. https://www.unicef.org/tdad/arabcharterhumanrights.doc
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The main weakness of this charter is that it states that all rights and obligations 
placed on states shall be in accordance with the constitution or legislation in 
effect. Thus, states shall take the necessary measures to fulfill the rights set forth 
in the charter “in accordance with their constitutional processes” according to 
the aforementioned Article 44.
For example, the measures that enable a child to acquire her/his mother’s 
nationality must be “in accordance with their domestic laws” (Article 29(2)21). 
Another example is the enjoyment of the freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, which is limited by the constraints set forth in the law in effect (Article 
30(1)).
The risk associated with such references to the constitution and domestic laws 
in effect stems from the fact that national law may contain many shortcomings. 
National laws may themselves violate the simplest principles of equality and 
establish systematically discriminatory practices. Thus, taking this national 
legislation as the reference to granting rights could only mean further denial 
of rights and could protect discriminatory practices instead of abolishing them.
Based on the aforementioned, it becomes clear that the obligation to engender the 
constitution is a binding international legal obligation, with clear legal sources. 
Women’s rights-related international conventions are agreements of a universal 
and regional nature which apply to the majority of the world’s states. It must be 
noted that the continents are unequal in terms of their recognition of these rights, 
and there is an obvious lack of recognition of equality between women and men 
in Asia, especially in the Arab region, either through delaying the ratification of 
international relevant commitments or through making reservations that empty 
the commitments of meaning.
It is clear to us how international law is binding for the signatory/member States. 
They have to implement these treaties ‘in good faith’, and incorporate them into 
their national legislation, which may not be invoked as an excuse or justification 
21. https://www.unicef.org/tdad/arabcharterhumanrights.doc
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for evading the implementation of the obligations under those treaties. This was 
clearly stated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 196922 under 
Articles 26 and 27. The obligation to engender their constitutions and all national 
legislation is binding upon states as a means to attain the end of ensuring gender 
equality and protection from all forms of discrimination. Chapter 3 of the ABC 
for Gender Sensitive Constitutions (Suteu & Draji, 2015) details the content of 
a gender sensitive constitution, looking at both general principles and specific 
rights which must be adopted in order to ensure full protection of women’s rights, 
gender equality, and non-discrimination. In spite of this, many international and 
regional conventions, especially those related to women’s right or human rights 
in general, did not leave their implementation and the incorporation of their 
content in national legislation to the general rules of international law, but have 
laid down special provisions at the core of the treaties, themselves obliging 
contracting states to amend their constitutions and other national legislation to 
ensure compatibility with their obligations to ensure women’s rights, including 
equality and non-discrimination in the exercise of those rights and the enjoyment 
of the freedoms contained therein. This is the essence of the term ‘gender of the 
constitution’, i.e. the incorporation of its provisions to guarantee women the 
exercise of all their rights without derogation or discrimination and to eliminate 
any obstacles to this.
2. Second, what must a democratic 
gender-sensitive constitution contain? 
Here I present the content of a democratic gender sensitive constitution, as 
drawn from international law and comparative constitutional design. 
2.1. Principles of a democratic gender sensitive constitution
In the simplest understanding, a democratic constitution is one that is 
democratically ratified and ensures the establishment and maintenance of a 
22. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf
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democratic system. On the 20th of December 2004, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted a resolution in which it defined the basic elements of 
democracy23.
According to this resolution, a democratic constitution has to guarantee human 
rights and freedoms, to incorporate a plural political system, ensure transparency 
and accountability, guarantee the rule of law, the separation of powers, and 
the independence of the judiciary. Moreover, it must take into account some 
basic issues concerning the process of constitution making and not only the 
constitution’s content.
A gender sensitive constitution is a constitution that
• adopts a gender perspective and pays attention to how issues of gender 
are dealt with and how provisions of the constitution impact on gender,
• ensures substantive gender equality, theoretically and practically, 
• prohibits discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, class, color, sexual 
orientation, age, and other characteristics,
• adopts gender sensitive language (more on this in Suteu & Draji, 2015, 
chapter 4), and
• contains rules and guarantees to activate this equality and empower 
women to exercise all their rights, including the possibility of having 
affirmative action measures to counter discriminatory practices against 
women.
There are basic principles that constitutions have to stand on and also clear 
criteria that no democratic constitution can ignore, especially if it is intended 
to be gender sensitive. If the principles of freedom, dignity, equality, and non-
23. See http://undocs.org/A/RES/59/201
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discrimination are among the fundamental principles that any constitution must 
contain, there are also others closely relevant to a democratic constitution and 
of special importance for women’s rights and gender equality. The latter provide 
guarantees that can be relied on in order to ensure women’s enjoyment of their 
full rights and to abolish the discriminatory practices targeting them. We address 
here the principles of freedom, dignity, equality, non-discrimination, separation 
of powers, popular sovereignty as the source of constitutional authority, as well 
as secularism.
2.1.1. Freedom
Freedom has been recognized as a fundamental principle on which the 
legal organization of states stands, and which must be included in national 
constitutions24. In addition to recognizing a number of rights and freedoms 
(such as the freedom of thought, religion, and conscience; the freedom of speech 
and expression; the freedom of assembly; and the freedom of association, 
etc.), the constitution should stipulate that it guarantees rights as universal 
and inalienable, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated. The list of rights 
included in the constitution should not be exhaustive. In that way, when 
necessary, the protection of the constitution could be extended to more rights 
than those listed explicitly in its text. Such an approach reaffirms that the origin 
of the rights included in the constitution is freedom and that any limitation of 
freedom must be subject to the controls set forth in the constitution itself. For 
example: the Venezuelan constitution, Article 2: “Venezuela constitutes itself 
as a […] State […] which holds as superior values of its legal order and actions 
[…] those of […] liberty”.
2.1.2. Dignity
Human dignity is one of the most important values that must be enunciated in 
national constitutions for both women and men alike. Therefore, the constitutions 
24. However, the French Declaration itself was discriminatory against women, and the failure of the French Revolution to 
promote women’s rights prompted Olympique de Gouge to publish the Declaration on the Rights of Women and [Female] 
Citizen in 1791.
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of many countries include this principle in their preambles or in separate 
provisions. Examples: South African constitution, Article 1: “The Republic of 
South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: 
1. Human dignity”. German constitution, Article 1(1): “Human dignity shall be 
inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority”.
2.1.3. Equality 
National constitutions are the “framework for the elimination of discrimination 
against women. An explicit constitutional guarantee of gender equality is 
fundamental to combating discrimination against women and girls in law and 
in practice”25. National constitutions adopt the principle of equality in many 
formulations. 
• Some constitutions enunciate it in general statements without specifying 
that it applies to both women and men like. For example: the Spanish 
constitution, Section 14: “Spaniards are equal before the law”.
• Other constitutions enunciate equality between women and men 
specifically. Like the Belgian constitution, Article 10: “Equality between 
women and men is guaranteed”.
• Other constitutions not only enunciate explicitly the equality between 
women and men, but also acknowledge that formal constitutional 
equality alone is not enough unless associated with affirmative action 
steps that must be taken by the State in order to activate this right and 
empower women to overcome decades of inequality and discriminatory 
practices against them. They oblige the State to ensure this equality and 
to take the necessary measures to implement it in practice. An example 
for that is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Article 15 on 
“Equality Rights”: “(1) Every individual is equal before and under the 
law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the 
25. http://ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WG/Family/A.HRC.29.40_E.pdf
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law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination 
based on race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or 
mental or physical disability. (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude 
any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of 
conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that 
are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, color, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability”.
Contrary to these good practices, there are some constitutions that disregard and 
ignore this right, or empty it of any meaning and restrict it in a way that prevents 
women from benefitting from it. Yemeni constitution, Article 31: “Women 
are the sisters of men. They have rights and duties, which are guaranteed and 
assigned by Shari’ah and stipulated by law”.
Here, the constitution makers avoided using the term ‘equality’, preferring 
instead to use ‘sisters of men’, which does not have a clear meaning and may 
be interpreted in a restrictive way. Moreover, the text further undermines gender 
equality by describing the source of women’s rights, as sisters of men, as being 
sharia and national legislation rather than any clearly defined international norm 
or convention. This allows for interpretations which may empty gender equality 
of meaning and deny women their rights. The constitution of Yemen, however, 
is not the only one in this regard. For example: Iranian constitution, Article 20: 
“All citizens of the country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection 
of the law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, 
in conformity with Islamic criteria”. Clearly, though this constitution uses the 
term ‘equality’ between women and men, it restricts this supposed equality by 
subjecting it to ‘Islamic criteria’, which are, in turn, subject to religious men’s 
different interpretations and explanations. 
Numerous constitutions have created constitutional bodies tasked with 
promoting gender equality and removing all forms of discrimination between 
women and men26. They should have a clear mandate to deal with and follow 
26. For a review of institutions in the OSCE region, see http://www.osce.org/odihr/97756
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up on equality issues, and should possess the competence and capacity to enable 
them to achieve the objective for which they have been established.
The United Nations27 has adopted a set of minimum standards applicable to 
national human rights institutions which include women’s rights and gender 
equality bodies. These principles require that the body have a broad and clear 
mandate, autonomy from the government, independence, pluralist membership, 
adequate resources, and adequate powers of investigation. For example, the 
Ecuadorian constitution, Article 156: “The National Equality Councils are 
bodies responsible for ensuring the full observance and exercise of the rights 
enshrined in the Constitution and in international human rights instruments. 
The Councils shall exercise their attributions for the drafting, cross-cutting 
application, observance, follow-up and evaluation of public policies involving 
the issues of gender”.
It should be highlighted that these bodies are not ends in themselves. Rather, they 
are means to realize a higher end, which is both formal and substantive equality 
between women and men. Thus, it is not sufficient to stipulate the creation of 
these bodies in the constitution and then leave them inactive and powerless, 
as experience in many countries reveals. Their financial and administrative 
independence must be set forth in the constitution in order for these bodies 
not to be manipulated or suppressed by political authorities. They should also 
not be left vulnerable to budgetary cutbacks, as experience shows that in times 
of austerity, cuts to public spending disproportionally affect gender equality 
institutions28.
It may also be best not to go into detail in the constitution itself about the 
competences and procedures guiding the operation of these bodies in order for 
them to have the necessary flexibility to perform their tasks29. Such details will be 
mandated in implementing legislation and are not what will guarantee the proper 
27. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfNationalInstitutions.aspx
28. See http://www.womenlobby.org/IMG/pdf/the_price_of_austerity_-_web_edition.pdf
29. See Suteu and Draji (2015, chapter 4).
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operation of these bodies. This will be guaranteed by the political will behind 
creating such bodies and enabling them to work under the best circumstances. 
Otherwise, they will remain mere bureaucratic structures created in response to 
international pressure, with no political commitment behind them. This has been 
the case of Morocco, where the creation of such a body was set forth in law, but 
the institution has not actually been created.
2.1.4. Non-discrimination
Constitutions must explicitly forbid discrimination. This is a basic principle 
that may not be ignored or disregarded. For example, the constitution of South 
Africa prohibits all forms of discrimination, whether exercised by the state 
or individuals. It also obliges the state to make legislation to combat it. For 
instance: the South African constitution, Article 9(3): “The state may not unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex […]. No person may unfairly discriminate directly or 
indirectly against anyone […]. National legislation must be enacted to prevent 
or prohibit unfair discrimination”.
Other constitutions adopt another option by shedding light on the most common 
practices of discrimination against women and prohibiting them explicitly. They 
not only prohibit discrimination generally and explicitly, but prohibit certain 
practices by name as well. This is the case of the Portuguese constitution, 
which concentrates, in Article 109, on discrimination against women in the 
field of “access to political office”. The constitution of Ecuador guarantees, 
in Article 43(1), freedom from discrimination to pregnant and breast-feeding 
women in “education, social, and labor sectors”. Additionally, gender sensitive 
constitutions have to clearly prohibit both direct and indirect discrimination. 
Sometimes, indirect discrimination can be more serious as it is hidden and not 
enough attention is paid to it. This happens
“when laws, public policies and programmes are built on seemingly 
gender-neutral criteria, [while in practice they] have a detrimental 
impact on women. [The risk here is that these] laws, policies and 
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programmes may unintentionally perpetuate the consequences of past 
discrimination. They may be inadvertently modelled on male lifestyles 
and thus fail to take into account aspects of women’s life experiences 
which may differ from those of men. These differences may exist 
because of stereotypical expectations, attitudes and behaviour directed 
towards women which are based on the biological differences between 
women and men. They may also exist because of the generally existing 
subordination of women by men” (footnote 130).
Examples of indirect discrimination include unnecessary requirements in the 
workplace which place one gender at a disadvantage compared to the other (such 
as by discriminating against women who have taken maternity leave or are the 
primary caregivers in their family). Therefore, constitution makers must address 
both direct and indirect discrimination when drafting the prohibition of gender 
based discrimination in the constitution. This will enable them to also combat 
existing hidden discriminatory practices.
2.1.5. Separation of powers
Respect for the separation of powers principle also has positive implications for 
women’s rights and gender equality because it prevents the different branches of 
power from cooperating to restrict or ignore them. For example, if the legislative 
power failed to enact laws related to women’s rights, or if the executive power 
insisted on ignoring the application of these rights, the independent judicial 
power would be the real guarantor to resort to. The principle of the separation 
of powers is set forth in most constitutions of the states of the world. For 
example, the Portuguese constitution, Article 2: “The Portuguese Republic 
shall be a democratic state based on the rule of law […] and the separation and 
interdependence of powers”.
Some constitutions even include the separation of powers among principles not 
open to amendment. Example of the Brazilian constitution, Article 60(4): “No 
30. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/General%20recommendation%2025%20(English).pdf
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proposal of amendment shall be considered which is aimed at abolishing: III – 
the separation of the Government Powers”.
2.1.6. Popular sovereignty as the source of constitutional authority 
Constitutions must address the source of sovereignty, meaning they must 
clarify the authority from which the branches of power derive their jurisdictions 
and manifestations of power. It is worth mentioning that recognizing popular 
sovereignty as the source of constitutional authority is not only a basis of equality 
among all citizens, but allows for the removals of the guardianship of clergies, 
regardless of their creed, over societal affairs and subsequent discrimination on 
the basis of religious belief. The overwhelming majority of constitutional and 
political systems throughout the world tend to adopt popular sovereignty as the 
basis of constitutional authority. This is a requirement of democracy itself. For 
example: the Italian constitution, Article 1: “Sovereignty belongs to the people, 
which exercises it in the forms and within the limits of the Constitution”.
2.1.7. Secularism 
Secularism refers to the separation of religion and religious institutions 
from the decision-making processes of the government and the legislature 
and judiciary, so that political and legislative institutions are independent of 
religious institutions. Thus, religious affairs should be viewed as personal 
matters by the State. This issue is very important and has serious repercussions 
for women’s rights and freedoms. Women also differ in terms of religion and 
beliefs, which makes them subject to different, and sometimes contradictory, 
legal systems in countries where religious or traditional authorities also 
exercise legal and political power.
Many constitutions in the world explicitly affirm the State’s secularism, and 
enunciate this in different ways. The French constitution, for example, stipulates 
the secularism of the French Republic, reaffirming in the same article the ‘respect 
to all beliefs’. For example: the French constitution, Article 1 of the Preamble: 
“France shall be a […] secular [power].  It shall respect all beliefs”.
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Other constitutions adopt a clearer way to reinforce that the State must not 
ascribe to a religion and must not interfere with or oblige anyone to follow any 
religion. They also affirm the equality among religious associations representing 
all religions, which must be separate from the state. The example of the Russian 
constitution, Article 14: “1. The Russian Federation is a secular state. No state 
or obligatory religion may be established. 2. Religious associations shall be 
separate from the State and shall be equal before the law”. 
It is also necessary for a secular constitution to be a democratic one, as each has 
its own foundations and principles that must be realized. A secular constitution 
can also be undemocratic – an example of which is the Turkish constitution 
which adopts secularism clearly but also includes many provisions that violate 
democratic principles. Supporters of gender equality and non-discrimination 
should not barter a democratic constitution for a secular one; instead, they should 
work to ensure that the gender sensitive constitution they seek to bring about is 
democratic and secular at the same time.
Incorporating these principles into the constitution will significantly serve 
women’s rights and gender equality. Women are still denied their fundamental 
rights in many countries, either owing to clear discriminative legal texts, or 
because of religious beliefs and discriminatory social practices. Therefore, 
the inclusion and protection of these principles in the constitution will have a 
significant positive impact on women’s rights and gender requirements, as it will 
provide a constitutional basis that can be legally relied on to forbid many unjust 
practices that target women and deny them their individual rights31.
2.2. Rights and freedoms in a gender sensitive constitution
Rights and freedoms occupy a high status in most constitutional documents. 
A constitution is not a mere document describing the form of the state and its 
system of governance and regulating the relations among the branches of power. 
It is also a document that guarantees individual rights and freedoms (Kedzia, 
31. For more on constitutions providing a legal basis for women’s empowerment, see Suteu and Draji (2015, chapter 1).
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2013, p. 8 and beyond). In addition to the clear protection of individual rights 
in general, gender sensitive constitutions must contain specific provisions 
ensuring women’s human right to protection against abuse and discrimination. 
Constitutions must provide women with an enabling environment in which to 
exercise their rights and overcome the obstacles restraining them.
2.2.1. The content of constitutional rights
A constitutional document must state, in clear, precise, and detailed terms, all 
of the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights it protects, up to 
what has become to be known as ‘the third generation of rights’, which include, 
among others, the right to a safe environment and sustainable development. 
Among the constitutions that follow this approach is the constitution of Brazil, 
which contains 78 articles on rights and freedoms. The same is true for the 
Colombian constitution, which contains 76 articles on rights on freedoms. This 
is also the case of the constitution of South Africa, which allocates Chapter 
II completely to rights and freedoms, under the title of “Bill of Rights” and 
covers the rights in detail. Of course, it is not just the list of rights included in 
the constitution which is important, but the extent to which they are enforced. 
Nevertheless, having a comprehensive bill of rights in the constitution can 
provide the legal basis for women’s empowerment and for achieving further 
protections in the future. 
In addition to the drafting of an accurate text containing clear statements of the 
general individual rights to be included in the constitutional document, there 
are other measures that must be included in the constitution to strengthen the 
constitutional rights of women and ensure their actual enjoyment thereof. This 
includes clearly enunciating women’s right to exercise the freedoms that they 
have traditionally been denied, such as their sexual and reproductive rights, 
the right to hold political and judicial positions, labor-related rights, rights of 
inheritance, freedom within marriage, and the freedom to choose a partner. 
Therefore, certain constitutions, despite their assertion that ‘all citizens’ enjoy 
‘all rights’, reaffirm in clear terms the equality between women and men in their 
enjoyment of certain rights. 
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Many constitutions also contain texts concerning the creation of agencies 
aiming to ensure the activation of the rights enshrined in the constitutions. 
These are given different names: Ombudsman, Gender Equality Ombudsman, 
Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Ombudsman, Human Rights 
Protection Committee, etc. Regardless of the name, they have to possess real 
powers and not be merely supervisory or consultative bodies.
2.2.2. Rights to sexual and reproductive health 
and to bodily integrity and autonomy 
A gender sensitive constitution must provide for women’s health, including 
for their sexual and reproductive health. A good starting point is recognizing 
reproductive rights as human rights as the United Nations has done (HR/
PUB/14/6, 2014). As declared in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action:
“The human rights of women include their right to have control 
over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their 
sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, 
discrimination and violence. Equal relationships between women and 
men in matters of sexual relations and reproduction, including full 
respect for the integrity of the person, require mutual respect, consent 
and shared responsibility for sexual behavior and its consequences” 
(Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 1995, para 96). 
Women’s sexual and reproductive health is connected with many human 
rights, including the right to life, the right not to be exposed to torture, the 
right to health, the right to privacy, the right to education, and the prohibition 
of discrimination. This places specific obligations on States, as reaffirmed 
by the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, who refers 
to women’s right to access reproductive healthcare services, goods, and 
facilities that are: 
• available in adequate numbers;
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• accessible physically and economically;
• accessible without discrimination; and 
• of good quality32. 
Violations of women’s reproductive rights take numerous forms and include:
“denial of access to services that only women require, or poor quality services, 
subjecting women’s access to services to third party authorization, and 
performance of procedures related to women’s reproductive and sexual health 
without the woman’s consent, including forced sterilization, forced virginity 
examinations, and forced abortion; [female genital mutilation and early marriage 
also constitute risks for women’s sexual and reproductive rights]”33.
Acknowledging differences in reproductive biology between women and men is 
not akin to endorsing paternalism or the view that “biology is destiny” (Irving, 
2008, pp. 192-193). Instead, “a gendered perspective on health includes, besides 
examining differences in health needs, looking at differences between women 
and men in risk factors and determinants, severity and duration, differences 
in perceptions of illness, in access to and utilization of health services, and in 
health outcomes”34. The constitutional recognition of the particular needs and 
vulnerability of women when pregnant, during childbirth, and when caring 
for their children is a duty incumbent upon the state and is based on the needs 
associated to that vulnerability, not on the assumption of incapacity (Irving, 
2008, pp. 194).
Despite rights to sexual and reproductive health being seldom included in 
constitutional texts, newer constitutions have begun to recognize their special 
importance. Like for example the Ecuadorian constitution, Article 32:
32. A/61/338
33. Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. See 
http://www.ohchr.org/AR/Issues/Women/WRGS/Pages/HealthRights.aspx
34. https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/circle/modules/module4.htm
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“Health is a right guaranteed by the State […] by means of economic, 
social, cultural, educational, and environmental policies; and the 
permanent, timely and non-exclusive access to programs, actions 
and services promoting and providing integral healthcare, sexual 
health, and reproductive health. The provision of healthcare services 
shall be governed by the principles of equity, universality, solidarity, 
interculturalism, quality, efficiency, effectiveness, prevention, and 
bioethics, with a gender and generational approach”.
2.2.3. Right to protection from gender based violence 
Gender based violence is a major challenge hindering women’s ability to 
exercise many rights and a major violation affecting their rights to life, physical 
integrity, and human dignity. It occurs all over the world and is used to deny 
women and girls security, freedom, and the right to life. It is important to take 
into consideration that not only actual violence constitutes a barrier to freedom, 
but also the threat of violence. Thus, constitution makers must pay attention to 
this issue and devote resources to combatting it. Like for example, the Tunisian 
constitution, Article 46: “The State takes all necessary measures in order to 
eradicate violence against women”.
When formulating the constitutional provisions relevant to the right to 
protection against gender based violence, this issue should be stated clearly 
in a separate article and not incorporated into other rights, such as the right to 
life, physical integrity, or into the provisions of other articles. It will be useful 
to emphasize it in a clear, accurate, and separate article, as in the case of the 
Tunisian constitution. Also, the text of the proposed article must clearly state 
both women’s right not to be subjected to this violence, and the state’s duty 
to take all necessary measures to ensure this right and to protect victims of 
gender based violence35.
35. For clarification on the terminology of “gender based violence”, and how it differs from references to “violence against 
women”, see the Glossary included in Suteu and Draji (2015).
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2.2.4. Preventing women’s rights violations 
under the pretext of religion or social customs 
The violation of women’s rights under the pretext of religion, culture or customs/
traditions also hinders women’s enjoyment of their human rights. Whereas 
gender based violence is often prohibited by the constitution or ordinary 
legislation (even if the latter may be poorly enforced), violating women’s rights 
under the pretext of religion or customs is often justified and legitimized by 
many who may view it not as a violation but as compliance with religious or 
customary law. This is often the view taken in countries where sharia is a source 
of law or the basic or exclusive source of law. This risk is even higher when 
constitutions explicitly restrict women’s rights by stating that they must not 
contradict religion or custom, or when they make religion and custom, rather 
than the constitution, the basis for such rights. Therefore, great caution must be 
exerted when including any reference to existing customs in the constitution. 
For example, the constitution of South Africa recognizes the roles and rights of 
religious, cultural, and linguistic communities, but it ensures that their exercise of 
these rights may not contradict the constitutional bill of rights (Article 31). Then, 
the same constitution recognizes traditional leaders, allows their legislation to be 
applied, and mandates that courts apply customary law but only “subject to the 
Constitution” (Article 211).
The constitution of Venezuela, after recognizing rights of religious 
communities, restrains the exercise of their beliefs in Article 59, which states 
that: “no one shall invoke religious beliefs or discipline as a means of evading 
compliance with law or preventing another person from exercising his or her 
rights”. The essential point that constitution makers have to highlight is that 
the application of religious and customary law depends on their compatibility 
with the constitution, especially the constitutional bill of rights, and not the 
opposite. This has to be projected in explicit and clear statements. This is 
also the position of the Working Group on the Issue of Discrimination against 
Women in Law and Practice. In its report of 2015, it recommended that states 
“recognize and enshrine, in their constitutions and laws, the right to equality, 
which should apply in all areas of life and have primacy over all religious, 
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customary and indigenous laws, norms, codes and rules, with no possibility of 
exemption, waiver or circumvention”36.
This subject is especially important in societies that are still under religious 
or customary authority. There, the interpreters of religious texts, and not the 
texts themselves, wield public authority, and their interpretations supersede the 
constitution. It must be highlighted that all legal texts require an authority to 
interpret them. The problem is not this openness to interpretation, but who has 
the power to interpret and give the final say with regard to legal texts: a religious 
power or a civil one, i.e. a judge. A gender sensitive constitution requires a 
secular authority interpreting its provisions; otherwise, the protections it offers 
women risk being undermined in the name of religion37.
The importance of the above is not limited to the protection of women from the 
violation of their rights under the pretext of religion or customs. It also ensures 
that no legislation will be enacted later based on religion or customs, regardless 
of its contradiction with women’s constitutional rights and gender equality. This 
occurs specifically with regard to regulations on the family, eligibility for public 
office, inheritance, and personal status laws.
2.2.5. Women’s right to participate in public and political life
Constitutions have to ensure all women’s political rights, especially the right 
to popular participation in the administration of public affairs, the right to 
candidacy and voting in periodic elections through public, equal and secret 
ballot, and the right to hold public offices and exercise all public functions 
created pursuant to national legislation, including women’s enjoyment of their 
right to get opportunities to represent their governments at the international level 
and to take part in the activities of international organizations.
36. Report of the Working Group on Discrimination against Women in Law and Practice A/HRC/29/40, Human Rights 
Council, Twenty-ninth session, 2 April 2015, http://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/29/40
37. For more on an independent judiciary as a necessary guarantee for the constitution’s implementation, see Suteu and 
Draji (2015, chapter 5).
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The Beijing Platform of Action adopted at the Fourth International Women’s 
Conference (1995) urged the governments of the world to increase women’s 
participation in decision making positions so as to reach not less than 30% – the 
goal set by the Economic and Social Council.
The purpose is to reach parity between women and men as a mechanism to realize 
complete equality. However, international progress on the realization of women’s 
political representation goals, as set by the international community, is still very 
slow and far from meeting these objectives. Thus, a gender sensitive constitution 
should stipulate an obligation to address women’s exclusion and enable women 
to hold public office and to participate in elected bodies, including participation 
in the State’s political and public life; the exercise of legislative, judicial, 
executive, and administrative powers; as well as participation in all aspects of 
public administration and policy formulation and implementation at international, 
national, regional, and local levels. This participation must also extend to civil 
society, including general assemblies and boards, as well as to organizations such 
as political parties, trade unions, professional or industrial associations, women’s 
organizations, community organizations, and other organizations active in public 
and political life. However, constitution makers have to take into account that the 
mere recognition of the equality principle is not sufficient to redress women’s 
exclusion and to enable them to actually participate in the political and public life 
of the country. That is why the CEDAW Committee has stated that: 
“the principle of equality of women and men has been affirmed in 
the constitutions and laws of most countries and in all international 
instruments. Nonetheless, in the last 50 years, women have not achieved 
equality, and their inequality has been reinforced by their low level of 
participation in public and political life” (CEDAW, 1997). 
Therefore, the Committee affirmed that, while it is necessary to remove 
impediments in law, this is not sufficient; affirmative action measures must be 
adopted so as to realize equality of participation38.
38. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Sixteenth session (1997) General Recommendation 
No. 23 United Nations document A / 52/38; http://www.refworld.org/docid/453882a622.html
Chapter 9 
138
For example, the Italian constitution affirms the right of citizens of both sexes to 
hold public office and obliges the State’s authorities to adopt specific measures 
to promote equal opportunities between women and men. The example of the 
Italian constitution, Article 51: “All citizen of either sex is eligible for public 
offices and elected positions on equal terms, according to the conditions 
established by law. To this end, the Republic shall adopt specific measures to 
promote equal opportunities between women and men”.
A broad set of such measures exists, including39:
• appointing female candidates, 
• modifying the electoral procedures, 
• enacting binding laws for political parties to include women on their 
lists, and 
• specifying numeric objectives and quotas in elected bodies, executive 
bodies and judicial organs. For example, the constitution of Ecuador 
states explicitly that women must be able to hold judicial offices, 
including membership of the Constitutional Court on a basis of “parity 
with men”.
The example of the Ecuadorian constitution, Article 434:
“Members [of the Constitutional Court] shall be elected […] through 
a public examination process, with citizen oversight and option for 
challenging the process. In the membership of the Court, efforts shall 
be made to ensure parity between men and women”.
A constitution may also contain a rule stating that no gender may constitute 
less than a certain percentage of any public body’s membership, for example 
39. To review the use of the quota for women in Europe, see: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200
903/20090310ATT51390/20090310ATT51390EN.pdf.
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stating that “neither gender should occupy more than 60% or less that 40% of the 
positions on a party list or in a decision-making body” (Dahlerup, 2005, p. 142). 
An example of this is the constitution of Kenya, which states that no more than 
two-thirds of the members of elective or appointed bodies shall be of the same 
gender. This ensures that at least one third of a body’s members will be of the 
‘other gender’. The Kenyan constitution makes it obligatory, in Article 27(8), for 
the state “to take legislative and other measures to implement the principle that 
not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies shall 
be of the same gender”. This is reaffirmed in Article 81, which states that: “The 
electoral system shall comply with the following principles–– (b) not more than 
two-thirds of the members of elective public bodies shall be of the same gender”.
The purpose of affirmative measures is to achieve parity between women and 
men on the way to realizing complete equality. As such, they are meant to address 
existing democratic deficits and to be transitory towards ensuring women’s equal 
participation in economic decision and policymaking and implementation40. In 
addition to the fact that it is a right for women, women’s equal participation in 
public and political life constitutes a benefit for society as a whole. Studies have 
shown that women working in politics are no less competent than their male 
peers (Duflo & Topalova, 2004). Moreover, it has been shown that “not only are 
women leaders needed to reflect the policy preferences of women voters, but that 
they may be more effective in doing so”41. Women participating on equal terms 
in public and political life thus ensures that they can pursue policies and decision 
making which reflects their needs and interests.
Finally, it should be pointed out that a gender-compatible constitution is legally 
binding on states and is not merely a ‘point of view’ subject to consensus or 
disagreement and does not tolerate multiple views. The Iranian woman Fatima 
Umm Salamah was killed in 1852 and her body dumped in the well after she 
cried out loud “You can kill me whenever you like, but you cannot stop the 
40. Euromed Feminist Initiative (EFI-IFE), “Women’s Rights and Democracy Building, Promoting a Common Agenda 
for Equality between Women and Men”, Recommendations from Euro-Med conference, Amman, Jordan,7-8 June 2013, 
https://goo.gl/vD3b4J.
41. Rohini Pandey and Alexandra Siron will see women in politics: quotas, voter trends, and women’s leadership. See the 
study link on the Internet: http://iknowpolitics.org/sites/default/files/quota.pdf
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liberation of women”42 – it seems that this cry will continue to resonate until 
women actually succeed in achieving their full equality of rights, which should 
be at the forefront of entrenching these rights with clear and precise constitutional 
provisions. This is what should be done. It is our responsibility to all women and 
men alike as human beings who truly believe in human rights.
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10Women’s rights and constitutional implementation in the MENA region: 
challenges and perspectives
Francesco Biagi1
Several constitutional reforms adopted in Middle Eastern and Northern African 
countries (MENA region) following the Arab uprisings have significantly 
strengthened the provisions on women’s rights and gender equality. The 1996 
Moroccan constitution, for example, only granted political rights to women 
(Article 8), while the new 2011 Moroccan constitution declares that: “The man 
and the woman enjoy, in equality, the rights and freedoms of civil, political, 
economic, social, cultural, and environmental character […]” (Article 19). In 
Egypt, “equality between women and men in all civil, political, economic, 
social, and cultural rights” has become an object which the State “commits to 
achieving” (Article 11(1)). The 2014 Egyptian constitution also declares that 
“The State commits to taking the necessary measures to ensure appropriate 
representation of women in the houses of parliament, in the manner specified 
by the law. It grants women the right to hold public posts and high management 
posts in the state, and to appointment in judicial bodies and entities without 
discrimination” (Article 11(2)). In Tunisia, the 2014 constitution states that “All 
citizens, male and female, have equal rights and duties, and are equal before the 
law without any discrimination” (Article 21), and that the right to work is “a right 
for every citizen, male and female” (Article 40). The Tunisian constitution also 
guarantees “equality of opportunities between women and men to have access 
to all levels of responsibility and in all fields” (Article 46), and provides that 
“every male and female voter” has the right to stand for election as President of 
1. University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy; francesco.biagi4@unibo.it
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the Republic (Article 74). In Algeria, the February 2016 constitutional reform2 
introduced a provision that stipulates that the State promotes “equality between 
men and women in the labour market” and “encourages the advancement of 
women in positions of responsibility in public institutions and administrations, 
as well as at a company level” (Article 36).
However, in order to assess the sincerity of these innovations, the process of 
constitutional implementation will be decisive. The latter will be undoubtedly 
extremely complicated, since North Africa and the Middle East is a region in 
which – more than in other parts of the world – women’s rights and the principles 
of gender equality and non-discrimination have often remained ‘on paper’.
In this short paper, I will address some of the most relevant factors that may 
influence the process of constitutional implementation, i.e. (1) the nature of the 
constitution, (2) the role played by the constitutional courts, (3) the ‘limitation 
clauses’, (4) international treaties and conventions on human rights, (5) women’s 
representation in elected institutions, and (6) the social, cultural, and religious 
context. 
1. The nature of the constitution
The first factor that may deeply influence the process of implementing 
constitutional provisions concerning women’s rights and gender equality relates 
to the very nature of the constitution in question. In particular, it is crucial to 
verify whether constitutions in the Arab world are considered legally binding 
documents, the highest laws of the land, or whether they are merely perceived as 
political and/or symbolic texts, deprived of any legal value. This question is of 
the utmost importance since only a constitution which is considered the supreme 
law of the State will be able to effectively protect women’s fundamental rights 
(and more generally human rights).
2. Currently, there is not an English version available online of the updated Algerian constitution; quotes are translated from 
the official French version.
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It should be recalled that for a long time, the significance of the constitution in 
Europe was radically different from the significance that the constitution had in 
the United States (US). In the US, the constitution has been considered, since 
the very beginning, the “superior, paramount law” – as it was made clear by 
the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison (1803) –, with the consequence that 
statute laws in contrast with the constitution had to be considered void.
In Europe, on the contrary, the notion of constitution was for a long time 
deeply affected by the Jacobin ideal of the ‘law as the expression of the general 
will’, which denied the normative character of the constitution. The latter was 
considered a symbolic text, or, in a best case scenario, a political document 
aimed at regulating the organisation of the branches of government (Blanco 
Valdés, 1997; García de Enterría, 2006). This idea of the constitution only 
changed starting from the end of World War II, thanks to the establishment 
of constitutional courts which regarded constitutions as legally binding texts 
(Biagi, 2016). In this way, the normativity of the constitution became a “brute 
fact of the legislator’s world” (Stone Sweet, 2000, p. 196).
In the MENA region, the constitutions adopted following the decolonization 
process were mainly perceived as political and/or symbolic documents. Indeed, 
once they became independent, many Arab States promulgated constitutions “as 
an expression of national sovereignty” (Brown, 2002, p. 10), and the role of 
these texts was “less legal than symbolic or programmatic” (Le Roy, 2012, p. 
110).
This notion of the constitution has changed gradually over time. On the one 
hand, nowadays constitutions are perceived as more legally binding than in the 
past. An example of this trend towards the normative value of the constitution 
is given by the fact that the preambles to several constitutions (i.e. Morocco, 
Syria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria) are classified by the constitutions themselves 
as constituting an ‘integral part’ of the constitution in question. This means 
that these preambles – which proclaim, inter alia, the principles of gender 
equality, non-discrimination, and equal opportunities – constitute a parameter 
for constitutional review (bloc de constitutionnalité). 
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On the other hand, however, the full recognition of the normative value of the 
constitution in most of the Arab countries is yet to come. In a similar manner 
to the role played by European constitutional courts in the last century, Arab 
constitutional courts, whose powers and competences have been strengthened – 
as discussed below – may be crucial in clearly recognizing and guaranteeing the 
normativity and supremacy of the entire constitution, with particular attention to 
the principle of equality and the provisions on fundamental rights and freedoms.
2. The role played by constitutional courts
Another factor that may influence the process of implementation of the 
constitutional provisions concerning women’s rights and gender equality is 
given by the role played by constitutional courts. It should be noted that judicial 
review, generally in the form of constitutional courts and councils, was a common 
feature in the MENA region even before the Arab uprisings. However, “only a 
few of the bodies charged with the task [were] viewed as effective defenders 
of constitutionalism” (Brown, 1998, p. 85). One of the very few exceptions 
was given by the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, which, during the 
period from the mid-eighties to the end of the nineties, struck down several 
laws adopted by the regime, thus seriously challenging Mubarak’s government 
(Moustafa, 2007).
Interestingly enough, the Arab upheavals gave rise to the emergence and 
strengthening of constitutional courts in the MENA region. Jordan and Palestine 
established a constitutional court for the first time in their history, respectively in 
2012 and 2016; Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Algeria reinforced the position and 
the competences of their respective constitutional courts; in Egypt, the Supreme 
Constitutional Court continues to be an extremely powerful and influential body 
(Frosini & Biagi, 2015, p. 129).
The most significant novelty is probably given by the procedural gateways 
to the constitutional courts. While in the past the referrals to these bodies 
mainly came from governmental entities (such as the president of the republic, 
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the speaker of the parliament…), the recent constitutional reforms have 
widened access by granting to ordinary courts the power to challenge the 
constitutionality of laws before the constitutional courts. This undoubtedly 
represents a fundamental step, since in this way individuals (including women) 
can have access – at least indirectly – to constitutional courts. Indeed, thanks 
to the introduction of concrete constitutional adjudication, when an ordinary 
judge concludes (either following a request by one of the parties or ex officio, 
depending on the country) that the law that has to be applied to the specific case 
violates the constitution, he/she must suspend the case and refer a question of 
constitutionality to the court. This system is therefore likely to increase the 
likelihood of constitutional courts ruling on the constitutionality of laws that 
violate the principle of equality (including gender equality) and human rights 
(including women’s rights).
A distinction, however, has to be drawn between the countries that have adopted 
a ‘single filter’ system and the countries that have adopted a ‘double filter’ 
system. Indeed, some countries (e.g. Egypt and Tunisia) have followed the 
system that can be found, for example, in Germany, Italy, and Spain, where all 
courts – including lower courts – can directly refer questions of constitutionality 
to the constitutional court (‘single-filter’ system). Other countries (e.g. Jordan 
and Algeria), on the contrary, have followed the French model, where lower 
courts have to refer the question of constitutionality to the apex courts (such as 
the Court of Cassation and the Council of State), which then decide whether to 
refer the question to the constitutional court (‘double-filter’ system). 
As previously mentioned in Biagi (2017), it should be noted that the French 
and the Jordanian experiences have shown that the ‘double-filter’ system can 
be rather problematic, especially at the outset. In France, during the first year of 
operation of the question prioritaire de constitutionnalité, the Court of Cassation 
(but not the Council of State) displayed a certain level of “resistance” (Molfessis, 
2011, p. 83) when referring questions of constitutionality to the constitutional 
council. In Jordan, five years after the establishment of the constitutional court, 
the extremely low number of judgments issued by the constitutional court would 
appear to be related – amongst other things – to a certain reluctance on the part of 
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the Court of Cassation to refer questions of constitutionality to the constitutional 
court. The Venice Commission (2011) has underlined that “from the viewpoint 
of human rights protection, it is more expedient and efficient to give courts of 
all levels access to the Constitutional Court” (p. 18, emphasis added). Therefore, 
the ‘single filter’ system seems to be more suitable for guaranteeing protection 
for women’s rights.
3. The ‘limitation clauses’
A factor that might have a positive impact on the process of implementation of the 
constitutional provisions concerning women’s rights and gender equality is given 
by the ‘limitation clauses’, i.e. the clauses which are aimed at guaranteeing that 
the core, the essence of fundamental rights, is not affected by the implementing 
legislation. These clauses – that can be found, for example, in the Constitutions 
of Germany (Article 19(2)), South Africa (Article 36) and Kenya (Article 24) 
– were also included in the Constitutions of Jordan (Article 128(1)), Tunisia 
(Article 49) and Egypt (Article 92). Their introduction was clearly aimed to 
overcome the practices of the past, when laws implementing the fundamental 
rights and freedoms declared by the constitutions often ‘hollowed out’ those 
very same rights. 
It has been rightly pointed out that the limitation clause contained in the 
Tunisian constitution is “probably the Arab region’s most detailed [one]” (Al-
Ali & Ben Romdhane, 2014, n.p.). Article 49 of the Tunisian constitution states 
that legislation limiting rights can only be adopted if it is “necessary to a civil 
and democratic society” and “provided there is proportionality between these 
restrictions and the objective sought”. This provision, however, also states that 
limitations to fundamental rights can be put in place “with the aim of protecting 
the rights of others, or based on the requirements of public order, national 
defence, public health, or public morals,” (Article 49, emphasis added) which 
leaves room for potential abuses. The constitutional court will play a key role 
in assessing whether the core, the essence of fundamental rights (including 
women’s rights), has been violated or not.
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4. International treaties and conventions 
on human rights 
Following the Arab uprisings, a number of countries have adopted a noticeably 
favourable stance towards international treaties and human rights conventions 
(including those on women’s rights). On the other hand however, the will to 
preserve national identity (especially in relation to religion) has thus far prevented 
their full incorporation into domestic legal systems. These two opposing trends 
can be easily seen in Tunisia and Morocco.
Tunisia, which has long been at the forefront of the Arab world with respect to 
women’s rights, took another historical step in 2014 when it became the first Arab 
country to withdraw all its reservations to the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). At the same time, 
however, Tunisia decided to maintain a general declaration which states that the 
country “shall not take any organizational or legislative decision in conformity 
with the requirements of this Convention where such a decision would conflict 
with the provisions of Chapter I of the Tunisian Constitution”.
Chapter I of the Constitution states – inter alia – that the religion of Tunisia 
is Islam (Article 1). It is to be seen, then, whether the withdrawal of the 
reservations will be translated into actual laws, or whether the retention of the 
general declaration will prevent major changes to ordinary legislation from 
taking place.
In Morocco, Article 19 of the 2011 Constitution stipulates that “the man 
and the woman enjoy, in equality, the rights and freedoms of civil, political, 
economic, social, cultural, and environmental character, enounced in this Title 
and in the other provisions of the Constitution, as well as in the international 
conventions and pacts duly ratified by Morocco and this, with respect for the 
provisions of the Constitution, of the immutable values [constantes]3 of the 
Kingdom and of its laws”. The ‘immutable values’ clearly recall Islam, which 
3.  The French ‘constantes’ is usually translated by the leading literature as ‘immutable values’.
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is the religion of the State (Article 3 of the 2011 Moroccan constitution). 
When applying this provision, the judges may base their reasoning on the 
reference of the constitution to the “international conventions and pacts 
duly ratified by Morocco”, or, alternatively, give greater emphasis to the 
“immutable values and the laws of the Realm” – which, as noted above, are 
also expressly enshrined within the constitution. Therefore, it would appear 
that the constitution permits two diametrically opposed interpretations in 
relation to the principle of gender equality: one “in favor of universalism”, 
and one “towards conservatism” (Bernoussi, 2012, 2016, p. 225 and p. 705, 
respectively). 
Striking a balance between the respect of international treaties on human rights 
– and in particular on women’s rights – on the one hand, and the preservation of 
national identity (especially when it comes to religion) on the other, now more 
than ever represents one of the major challenges for Arab countries. 
5. Women’s representation 
in elected institutions
Securing greater participation by women in political parties and representation 
in public institutions, and consequently increasing the chances of the effective 
implementation of the constitutional provisions on gender equality, can 
contribute enormously to guaranteeing full citizenship for women. This seems to 
be of the utmost importance in North Africa and the Middle East, where women 
very often can hardly make their voices heard.
Although they are not immune from criticism, it seems that electoral gender 
quotas can contribute to achieving this aim. Electoral quotas for women are 
nowadays provided for in a number of Arab countries. In Algeria, for example, 
thanks to the electoral quota, 26% of the seats of the Lower House are held by 
women. Electoral quotas for women are provided for also in other countries, 
such as Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan, but women’s representation in Parliament 
is lower. 
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In Tunisia, Article 46 of the constitution guarantees “equality of opportunities 
between women and men to have access to all levels of responsibility and 
in all domains. The state seeks to achieve equal representation for women 
and men in elected councils”4. This gender sensitive provision is reflected in 
the electoral legislation. Indeed, the electoral law for parliamentary elections 
provides for the principle of ‘vertical equality’ – according to which electoral 
lists have to be established in such a way to alternate between men and women. 
Currently, 31% of the seats of Parliament are held by women. Moreover, the 
electoral law for municipal and regional elections adopted in February 2017 
took a further step by providing for the principle of ‘horizontal equality’ – 
according to which “political parties will be obliged to respect the equality 
of sexes, not only in the same list but also between the lists that they present 
in different constituencies in such a way that if in Constituency A the lead 
candidate of a list is a man, the lead candidate in Constituency B must be a 
woman” (Mekki, 2017, n.p.).
It should be noted, however, that an electoral quota per se is not enough to 
guarantee women’s representation. This has to be complemented with an 
electoral system that favors women’s representation (it is generally agreed that 
proportional systems are favourable to the election of women and make the 
quota system work better), and with an electoral management body in charge 
of verifying that the measures aimed at guaranteeing women’s participation 
in elections are respected, i.e. “exemptions from candidacy fees, access to 
official media, access to public resources, [and] imposing sanctions on the 
political parties that fail to comply, including elimination of lists that exclude 
women” (Suteu & Draji, 2015, p. 63).
6. The social, cultural, and religious context
In spite of the fact that in the past two decades several countries have taken 
important steps to strengthen women’s rights, the path towards creating real 
4. Translated from the official French text of the 2014 constitution.
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equality between men and women in the MENA region is still very long and 
difficult. The social, cultural, and religious context is the factor that – probably 
more than others – has thus far prevented women from obtaining full citizenship 
in the Arab world. In particular, for a long time women have been fighting 
against a patriarchal interpretation of Islamic texts, which have been used to 
legitimize various legal and social restrictions against them. It has been rightly 
pointed out that
“it is necessary to deconstruct this politicized structure and reconstruct 
it, by relying again on the spirit of the Quranic text, which gives all 
the possibilities to contextualize the equality between man and women. 
Therefore, women have to regain what was usurped from them over 
centuries” (Gaté, 2014, p. 10).
For the moment, resistance to greater gender equality from certain sections of 
society, political parties, and public institutions is extremely strong, and will not 
be uprooted easily. 
Examples of discrimination against women in Arab societies are boundless. 
It is emblematic, for example, that at the beginning of October 2016 a member 
of the Egyptian parliament called for mandatory virginity tests for women 
seeking university admission. The aim of these tests would be to prevent 
informal marriages (known as ‘gawaz orfy’) between young people who 
choose to have premarital sex (New York Times, 2016). Another example 
is given by Morocco, where, on the 23rd of November 2016 (i.e. two days 
before the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women), 
a program on state television demonstrated how women could use makeup 
to cover up evidence of domestic violence, thus helping them to “carry on 
with [their] daily life”, as the host said at the end of the segment (Ait Akdim, 
2016, n.p.).
It goes without saying that social and cultural changes cannot be imposed ‘from 
above’, although parliaments, governments, courts and all the other public 
institutions can facilitate these changes. The case of Italy during the sixties is 
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emblematic. In 1961, the Italian constitutional court delivered a judgment (no. 
64/1961) in which it declared that Article 559 of the Criminal Code – which only 
punished women’s adultery (and not men’s) – did not violate the provisions of 
the Constitution that guarantee the equality between men and women. Indeed, 
according to the court, women’s adultery – more than men’s adultery – could 
threaten the unity of the family.
Seven years later, in 1968, the Italian constitutional court (judgment no. 126/1968) 
was asked to re-examine the issue. This time the court decided to strike down 
the provision of the Criminal Code that punished only women’s adultery, stating 
that the historical and the social conditions had deeply changed, and that men 
and women had to be considered on the same footing within the family and the 
entire society. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this short paper, several constitutional reforms 
adopted in the MENA region following the Arab uprisings have significantly 
reinforced the provisions on women’s rights and gender equality. Now, it is up to 
public institutions to respect and implement these provisions, thus spearheading 
positive changes in Arab societies.
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11No democracy without gender equality
Maya Alrahabi1
The war in Syria has been going on for seven consecutive years. It began with 
peaceful demonstrations against the tyrant regime for months, then was faced 
with excessive violence. Many protesters were arrested and tortured brutally, 
which led to the death of some of them. Many other peaceful protesters were 
killed by gunshots during demonstrations. It turned into an armed conflict 
between the regime and the opposition. Several regional powers intervened in 
the Syrian conflict by supporting parties to the conflict and arming them, even 
by sending militias. The regime then began the random shelling of cities where 
those factions were based, which led to a huge number of civilian casualties. 
The arrests of peaceful civilian activists, especially those who worked in relief 
of the afflicted areas, continued by the regime. Many were arrested and brutally 
tortured and killed (there are documented photos for 11,000 detainees who died 
under torture). Feminist activists were arrested and tortured, some of them were 
killed and others were tried by anti-terrorism courts and are still in prison. Others 
escaped outside Syria and are working in the neighbouring countries, or all over 
the world. Fighters of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) began to fly 
from all over the world to Syria, under the eyes of the whole world, which did 
not do anything against it until ISIS seized half of Syria, brutally treating Syrian 
citizens in the areas under its control, especially women who are prohibited 
from appearing in the public sphere unless they cover their entire bodies, denied 
education, and work. ISIS applied brutal sanctions on people in their control 
areas. The international forces (especially USA and Russia) intervened, which 
has made the conflict more complex and brutal; they bombard cities all over 
Syria, most victims being civilians. The regime also laid siege on more than 
1. Director of “Musawa”, Syria; m.rahabi@gmail.com
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16 cities that were completely cut off from food, medicine, water, electricity, 
and all the necessities of life. The armed groups lay siege on two cities as well. 
As a result, there are 500,000 dead, hundreds of thousands of detainees and 
disappearances, 4.8 million refugees in neighbouring countries, more than half 
a million refugees in Europe, and 7.6 million displaced (Syria’s population 
is 23 million) who suffer inhumane and difficult conditions. What can we 
do, as feminist movements that stand against wars, who believe in peaceful 
solutions and dialogue as a means to solve any conflict? Certainly the United 
Nations (UN) Resolution 1325, and related provisions, are guidelines that 
could be consulted in times of conflicts, along with international humanitarian 
laws and many others. We should not forget, however, that all the resolutions, 
conventions, and treaties have been signed under an international patriarchal 
order that basically legalizes wars by developing controlling regulations in an 
attempt to designate an ethical system for an intrinsically unethical act. The 
UN, for its part, does not depart from the authoritarian male standard that still 
rules the world, as its composition puts the fate of the people in the hands of 
five member countries in the Security Council. Eventually, any one of them can 
use the veto right to obstruct justice and the possibility of a people achieving 
their rights. This applies to all international treaties and conventions issued by 
the UN, which do not have a binding character on the ground, allowing the 
religious male political tyrannical systems to manipulate the destinies of their 
people, especially women, without any oversight or accountability. The UN 
also allows states to infringe on other states unchecked, perhaps even under 
cover from the United Nations itself.
So we raised our voice loud against any form of religious male political 
domination, which is manifested in authoritarian governments and colonial 
occupation, resulting in devastating violence. We have always stood against war 
and all forms of violence, calling for pursuing peaceful ways to resolve conflicts 
and disputes. Our ways of conflict resolution are based on several points:
• The struggle for an active participation of women in all stages of conflict 
resolution, peace-building, and reconstruction is through adopting 
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the feminist vision of a peaceful world, in which all forms of armed 
conflicts are abolished.
• The protection of civilians in wars by helping them, especially women, 
empowering them, and raising their awareness.
• Mobilizing advocates for our just causes by networking with global 
women’s organizations and human rights organizations, and anyone 
else that could support our just causes.
• Pressure on the influential international powers and organizations to 
support our just causes and to resolve our conflicts peacefully.
It is worth noting that people’s experiences have shown that the involvement 
of women in peacemaking, at the local and international levels, give peace a 
greater impact and make it longer lasting. There is a tendency in the international 
community for the standardization of the role of women as victims of wars 
seeking peace, any peace, even if the forces of authoritarianism stay in power, 
which has contributed to further oppression of the people, depriving them of 
their will. This is not real peace; it is a fragile peace that is based on the balance 
between internal and external domination forces. The peace that we seek is 
the lasting and sustainable peace which will only be achieved by changing 
the structure of the authoritarian state into a democratic modern secular state, 
based on the principle of equal citizenship, the rule of law, and social justice. A 
comprehensive, sustainable, just peace will only be achieved by striking a balance 
between forgiveness and accountability; namely, forgiving others, and holding 
accountable all of those whose hands are stained with blood, compensating the 
victims in accordance with the principles of transitional justice. We are seeking to 
get to that just and comprehensive peace in a transitional phase that is governed 
by a constitutional declaration, including all the foundations of a modern 
democratic state, a transitional provision body with an executive and legislative 
authority that represents all spectrums of the people, an impartial independent 
judicial authority that is responsible for monitoring and accountability, a 
transitional justice under which all those who have committed a crime against 
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the people will have a fair trial, and a transitional period which will allow us 
to work on drafting a permanent constitution for the country that we seek. The 
Coalition of Syrian Women for Democracy (CSWD) was founded in July 2012, 
and since then 16 organizations have joined it so far, and from the beginning it 
has focused on putting forth and promoting engendered constitutional principles 
to guide the transition towards democracy in Syria. This ongoing work has been 
supported from the beginning by the Euromed Feminist Initiative in the frame of 
different programs funded by Sweden and the European Union. 
The CSWD has been building on lessons learned from the experiences of other 
countries. It published a booklet, Looking Towards a Democratic Constitution 
(20122), and recommendations for promoting nonviolent transition towards 
democracy through engendering constitution building process in Syria3 from the 
international conference held on the 10th and 11th of April 2014 in Brussels. 
It also published the report, Gendered constitution building process for Syria 
(Zakzak, Hjeieh, & Al Rahabi, 2014), and in 2015 some of its members were 
involved in the reference group for writing the handbook on engendering 
constitution-making: ABC for a Gender Sensitive Constitution (Suteu & Draji, 
2015). CSWD has held several conferences about ‘Principles of gendered 
constitution’ in partnership with the Euromed Feminist Initiative at local and 
international levels. The gendered constitutional principles of Syria, and the 
mechanisms to implement them adopted by the CSWD are:
• Syria is a sovereign, independent, democratic republic based on political 
pluralism and administrative decentralization, and has the full right to 
retrieve its occupied territories within the context of the unity of the 
Syrian land. 
• All Syrian citizens, women and men, are united under one national 
identity encompassing their different ethnic, cultural, and religious 
belonging. The constitution guarantees respect, equality, gender 
2. http://www.efi-ife.org/equality-first-towards-democratic-constitution
3. http://www.efi-ife.org/gendered-constitution-building-process-syria
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equality, non-discrimination, as well as the establishment of equal 
opportunities for all these social components.
• The constitution guarantees the achievement of full equality between 
women and men in citizenship rights so that both women and men can 
enjoy their civil, political, social, economic, cultural, and educational 
rights in all areas of public and family life. 
• The constitution prohibits discrimination, whether direct or indirect, 
against any citizen on the basis of gender, and obliges the State to 
issue national laws that prevent, prohibit, and criminalize any act of 
discrimination against women and all forms of violence against them in 
both private and public life; to annul all discriminatory laws and texts, 
to lift all the reservations posed on the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and to endorse 
its optional protocol. 
• The Syrian constitution is a secular one and explicitly mentions the 
separation of religion from the State and legislation. 
• The people are the source of power. The constitution guarantees 
representation of Syrian people through free and impartial elections, 
which are administered by just laws that ensure women’s equal 
participation, achievement of parity between women and men through 
providing for affirmative actions such as gender quotas and fair 
representations of all groups. 
• The constitution protects the separation of powers and the establishment 
of regulations that ensure a balanced relationship among them.
• The constitution ensures equal participation of women in public, 
political, economic, and social life; their equal right to employment 
and to holding any decision-making position, as well as their equal 
representation in all designated and elected bodies. 
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• The sources of legislation are international human rights treaties and 
agreements, women’s rights conventions and resolutions, as well as 
international human rights laws and principles of social justice and 
gender equality. 
• All international treaties and agreements ratified by the State have 
supremacy over national legislation. The constitution and national laws 
comply with international agreements and conventions ratified by the 
State that protect the political, economic, and social rights of women 
and men, on top of which is CEDAW. 
• The constitution guarantees the right to life and bans the death penalty; 
it prohibits ill-treatment and abuse of women and men under any 
circumstances; it explicitly criminalizes all forms of gender-based 
violence and torture, including rape, and all other forms of abuse and 
inhumane treatment.
• The constitution protects the independence of the judiciary and the 
equality of all citizens, women and men alike, before the law and in the 
law. The constitution also ensures equal access for women and men to 
legal entities, equality in treatment, and protection against sexual and 
physical violence, as well as providing compensations for victims of 
sexual violence within the system of transitional justice. 
• The constitution protects the right of women and men to transfer their 
citizenship to spouses and children.
• The constitution protects freedom of expression, thought, and conscience, 
as well as participation in decision making through political parties and 
civil society organizations, including women’s rights organizations, and 
publishing newspapers and other printed materials. 
• The constitution guarantees and protects women’s and men’s equal 
rights to education, work, property ownership, and inheritance. 
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• The constitution ensures abolishing or amending all laws conflicting 
with these principles. 
As mentioned in Zakzak et al. (2014), the CSWD has also elaborated mechanisms 
to implement the above-mentioned gender-sensitive constitutional principles. In 
this vein:
• The constitution must be written in a gender-sensitive language. The 
words ‘women and men’ must be clearly included after phrases like ‘all 
citizens’ or ‘individuals’ to emphasize that women and men are equal in 
worth, before the law and in the law. 
• The constitution must prohibit the legislative authority from revising 
its articles in a way that negatively affects gender equality or any of the 
principles of freedom and justice. The constitution also must clearly 
state that the articles guaranteeing civil rights and freedoms, and equality 
between women and men, are not subject to change, unless change was 
intended to emphasize or enrich, in which case the legislative power 
may amend some articles.
• The constitution must include implementation mechanisms, such as 
articles and bodies for equality, to ensure it does not remain a declaration 
of principles. A supreme national body is created to implement and 
protect women’s rights and establish gender equality in all ministries 
and local institutions and authorities, along with the gender equality 
committee in the parliament to monitor the implementation of gender 
equality law and related issues. The principle of gender equality is 
established clearly and through all governmental plans and programs. 
• Current laws must be amended by the legislative authority to agree with 
all the rights and freedoms protected by the sought constitution. No 
article or law should stand in opposition to the spirit of the constitution. If 
any such contradiction is noted, laws must be amended to be compatible 
with the constitution, and therefore with international agreements on 
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human and women’s rights. Feminist organizations and human rights 
activists must be involved in the process of revising laws and systems 
and developing civil and criminal laws to ensure justice and eliminate 
all forms of discrimination and violence against women. 
• The national policy focused on education includes all Syrian children in 
the educational process, especially those who were deprived from it in 
the past years, as well as focusing on literacy programs and the spread 
of knowledge and awareness on democracy, human rights, and gender 
equality in all educational stages and in all media. 
• National policies reflect a positive image of women and stand in 
opposition to social tolerance towards discrimination against women, 
and mechanisms guarantee the protection of women’s rights in reality. 
The constitution alone cannot protect women from cultural stereotypes 
and prejudices which continue to marginalize women in obvious or 
subtle ways. 
• Independent civil records are provided for women to further 
institutionalize the full citizenship of women. 
• A clear work table is set for gender equality and all opportunities are 
sized to emphasize this issue. 
• All social components in Syria are involved in establishing gender 
equality and raising awareness of women’s rights on a local level, since 
even the progressive forces in Syria hesitate on the subject of gender 
equality and women’s rights. 
• All feminist and civil society organizations are engaged and actively 
participate in the preparation for negotiations and the creation of 
transitional governing bodies. Civil society organizations must have the 
freedom to work and be properly represented in committees that adopt 
programs and policies. 
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• The participation of women in negotiating delegations of Syrian 
political parties and powers is ensured at all stages. 
• The discussions and negotiations pertain during the constitution 
building period, since it could change the balance of powers through 
the mobilization of democratic forces. 
• Mechanisms must ensure the transparency and fairness of constitutional 
referendums and all stages of elections, as well the participation of civil 
society organizations in monitoring the elections. 
• The electoral system is a proportional representative one in order to 
promote gender equality. 
• This entire process is connected to democracy, since women’s rights are 
an indivisible part of the international human rights.
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Section 4.
Testimonies by civil society organizations 
and Syrian lawyers’ internships 
at the CIRSG and SPGI
Testimonies from civil society organizations that are active between Italy and 
Syria and that support women and their families facing conflict situations were 
offered during a ‘Civil Society Dialog’ held on the occasion of the International 
Conference. Initiatives promoted by Auxilia, and the representation of Trama di 
Terre, both long standing IFE-EFI partner organizations, are introduced.
This section also hosts short contributions from two young lawyers who were 
welcomed by the Center for Gender Studies at the University of Padova during 
the first six months of 2016 in the context of the Euromed Feminist Initiative 
IFE-EFI project titled “Supporting the transition towards democracy in Syria 
through preparing for an engendered constitution building process”. Their goal 
was to widen their knowledge and understanding of international experiences 
and constitutional processes in relation to fundamental rights of women and 
men, and of the mechanisms available to enforce such rights enshrined in the 
law and constitution; all this with a view to contribute to a democratic transition 
in Syria through supporting a constitution building process inclusive of gender 
equality and women’s rights.
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12How international cooperation and micro‑credit allow women to take back their lives: 
the Auxilia Onlus experience in Syria
Massimiliano Fanni Canelles1
The war in Syria is not new. Since March 2011, there have been thousands of 
victims of a fratricidal conflict that sees the central government of Bashar al 
Assad opposed by many representatives of various groups, often simply referred 
to as ‘rebels’, but within whose ranks deeply different groups clash.
As always when there is a war, it is the civilians who are the first victims. Today 
in Syria, it is also difficult to get a count on the number of deaths or displaced 
or missing people. The many eyes of humanitarian organizations focused on the 
region have denounced over and again the abuses and violations of human rights 
carried out on all fronts. From rapes of women and girls to the recruitment of 
children: the situation is a real humanitarian disaster. It is impossible for people 
whose raison d’être is the respect of human rights, like us at Auxilia Onlus2, to 
stand aside. To stay silent. To look the other way.
Our work started from the need to help the victims of the conflict: the first project 
was the support of children from the Iblib region, the border area between Syria 
and Turkey, isolated and abandoned by other international organizations. After 
the first few visits, we found that, as often happens unfortunately, the worst 
injuries were those suffered by children and women. However, we also noticed 
that women could be the key to unlocking the situation and could trigger a small 
positive change.
1. Bologna University, Bologna, Italy; presidente.auxilia@gmail.com
2. Onlus stands for ‘Organizzazione Non Lucrativa di Utilità Sociale’ (not for profit organizations socially oriented); 
http://www.auxiliaitalia.it/en/foundation.html
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We are accustomed to think of women in the Arab world as submissive, 
hidden, and marginalized. Instead, especially in countries like Syria, there are 
emancipated women, armed with a strong university education, and who already 
before the war did not give up their freedom. Furthermore, the conflict may also 
stimulate those who had not had many opportunities to get out before. It is the 
women in the Middle East, even in such a fragile situation, who can take action 
to try to make a terrible situation more humane.
The action of Auxilia aims to re-establish a form of stability for the population 
living in the areas of Iblib and Atma. The cooperation activities encompass 
different fields, always placing special attention on women’s development: 
a school was created to involve children and reintegrate people who were 
working in schools before the war, a small health center was opened, becoming 
a landmark, and women were offered the opportunity to financially care for their 
families through micro-enterprise projects.
Indeed, these projects deserve further attention. How is it that in the midst of 
a terrible conflict like the one in Syria, there is room for micro-entrepreneurs? 
What can you produce with so few resources? How can products be sold and to 
whom? It is in this context that opportunities arise when international cooperation 
is structured, designed, and built in an effective way, addressing the needs of the 
area in which it operates.
In 2013, a project of female micro-entrepreneurship was started. The aim was to 
provide women from Idlib and Atma sustenance for their families through the 
production of scarves. Just scarves, an object used by many women around the 
world. What was special was the point in which they were made: a knot called 
‘love knot’, from which derived the name of the product and the project: love 
scarves. The knot symbolized the precious bond between Italian women and 
Syrian ones.
At the Women’s Center in Atma, we organized a workshop open to all, where 
we delivered 100 kg of wool, which then increased thanks to some private 
donations. The production of scarves is particularly suited to the conditions 
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of the area because they can be produced almost anywhere, including in tents 
or at home. The idea to make women economically independent in Atma was 
developed together with the Maram Foundation, a British organization that 
is our partner in Syria. The scarves produced are then imported into Italy 
and elsewhere where they are sold at charity markets and awareness events. 
The goal, which has been partially realized, is to transform a refugee camp 
into an active community where you can work, learn, and grow. In this way, 
women and Syrian children can begin, slowly, to regain possession of their 
lives.
It is not the only humanitarian project that we wanted to vigorously carry out in 
Syria and in the Turkish border. In collaboration with the Department of Human 
Sciences, University of Trieste, Maram Foundation, and with the support of 
the Autonomous Region Friuli Venezia Giulia, we have implemented another 
project, ‘Aurora in Syria’, which consisted in vocational training, conflict 
mediation, and reconciliation. Within this frame, we have promoted some 
courses in various areas: mediation, negotiation, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
sewing, and knitting. One hundred and fifty refugees of Atma, from 15 to 50 
years old and in particular widows, abused women, women with low education, 
and disabled women, have learned small jobs and strengthened themselves 
through their participation in the micro-credit activities.
Recently, our activities have increased in order to provide additional support and 
space for action for Syrian refugees. Al Bayti, which means ‘my home’, will 
soon come to life as a female youth center at the orphanage Al Bayti (Reyhanli, 
Turkey), to provide women of the area a meeting place where they can engage 
in specific activities and talk. The hope is that it becomes a space where micro-
entrepreneurship projects can be carried out thanks to the psychosocial support 
also offered to participants.
At the same time, we also started the WomenNet project, aimed at creating a 
local network and support tools for refugee women. In this case, the primary 
objective is to offer psychological support to cope with the post-traumatic stress 
disorders that are often, unfortunately, the invisible wounds of war.
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Choosing to support women is not a choice like any other, it is not the result of 
chance but a concrete response to the humanitarian emergency. Women have a 
fundamental role in every society and even more so in a community plagued 
by violence that forces them to escape far from home and to face enormous 
obstacles. Women can turn into an exciting and vital fulcrum. Most women are 
away from the logic of physical violence, less corruptible, and more sensitive 
to suffering. This way, even remotely, you can help those who need it most in a 
concrete way so that the tragedies and bombs of the past will leave room for a 
safe and bright future.
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13In search of liberty through self‑determination: women in need of international protection and 
violence against women in the contemporary 
context of globalized migrations
Giulia D’Odorico1
Trama di terre (Weave of Lands) is a feminist association2 set up in 1997 in 
Imola, in the province of Bologna (Italy), by a group of women from different 
backgrounds. Most of the founders and the members are of migrant origin. The 
main purpose of the association is to assert grassroot women’s rights while 
working for concrete political answers to the concerns of women, especially of 
those who usually remain on the sidelines of the mainstream because of their 
class, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity. The association provides a range 
of advice and support services to women, such as a cultural center, including 
a school of Italian language for foreign women, a women’s library, an anti-
violence center, including two shelters, a housing service for women in need, 
and a reception project addressed to refugee and asylum seeking women.
The association currently hosts around 30 women, and every year hundreds 
of women come across Trama in order to find support and help. Furthermore, 
the association is member of a wide network of institutions, non-governmental 
organizations, and universities, such as the Euromed Feminist Initiative, aimed 
at researching women’s rights and developing gender-sensitive programs and 
policies at local, national, and European level. Since 2014, because of the 
increasing number of women who cross the Mediterranean and then apply for 
asylum in Italy, the association has been consistently engaged in developing 
1. Trama di Terre, Imola BO, Italy; giuliadodorico@hotmail.com, info@tramaditerre.org
2. http://www.tramaditerre.org
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and implementing gender-sensitive reception measures and tools in order to 
secure the specific needs of women and girls in refugee contexts. According 
to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) statistics 
between January and June 2016, around 115,068 people arrived in Italy (almost 
the same in 2015: 116,149) (UNHCR, 2016). The number of women increased 
from 9% in January to 14% in August. The most represented nationalities 
are Nigeria (around 20%), Eritrea (13%), Sudan (7%), Gambia, Ivory Coast, 
Guinea (6%), and Somalia (5%). According to the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), in 2016 around 3,501 people lost their lives crossing the 
Mediterranean3. This number includes missing people. In particular, Trama di 
terre is concerned with improving the specific life conditions of women seeking 
international protection in Italy, taking as a starting point their own words and 
the life experiences they share with us during the hospitality. Currently, we host 
30 women and two children. They come from Cameroun, Eritrea, Mali, Nigeria, 
and Somalia. The association financially sustains two of them, since they have 
been excluded from the official aid system: it provides them with immediate 
relief through housing, health and economic support, legal aid, and psychosocial 
care along with the asylum procedure.
In addition, the association advocates with politicians, health services, training 
centers, universities, etc., to improve aid efficiency at local, regional and 
national level, and to take their specific needs into account. All the activities 
are developed with the aim of designing and implementing long-term solutions 
for an adequate refugee protection system within a specific gender-sensitive 
and cross-cultural perspective. However, we recognize that in Italy the refugee 
system is still managed according to an emergency logic, as if the refugee fluxes 
were temporary – this is not the case as the data related to migration flows 
shows very clearly. Moreover, adequate and forward-looking international 
migration policies to face the refugee crisis are completely missing, as the 
recent UN summit showed, as well as the raising of walls across Europe. As 
of today, six walls have been built across European borders; and Europe has 
spent 1.7 billion on them.
3. http://migration.iom.int/europe/
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In 2016, some international reports, such as those of Amnesty International 
(2016), the Women’s Refugee Commission (Cosgrave et al., 2016), and Save 
the Children (Coppola & Lo Iacono, 2016), described how the majority of 
women and girls seeking asylum in Europe experienced multiple forms of 
violence against women throughout their life-course, in their countries of origin, 
transit, and arrival. In Trama, we try to create a space where women may share 
their experiences of violence and find support. Most women tell us about the 
extremely gender discriminating context they were born and grew up in. Most 
of them did not have any access to formal education or sexual and reproductive 
services. Some were forced into early marriage – even several times – with older 
men, and this practice always includes marital rape and unwanted pregnancies. 
Some others were forced into military service, including different forms of 
exploitation, torture, and sexual harassment, such as in the case of Eritreans. 
Other women, like the Somali we meet, fled war contexts dominated by religious 
fundamentalist groups, where women suffered rape or extreme violence by 
official/unofficial armed groups. Many women are at risk while they are traveling 
to Europe, in particular in Libya, where they are at the mercy of traffickers, camp 
guardians, and official as well as unofficial armed groups. Most women reported 
being held in private houses and jails against their will, while others have been 
forced to work without remuneration or to prostitute themselves in the so-called 
‘connection houses’. Some women have been allowed on board to cross the 
Mediterranean only by ‘accepting’ to be raped by the traffickers. Even in the 
transit and reception centers, they can face violence. They often do not have 
the opportunity to meet experienced and gender-trained personnel in reception 
centers. In addition, there are no sex-segregated facilities and female specific-
shelters. Most of them declare that they feel at high risk of – or in some cases 
that they have experienced – sexual molestation or sexual coercion. Moreover, 
sexual and reproductive health care services are not always immediately 
accessible. This could prevent the transmission of Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus (HIV) and sexually transmitted infections or offer access to safe and legal 
abortion, especially if they suffered rape during the journey. 
One of the main issues that is questioning our daily work with women is the 
trafficking and sexual exploitation of many women asylum seekers. Most of 
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them are of Nigerian origin. Between January and June 2016, around 3,529 
women of Nigerian origin arrived in Sicily crossing the Mediterranean from 
North Africa. We can presume that most of them experienced trafficking or 
various forms of exploitation4. Later, in case sexual exploitation happens 
in Italy, women risk facing serious repercussions if they denounce their 
traffickers, who may have access to the existing special program for victims 
of trafficking (ex Art.18 Dlgs 286/98 ed ex Art.13 L. 228/2003). According to 
Save the Children (Coppola & Lo Iacono, 2016), in Italy, around 1,225 women 
and girls entered this program. Note that 80% of victims are of Nigerian origin. 
Many others have access to reception measures within the asylum system. Trama 
is hosting six Nigerian women aged between 19 and 27. All of them have been 
trafficked and many have been forced into prostitution in Libya. They are still at 
risk of sexual exploitation in Italy and across Europe. This situation challenges 
our practices of reception, especially in terms of women’s safety and legal 
support. To conclude, contemporary migration flows challenge our daily work 
as well as the Italian refugee protection system, while encouraging us to develop 
adequate measures, tools, and long-term aid policies, with a specific focus on the 
situation of women and young girls and the different forms of violence they may 
suffer. We urge the asylum system to recognize women the right to claim asylum 
based on Violence-Against-Women (VAW), as well as to develop more policies 
to effectively protect the rights of women seeking asylum. 
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14Learning about gender policies: my experience at the University of Padova
Roula Baghdadi1
The course Gender Politics and the Welfare State in the European Union, offered 
by Prof. Lorenza Perini at the Department of Law, Politics, and International 
Studies, was valuable for me in many aspects. Since the beginning of the course, 
I started to reconsider my knowledge and information about women’s rights 
and gender equality. I learned how important it is for defenders of women’s 
rights to be fully informed and knowledgeable about the equality that needs to be 
applied, and how gender equality relates to the constitution, laws, social systems, 
economics, and security. All too often, this formally recognized equality in many 
European constitutions and laws does not actually influence women’s lives in 
these communities. Sometimes the society finds ways to violate this equality, 
and the law allows that to happen. Perhaps we are still living in a patriarchal 
society, and achieving real equality needs certain conditions beforehand. 
After this course, I started to analyze and consider facts and information from a 
better informed and more comprehensive gender perspective. As for the research 
work we were invited to carry out as part of our commitment, it was one of the 
most important components of this course. I developed my own research around 
the theme Women’s Human Rights, and this took about three months. In that 
context, I tried to explain how important it is to focus on the fact that women’s 
rights are an indispensable part of human rights, and an international issue 
that is beyond the cultural and religious practices and beliefs of any particular 
community. I would like to mention something related to my Syrian community 
in this regard: that all Syrian political parties view women rights as a secondary 
issue. At the same time, unfortunately, even some human rights defenders in 
Syria hold a relatively similar attitude. I am currently preparing research about 
1. Equal Citizenship Center, Damascus, Syria; rolla.bg1981@gmail.com
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women’s rights under authoritarian regimes, taking the Syrian regime as an 
example to further explore the challenges related to fostering gender equality in 
conflict and non-democratic situations.
The Interdepartmental Center for Gender Studies at the University of Padova 
offered me the opportunity to attend several conferences, where I shared my 
knowledge and experiences with other activists and feminists from Brazil, 
Turkey, Argentina, Ecuador, Bangladesh, and Italy. 
Furthermore, during my stay in Italy, for five months, I traveled around the country 
and met many generous and open-minded activists and members of political 
parties. I learned a lot about Italian culture, history, politics, and economy; about 
the challenges the Italian women face, and how they fight injustice in their 
own communities. As a Syrian, in the past I did not have many opportunities to 
attend such workshops and conferences because of visa issues. Fortunately, after 
getting an Italian visa, I was allowed to travel to Berlin, Brussels, Moscow, and 
Paris, where I met unique people and had great experiences.
Finally, I would like to thank Initiative Féministe Euromed - Euromed Feminist 
Initiative (IFE-EFI) and Equal citizenship center for offering this scholarship 
and opportunity to me; and to thank the Center for Gender Studies in Padova 
which gave me the opportunity of attending this course. Now, I have rejoined my 
advocacy group in Syria – Equal Citizenship Center (ECC) – and I am enrolled 
in a Master degree in International Law at Beirut Arab University (BAU). I am 
currently preparing my thesis on “The Legal Framework of Sexual Violence 
Against Woman in Syria” and I am planning on graduating in summer 2018. 
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15Women’s role in peace processes: reflections from my internship experience
Yousef Razouk1
During our internship to Padova we attended several courses, offered in English, 
about women’s human rights and gender politics, the European Union (EU), and 
human rights and international justice.
With regard to women’s human rights, such courses provided “theoretical, 
conceptual and methodological analysis of the issues that the UN has 
increasingly considered as part of the political agenda of human rights in relation 
to the status of women and decision making; [a conceptualization] that led to the 
consolidation of certain guidelines [and] policies”2, and informed our analysis of 
the Convention of the Elimination of all kinds of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW).
For what concerns European law and human rights, the courses we attended 
provided important knowledge of the fundamental texts of EU Laws (particularly 
the EU Charter of fundamental rights).
While in relation to gender politics and the welfare state in the EU, we studied the 
historical development of the concept of gender, and the subsequent processes 
and experiences that had been feeding the knowledge of gender equality; also, we 
have come to appreciate the mechanisms about how to get access to a gendered 
mentality and perspective.
We studied the case of reproductive rights: from acknowledging international 
mobilizations raising their voices to get access to the right to abortion, to 
1. Equal Citizenship Center, Damascus, Syria; you.razouk@gmail.com
2. http://en.didattica.unipd.it/off/2017/LM/EP/EP1980/000ZZ/EPP3050113/N0
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abortion being considered a controversial issue to the degree that we have 
not heard of any electoral candidate discuss the right to abortion during his/
her electoral campaign. Also, analyzing international statistics related to the 
abortion, I have noticed that the countries which are intensively mixed with 
the religious socio-cultural background are extremely influenced by these 
religious beliefs to the degree of considering the very discussion of the topic 
a taboo.
Finally, for what concerns international justice and human rights, we critically 
investigated the trajectory of the evolution of the recognition and promotion of 
social rights in Europe, considering in particular the interactions and intersections 
between the EU and the Council of Europe. 
I also took a two module course that lasted six days (18-23 April 2016) and 
focused on training for international electoral observers. The aim of the training 
was to deepen and enhance our theoretical and practical knowledge about the 
process of observing elections and to provide relevant tools and skills to perform 
the role in diverse situations.
While in Padova, I also attended several conferences and events, which were 
extremely useful to share my own experience and getting more details about 
other countries’ realities and situations. 
In the context of the course Gender Politics and the Welfare State in the European 
Union, offered by Prof. Lorenza Perini at the Department of Law, Politics and 
International Studies, I made a presentation about ‘Gender and Elections’ as an 
introduction to the importance of gender parity and women’s participation in 
public life. There I discussed two quota types, compulsory and voluntary, and 
linked them to the electoral systems. Finally, I presented non-quota measures 
to support women’s contributions in political life. All this stressing the crucial 
role of political parties as gatekeepers in the sharing of relevant and decision-
making positions. In that presentation, I reported, as an example, the fact that 
in Syria the percentage of female parliaments in the legislature is 13% and it is 
a low percentage if related to the fact that the women comprise approximately 
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half the population in Syria3. So, it would be important to allocate a compulsory 
quota for women as ‘reserved seats’, no less than 40%, and it is better to give 
constitutional protection to this measure. 
Besides acknowledging the importance of this internship for my personal and 
professional carrier, in this context I would also like to make some remarks on 
women’s roles in peace processes. We should always keep in mind that women 
are actually crucial stakeholders in peace building and democratic reform, and 
yet they are too sidelined because of the entrenched gender based discrimination 
(DPI, 2012, p. 6); that they protect the coherence of their families despite the 
tragic impact of conflicts on their domestic and social lives, and that they struggle 
to maintain a measure of stability during the displacement. Therefore, we should 
never deny women’s immense capacities to exceed the sadness, and to build 
new hopes in the aim of securing safe futures for their families and communities 
(DPI, 2012, pp. 11-12). 
In the end, I believe that, when it happens, engaging women in the resolutions 
of conflict has led to more positive and lasting outcomes, which are increasing 
the inclusivity, increasing the legitimacy of the process by making it more 
representative and reflective of the wider affected population and future society, 
and strengthening the ability to prioritize sustainable stability, democratic 
process, and peacemaking over the sharing of power and distributing political 
positions (DPI, 2012, pp. 30-31).
We all know that talking about involving women and gender considerations 
in peace processes is much easier than implementing it in reality: despite 
international standards that have led to radical changes in language and in the 
approach of the international community, little results have yet been seen in 
practice (DPI, 2012, p. 33).
3. World bank data https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS?locations=SY&view=chart. However, it 
is worth noting that according to the official website of the Syrian parliament, the percentage is approximately (11.6%) 
http://www.parliament.gov.sy/arabic/index.php?node=212#
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All I have said also relates to women’s roles in peace processes in the Syrian 
situation: Syrian women – both those who have stayed inside the country and 
those who were forced to flee because of the war – are struggling for the survival 
of their families and to protect their children. Yet, even now, they are still under-
represented at all levels and at all stages of the peace process. It would be time, 
for all parties in the Syrian conflict, external and internal, to stop marginalizing 
the role of Syrian women, because without them sustainable stability and 
democratic life would be extremely difficult to achieve. 
Finally, I want to conclude this short note by mentioning that studying 
comparative politics and policies, and adopting a comparative approach, has 
been so important in providing me with new ideas about possible methods and 
solutions to be applied in Syria; at the same time, it is really important to mention 
that there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution, as each society and conflict has its own 
unique features (DPI, 2012, p. 10).
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